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Over the last decade, the number of insider threat cases has increased by 500%. 
However, although this costs the world a great deal, very little academic research has 
been devoted to investigating the problem. One of the most recent security violations 
was committed by Edward Snowden in June–July 2013. Snowden, an American 
infrastructure analyst, leaked some of the National Security Agency’s (NSA) top-
secrets. In one of the worst NSA security breaches in United States history, 
Snowden, who was a technical contractor at NSA, disclosed highly critical 
information. . This incident illustrates that the prospect of insider threats is still a real 
and present danger threatening the security of organisations and indeed nations 
around the world; this study investigates the factors that influence insider threat 
behaviour and develops a holistic view of insider threat behaviour and ways to 
manage it. 
 
This research adopts an Explanatory Mixed Methods design approach for the 
research process. Firstly, the researcher collects the quantitative data and then the 
qualitative data is collected in two sequential phases. In the first phase of this study, 
the holistic insider threat model is developed; in the second phase, best practices are 
developed to manage the threat.  
 
In the first phase, the literature review identified the need for a holistic approach to 
address all insider threat factors.  After it was established that no holistic model 
exists that adequately addresses the issue of insider threat behaviour, a candidate 
holistic insider threat model was developed to incorporate all the factors that had 
been identified in the literature. The candidate model was then evaluated, via a 
survey, by 100 security specialists. The collected data were analysed using the 
Exploratory Factor Analysis technique and the candidate model was modified based 
on the results, leading to a further eight factors being included in the enhanced 




The quantitative data collection stage was followed by the qualitative stage, the aims 
of which were twofold: to evaluate the enhanced model, and to gather information 
about ways to manage each factor in the model. The data were collected from 11 
Chief Information Security Officers (CISOs). The semi-structured interview data 
were analysed using a two-stage content analysis technique. The results from the 
interviews were taken into account for the final holistic insider threat model. Finally, 
in the second phase a set of best practices were developed to manage the factors in 
the final holistic insider threat model.  
 
This study makes both theoretical and practical contributions. The theoretical 
contribution lies in the holistic conceptual insider threat model that successfully 
combines a range of factors that may influence the insider to behave inappropriately 
in terms of an organisation’s security. These factors were derived from three sources: 
academic research, published legal cases and IT industry publications. Regarding its 
practical contribution, the findings of this study, especially the best practices, will 
assist organisations to better manage the insider threat behaviour, thereby mitigating 
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 CHAPTER ONE:    1
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1   Background  
Any security system will have to rely on its operators even if it is designed and 
implemented in a perfect manner. Organisations face ongoing threats from external 
and internal attacks (Cappelli, Moore, and Trzeciak 2012; Willison and Warkentin 
2013; Guo 2013; Zafar 2013). Insider attacks, which have been recognised as a 
potential security problem since the 1980s (Chinchani et al. 2005), are associated 
with legitimate users who abuse their privileges and can easily cause significant 
damage or loss to an organisation (Cappelli, Moore, and Trzeciak 2012; Sasaki 2011; 
Sarkar 2010; Liu, Wang, and Camp 2009; Martinez-Moyano et al. 2008b). Almost 
all organisations and sectors are currently faced with the problem of insider threats to 
vital computer assets (Willison and Warkentin 2013). Internal incidents can cause 
more than just financial losses; the costs can also include loss of clients and damage 
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Carnegie Mellon University has been conducting a variety of research projects on 
insider threats. One of the significant results achieved is the confirmation of the fact 
that insider attacks are substantial and have occurred across all organisational 
sectors, frequently causing potential harm to the affected organisations. Cases 
included a mixture of types, from low-tech attacks, such as fraud or theft of 
intellectual proprietary, to highly sophisticated technical crimes which damage the 
organisation’s infrastructure; damages include financial or client loss and 
organisation’s reputation (CERT 2006). 
 
The impact from insider attacks can be shocking, according to a CERT study on 
organised insider threat crime; the average costs of these crimes exceed $3M, with 
some cases resulting in $50M in losses (King 2012). Moreover, according to the 
2005 E-Crime Watch Survey
 
conducted by CERT and CSO Magazine, one complex 
financial fraud case caused by an insider resulted in losses of around $700 million. 
Another incident resulted in losses of $10 million and the lay-off of eighty 
employees (CERT 2006). Cybercrime appears as one of the most important 
challenges to law enforcement as computer crime causes many problems to daily 
business operations and information. According to an Australian computer crime and 
security survey, computer fraud cost nearly $1,000,000 between 2005 and 2006, 
which caused the biggest financial loss to Australian businesses since 2003 (Mubarak 
and Slay 2010). A Computer Crime and Security Survey conducted in 2008 found 
that the average financial loss to an organisation as a result of fraud was US 
$500,000 per year (Mubarak and Slay 2010).  
 
Problems related to security and insider threat issues are not restricted to specific 
organisations; almost all organisations face the same problems. Therefore, a 
comprehensive model needs to be adopted to minimize the insider threat problem by 
controlling the factors which assist the insiders to behave inappropriately towards 
both the organisations and their computer systems. Such a model should place equal 
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Although most organisations pay great attention to outsider attacks and expend 
significant efforts in securing information systems, actually very few take an 
efficient approach to minimizing insider attack (Hu and Panda 2009). The insider 
threat is one of the most serious problems affecting security systems and one that is 
difficult to overcome (Bishop et al. 2008). The threat is  associated with the 
authorised users who misuse their access and trust to cause significant damage to an 
organisation (Martinez-Moyano et al. 2008b). Trusted employees have the most 
potential to harm the organisation by damaging the information or stability of the 
operation system (Ho 2008).  Understanding employee actions is a principal goal for 
insider threat protection and detection. The differences between “acceptable normal" 
and “unacceptable abnormal" employee behaviour varies among organisations. 
Understanding the special restrictions and concerns affecting an organisation's 
security policy could help to determine the inappropriate behaviour of the employees 
(Hu, Bradford, and Liu 2006). Although most employees can pose a potential insider 
threat in some form, not all insiders pose insider threats; in fact, most employees can 
be trusted to protect the information of the organisation. Even though most of the 
existing literature refers to the insider as malicious in insider threat researches (Wood 
2000), not all insider cases of abuse of organisations’ systems, networks or 
information are based on malicious intents. Insider threats can also arise by accident 
(Magklaras and Furnell 2002; Carroll 2006).     
 
Unintentional insider threat could be the result of either accidental deletion or policy 
violation. Accidental deletion occurs when an authorised employee accidentally 
accesses sensitive information and by mistake changes or erases this information. 
Unintentional policy violation is not malicious security policy circumvention. A 
good example of this is when an employee creates an unauthorised copy of sensitive 
data in order to take work home. This sensitive data now exists in a storage device 
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One challenge of the insider threat is how to discriminate between authorised and 
unauthorised actions. Once an authorised employee has access to internal resources, 
it could be difficult to recognize activities that are malicious. This is particularly 
difficult in the case of an outsourced employee or contractor who has been granted 
some access to complete a job. Furthermore, the increase in employee turnover and 
changing roles adds more complexity to the overall problem (Bhilare, Ramani, and 
Tanwani 2009). 
 
According to Hayden (1999), some computer investigators have classified the 
insiders into four classes, namely: traitors, who have a malicious intention to harm or 
destroy their organisation; zealots, who believe that the organisation is being badly 
run; browsers, who are curious to know everything even if it causes damage to the 
organisation; and the well-intentioned, who are characterized by a lack of concern 
and who damage the organisation by downloading untrustworthy documents and/or 
by not activating their virus protection software. 
 
Regardless of the category to which insiders belong, they have a significant 
advantage over externals in the harm they can cause an organisation. Insiders can 
avoid physical (electronic building access systems) and technical (firewalls, intrusion 
detection systems) security measures designed to prevent attacks (Besnard and Arief 
2004).  Moreover, insiders are aware of the vulnerabilities of their organisation’s 
policies and procedures and of the technology it uses (CERT 2009).  Schultz (2002) 
confirms that it is difficult to predict or prevent insider attacks because the offenders 
are authorised  employees. 
1.2   Insider Definitions 
According to Pfleeger et al. (2010), the concept of “insider” represents assumptions 
about who is under consideration, the trust level the insider had, the insider 
knowledge about the organisation’s systems, and the system’s perimeter. The 
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do not offer a comprehensive definition of an insider.  For example, a RAND Corp. 
report defines an insider as “an already trusted person with access to sensitive 
information and information systems” (Brackney and Anderson 2004, xi),  while on 
another position it defines the insider as “someone with access, privilege, or 
knowledge of information systems and services” (Brackney and Anderson 2004, 10). 
Ignoring the ‘trusted person’ in the first definition, this second definition assumes the 
insider is trusted not to abuse the information of the system. In fact who is 
considered as an insider might be different among organisations (Predd et al. 2008). 
According to Bishop (2005, 75), an insider is “someone with access, privilege, or 
knowledge of information systems and services”. And also “Anyone operating inside 
the security perimeter”. Chinchani et al. (cited in Bishop et al. 2008, 9) define 
insiders as “legitimate users who abuse their privileges, and given their familiarity 
and proximity to the computational environment, can easily cause significant 
damage or losses”.  Another definition by Butts, Mills, and Baldwin (2005, 413) 
states that an “insider is any individual who has been granted any level of trust in an 
information system”. Althebyan and Panda (2007, 240) define the insider as an 
“individual who has the knowledge of the organisation's information system 
structure to which he/she has authorised  access and who knows the underlying 
network topologies of the organisation's information system”. According to Carroll 
(2006, 156), “insider is any persons who have access to an organisations 
information including people such as contractors, temporary employees and the 
like”. Other definitions simply include anyone operating inside the security perimeter 
(Patzakis 2003), ignoring factors such as trust and knowledge of the systems. Such 
different definitions exclude insiders who are not trusted, which results in a binary 
distinction whereby a person is either an insider or not an insider. Blackwell (2009) 
define an insider “ as one who has legitimate access to an organisation , its systems, 
information or other resources”. The final definition of the insider was offered by 
Gabrielson (2006, 1) who regards the insider as “any entity (person, system, or code) 
authorised  by command and control elements to access network, system, or data”. 
Each definition could be suitable for a particular organisation, situation, or concern. 
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organisation’s needs, it is fundamental to have a general preliminary point for 
considering insiders and addressing their inappropriate behaviours. The basic 
definition should be common and free from assumptions about system’s perimeter 
and the nature of authorised access. Therefore, Pfleeger et al. (2010, 170) propose a 
common insider definition they define the insider as “A person with legitimate 
access to an organisation ’s computers and networks”. 
1.2.1 Insider Taxonomy  
Many researchers classify insiders according to different categories based on role or 
level of access. This section describes insider classification in more detail.  
 
The first attempt to categorize insider abuse of organisation systems was made by 
Anderson (1980). He describes three types of malicious insiders namely: 
masqueraders, misfeasors and clandestine users. Masqueraders are insiders with full 
access to the computer system who exploit its weakness in order to obtain the 
identity of another authorised employee. Misfeasors are insiders who misuse their 
authorised access so as to abuse the system.  Finally, the clandestine insider is the 
one using his authorised access to avoid audit, control and access resource 
mechanisms in a particular computer system.  
 
Magklaras and Furnell (2002) established three classifications of insiders: system 
masters, advanced users and application users. 
 System masters: includes all authorised employees such as network 
administrators with full administrative privileges access to most of the 
organisation’s resources. As a result of their increased level of access and 
trust, this category of authorised employees presents a significant threat to the 
organisation’s resources and infrastructure. 
 Advanced users: includes all authorised employees who have a significant 
knowledge about the organisation’s internal process and system. This category 
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previous system masters and the current shift operator. Even if they do not 
have a high level of access to the organisation’s system, they are aware of any 
system vulnerability.  
 Application users: this category includes all remaining authorised employees 
in the organisation who use standard applications, such as World-Wide-Web 
(WWW) browsing, email and a database of clients. Generally, they have only 
the access required for them to run their application without any extra access 
to system resources. These employees can misuse the application to which 
they have access. 
 
Furthermore, Cole and Ring (2005) categorise insiders according to their levels of 
access; they established four categories as follows: 
 Pure insider: is an employee with all the privileges and access associated with 
being employed by the organisation. In general, s/he has access to the 
facilities, devices and networks. This category of insider can cause great harm 
since they have almost all the access they need. An elevated pure insider is an 
employee who has additional privileged access, such as system administrators 
who are given greater access, such as route access to the network, in order to 
do their jobs. Nevertheless, in some cases, these employees are given greater 
access than is actually required. In general, when organisations attempt to 
minimize the insider threat risk, they start to limit the access of the elevated 
pure insider. Organisations should give their employees only the amount of 
access they require to carry out their jobs, and remove the additional access 
that they do not need.  
 Insider associate:  is an employee such as a contractor, guard or cleaner with 
limited authorised access. This category usually has limited access, the 
insider having physical access to the facility and building but not privileged 
access to the network. Some employees leave sensitive data on their desks 
and lock their office doors, although locking a door actually does not protect 
the data. Employees must remember that there are other individuals such as 






~ 8 ~ 
therefore, sensitive data must always be well secured. User awareness and 
control of access are required to minimize the harm caused by an insider 
associate. Increasing awareness is supposed to change employees’ behaviour, 
whereas training is intended to teach employees new skills. Many employees 
believe that their building and office are well secured and they can leave 
systems logged in and sensitive information lying about without any concern. 
User awareness sessions can assist employees to understand that locks do 
little to secure information. All employees should recognize that many people 
could have potential access and that they must consistently and adequately 
secure sensitive information and log out from the systems before they leave.  
 
Pure insiders and insider associates have an authorised reason to access the 
organisation’s recourses. The following two categories of insider do not. 
 
 Insider affiliate: is a partner or friend who uses the employee’s identification 
to obtain access. The most damaging insider affiliate is an individual who 
directly acts as an employee using the employee’s ID. For instance, the 
partner of an employee may need to browse the Web and borrows the 
employee’s laptop to do so. Using the employee’s user ID and password, he 
not only can log on and access the internet, but also he can access sensitive 
information. Moreover, some employees give their access card for the 
building and PIN number to their partner to pick up some sensitive papers 
from the office. To avoid insider affiliates, the best measure is to adopt 
consistent policies and procedures. Organisations should have written 
policies, procedures and regulations which all employees should read and 
sign off that they understand them. After that, any violation or ignoring of 
policy can be considered as a deliberate action on the part of an employee. 
 Outside affiliate: is an untrusted outsider who exploits open access in order to 
use an organisation’s resources. A good example is wireless access - an 
organisation sets up an unsecured wireless access point which allows an 
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unlocked with no access controls and allowing anybody to get in. Even if the 
outside affiliate threat seems obvious, it is frequently ignored by some 
organisations. For protection against the outside affiliate, organisations need 
to implement an appropriate access control protocol for all sorts of access, 
including logical and physical access. 
1.3   Insider Threat Definitions 
Most of the existing definitions focus on the insider’s abuse of trust or access rather 
than on the consequential risk to the organisation. Moreover, some definitions 
suggest that the threat is always malicious while others include accidental behaviour. 
 
Einwechter (cited in Pfleeger et al. 2010, 170) defines the insider threat as “someone 
entrusted with authorised  access who manipulates system access to exploit it”. 
Brackney and Anderson (2004, xi) define the insider threats as “malevolent (or 
possibly inadvertent) actions by an already trusted person with access to sensitive 
information and information systems”. Carroll (2006, 1):“Insider threats can be 
either intentional or unintentional”. Anderson et al. (2000, 36): “Any authorised  
user who performs unauthorised  actions that result in loss of control of 
computational assets”. Schultz and Shumway (2001, 189) describe the insider threat 
as “the intentional misuse of computer systems by users who are authorised  to 
access those systems and networks”. According to Blackwell (2009), insider threat is 
“a risk that an insider can misuse their access or knowledge to cause harm to the 
organisation”. The problem of insider threat definition is further complicated 
because the boundary is not clear-cut, as someone inside it naturally is an insider. 
This is further complicated by the increased use of outsourced and contract 
employees. Even after defining the boundary of the insider threat, many definitions 
do not address physical boundaries, and instead focus mainly on the technology 
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According to Bishop et al. (2008) handling the insiders rather than defining the 
problem is another complication in understanding the concept of insider threats. This 
point has been addressed by many studies, although they do not adequately describe 
the problem. Another definition given by Keeney et al. (2005b, 10) states that 
“insider threats are those executed by a current or former employee or contractor 
that intentionally exceeds or misuses an authorised  level of access to networks, 
systems, data, or resources to harm individuals and/or an organisation”. These 
definitions however, while addressing the cyber insiders, do not consider social 
insiders. This definition characterises the insider as an entity which includes not only 
people but also systems and code, which is very important as no other definitions 
have addressed these elements. Pfleeger et al. (2010) define the insider threat as the 
insider’s undesirable or inappropriate action which poses a risk to an organisation’s 
data, processes, or resources.  
 
Establishing a definition is important if researchers are to find an effective means of 
minimizing the insider threat problem. Without a comprehensive definition of the 
insider threat, each researcher defines it according to his/her own assumptions and 
perspective, which may lead to complications if their model is used for other 
applications. Therefore, a comprehensive definition of insider threat will allow 
flexible movement and translation between several domains under one model and 
thus assist in reducing the insider threat problem.  
 
This research uses this definition of insider threat: “the potential harm posed by any 
trusted entity with inside access to the organisation” (Munshi, Dell, and Armstrong 
2012, 2402). Each trusted entity will have a different level of trust assigned that is 
appropriate to their position and role. Each trusted person will be influenced by 
different factors, thus resulting in different behaviour. Insider behaviour refers to 
human attempts to obtain self-satisfaction. According to Calandrino, McKinney, and 
Sheldon (2007, 1) “Undesirable insider behaviour involves any wilful or negligent 
misuse of resources in an organisation’s information systems”. This research will 
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also controlled and guided by organisational policies, procedures, security 
restrictions, as well as external factors such as laws.  
1.4   Insider Behaviour  
Most information security specialists suggest that information security within 
organisations can be made more effective by encouraging good employee behaviours 
and limiting bad employee behaviours (Schultz 2002; Stanton et al. 2005; Möller et 
al. 2011). The crucial success of information security in any organisation relies on 
suitable end-user behaviours (Rhee, Kim, and Ryu 2009). Insider threat “refers to 
intentionally disruptive, unethical, or illegal behaviour enacted by individuals who 
possess substantial internal access to the organisation ’s information assets” 
(Stanton et al. 2005, 125). Due to the significance of employees’ security-related 
behaviours, studying the different types of behaviour that employees engage in could 
assist managers, auditors and information technologists to measure and influence 
employee behaviour (Stanton et al. 2005).  
 
Stanton et al.(2005) conducted a research study to illustrate the helpful and harmful 
behaviours that information technology employees perform within organisations, 
which might influence the information security. They determined six categories of 
security behaviour, focusing on two factors: intentionality and technical expertise. 
The intentionality factor relates to whether the behaviour is intentionally malicious, 
intentionally beneficial, or in between. The technical expertise factor focuses on the 
level of computer or information technology knowledge and skill that the users 
require in order to execute the behaviour. Table 2.2 shows the six categories arranged 
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Table 1.1: Two-factor taxonomy of security behaviours  
adapted from (Stanton et al. 2005, 126). 
Expertise Intentions Title Description 
High Malicious Intentional 
destruction 
Behaviour requires technical expertise together with a 
strong intention to do harm to the organisation’s IT 
and resources. Example: employee breaks into an 
employer’s protected files in order to steal a trade 
secret. 
Low Malicious Detrimental 
misuse 
Behaviour requires minimal technical expertise but 
nonetheless includes intention to do harm through 
annoyance, harassment, rule breaking, etc. Example: 
using company email for SPAM messages marketing a 
sideline business. 
High Neutral Dangerous 
tinkering 
Behaviour requires technical expertise but no clear 
intention to do harm to the organisation’s IT and 
resources. Example: employee configures a wireless 
gateway that inadvertently allows wireless access to 
the company’s network by people in passing cars. 
Low Neutral Naïve 
 mistakes 
Behaviour requires minimal technical expertise and no 
clear intention to do harm to the organisation’s 
information technology and resources. Example: 
choosing a bad password such as ‘‘password.’’ 
High Beneficial Aware 
assurance 
Behaviour requires technical expertise together with a 
strong intention to do good by preserving and 
protecting the organisation’s information technology 
and resources. 
Example: recognizing the presence of a backdoor 
program through careful observation of own PC. 
Low Beneficial Basic 
hygiene 
Behaviour requires no technical expertise but includes 
clear intention to preserve and protect the 
organisation’s IT and resources. Example: a trained 
and aware employee resists an attempt at social 
engineering by refusing to reveal her password to a 
caller claiming to be from computer services. 
 
1.4.1   Insider Attack Classification 
This section discusses several classifications of the insider attacks that have been 
identified in the previous literature.  
 
In the literature, one finds several classifications of insider attacks. Usually, 
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malicious intents they are ready to pose a risk to the organisations by following a 
specific process and engaging in various activities to achieve their targets (Wood 
2000). To mount a successful attack, the insider generally follows an essential 
process: insiders are motivated to attack, they identify their goals, plan their attack 
and finally launch the attack. 
 Insider motivated to attack: could be either the results of the insider’s 
discontent, or somebody employed by either an internal or external party to 
harm the organisation. 
  Insider identifies target: Either the insider spots the target as a means to fulfil 
a personal need, or an outsider suggests a target to the insider. 
 Insider plans operation: The insiders perform some investigation of their 
target. They plan the attack and might even employ somebody else to assist 
them in carrying out the attack.  
 Insiders launch the attack: Once the attack has been launched by the insider, 
subsequent actions are not obvious. Several possibilities include: damage 
assessment, escape in a hurry, escape when suitable, or launch the attack 
again until they are either successful or caught. 
 
According to Schultz (2002), there are several indicators that can point to future 
malicious insider attacks. These include: 
 Deliberate markers: insiders sometimes leave deliberate markers to make a 
“statement”, which can differ in scale and obviousness. 
 Meaningful errors: insiders can make several errors in the process of 
preparing for or executing the attacks. These mistakes could have been saved 
even if the insiders try to erase related evidence. 
 Correlated usage patterns: are patterns of computer usage that are consistent 
from one system to another. An insider can use a command to search on 
many systems for records with particular words in them. 
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 Personality traits: This indicator refers to the psychological profile of the 
offenders. Some personality factors such as introversion, stress handling 
capability and frustration could be used in predicting insider attacks. 
 
Butts, Mills, and Baldwin (2005) mention four types of actions that malicious 
insiders could execute: 
 Alteration: a malicious insider modifies an organisation’s information, or 
another employee accesses it in an unauthorised manner.  
 Elevation: a malicious insider gains unauthorised access to the system, for 
instance when someone tries to get administrative privileges. This could be 
achieved by social engineering.  
 Distribution: a malicious insider transfers confidential information to 
someone who is not supposed to have this information. The insider transfers 
secure information to an unauthorised individual; this happens when the 
insider has appropriate access to the system and the need to know. 
  Snooping:  a malicious insider obtains unauthorised information about a 
user or object. This action can occur when a malicious insider is given 
authorization by the system but this will violate the organisation’s policy. 
 
Furthermore, Bellovin (2008) suggest that there are three different types of attack: 
misuse of access, defence bypass, and access control failure. 
 Misuse of Access: Misuse of privileges access is considered to be probably 
the most difficult type of attack to detect or prevent. Usually, insiders use 
their authorised access rights to perform an authorised task. For instance, 
university professors can request that marks be changed after the end of the 
semester. Normally, this occurs in order to correct clerical errors. However, if 
professors request a change to the grades in response to a bribe, then this 
would constitute insider misbehaviour. It is very difficult to stop or spot 
abuse by insiders only through technical means. 
  Defence Bypass: Insiders normally have a main advantage over outsiders 
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firewalls which numerous organisations depend upon as a component of their 
cyber security. Typically, insiders are not blocked by the firewall because 
they are inside it, and therefore out of it range. Likewise, insiders normally 
have some kind of login access to an organisation’s computer systems which 
allows them to perform local attacks rather than network attacks. It is hard to 
detect this attack by means of only technical defences. Insiders are inside the 
organisation and therefore have better opportunities to carry out 
misbehaviour. 
  Access Control Failure: By contrast, access control failures are considered to 
be a technical issue. The ideal solution is to correct the problem. Insider 
attack detection is often more complex, particularly when a configuration 
error occurs, because by definition the system is not declining inappropriate 
access requests. Good solutions require looking for misbehaviour by other 
applications. 
 
Another classification is given by Blackwell (2009) and Serdiouk (2007) who 
suggest three classes of insider attacks based on their actions: sabotage, fraud and 
theft. These attacks cause unwelcome consequences by violating the basic security 
services of integrity, confidentiality and availability. Moreover, problems can also 
occur as a result of unintended failures or external attacks which are facilitated by 
internal weaknesses. These three types of attack are detailed as follows: 
 Sabotage: can cause loss of availability and integrity of the targeted resources 
with potential significant impacts on the organisation’s ability to execute its 
usual business activities. 
 Fraud: can cause major financial losses to the organisation since illegal 
transactions are carried out.  
 Theft: includes intellectual property, logical assets (e.g. Information) and 
physical assets (e.g. equipment). The leaking or theft of confidential 
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Likewise, the third CERT guide to insider threats classifies an insider attack 
according to the purpose of the attack, which can be one of three: sabotage, financial 
gain or business advantage (CERT 2009). 
 
Other researchers classify the insider actions that cause direct or indirect threats to 
organisational assets into two categories (Willison and Warkentin 2013; Crossler et 
al. 2013): 
 Intentional (deviant behaviour): includes sabotage, theft, and industrial 
espionage  
 Unintentional (misbehaviour): includes using an organisation’s computers to 
browse non-work related Websites, posting secure information onto untrusted 
Websites by accident, or carelessly opening phishing links on emails and 
Websites 
  
According to Cole and Ring (2005), all types of attacks carried out by an insider 
produce significant damage and financial loss to the organisation. 
 
The next section will discuss the problems posed by insiders, comparing the impacts 
of their activities with those of external attackers and will also present statistics 
which reflect the current problem.  
1.5    Purpose of the Study and Research Questions  
The problem of insider threat has become a major issue in the security field as many 
challenges have arisen and are increasing. “The challenges of preventing, detecting, 
and responding to insider threats, is among the most difficult facing security 
researchers and professionals today” (Huth et al. 2013, 1).  According to Huth et al. 
(2013, 1) there is no definitive description of insider threat problems and solutions: 
“one of the most important elements in any field of research is the common 
vernacular researchers use to describe problems and solutions. Unfortunately, 
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Most of the researches relating to insider threat cover the problem from the 
researcher’s perspective to match his/her situation which focuses on one primary 
problem as either a technical or human issue. The models used in such research may 
be suitable for their particular case but not for other cases covering different aspects. 
Moreover, most of the models focus largely on technical issues without considering 
the behavioural aspects. A recent study however, indicated that successful protection 
against insider threats relies on both technical and behavioural solutions (Martinez-
Moyano et al. 2008a).  
 
A holistic approach is essential to address the whole picture of the insider threat 
problem and provide further solutions as stated by Huth et al. (2013, 2) “an 
approach is necessary to provide holistic solutions to the problem of insider 
threats”.  There is a need for a holistic approach in order to understand the nature 
and breadth of the insider threat within the context of the organisational structure, its 
goals, activities, threats, risks and vulnerabilities. To be beneficial, such a holistic 
model would need to consider character, social, technical and organisational factors. 
Research is needed to develop such a holistic conceptual model, encapsulating a 
broader perspective of the insider situation that more closely reflects empirical 
experience. 
 
The purpose of this study is to develop a holistic model that includes all factors that 
influence the insider to behave inappropriately, and ways to manage these factors. It 
will examine the threat posed by any insider within the organisation and includes 
current, former or contractors employees. The primary research questions of this 
study are as follows: 
 
RQ1: What are the factors that influence the insider to behave 
inappropriately with regard to security? 
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1.6    Outline of the Thesis  
This section provides an overview of the thesis structure. The thesis has eight 
chapters. Chapter One (this chapter) briefly discusses the background of the study, 
the research problem and the purpose of the study. The focus of the study and the 
research questions research are presented.  
 
Chapter Two reviews the literature related to the insider threat behaviour from three 
different sources: academic research, IT industry publications and published reported 
incidents. The scope of the literature search and selection criteria is justified, and the 
risk of insider threat is detailed. The chapter then provides a critical review of the 
insider threat contributing factors from the three sources in order to develop the 
candidate holistic insider threat model. In addition, some of the previous insider 
threat models that represent the research scope are described to provide further 
theoretical support for the conceptual model. Finally, Chapter Two highlights the 
research gaps. 
 
Chapter Three starts with a description of the research objectives followed by the 
research questions. The theoretical and practical significance is explained. Next, the 
factors in the candidate holistic insider threat model are explained in detail. This 
research will assist in the development of the candidate holistic insider threat model 
by combining all factors identified in the three sources of the literature. Finally, the 
candidate holistic insider threat model is presented as the initial research model. 
 
Chapter Four describes the research methodology and research process. First, the 
selection of research paradigm and mixed method design will be explained and 
justified. Second, the sample selection and the quantitative and qualitative data 
collection are discussed. Finally, the various phases of the research are described.  
 
Chapter Five gives a general overview of the quantitative data collection that has 
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the survey design, target population and the Web-based survey. Furthermore, survey 
distribution and analysis are described. Finally, the enhanced holistic insider threat 
model is presented. 
 
Chapter Six provides a general overview of the qualitative data collection that has 
been used to validate the enhanced holistic insider threat model. The interview 
decisions, design, the process of obtaining interviewees, data analyses and coding are 
described in detail. The results from the interviews and the new information obtained 
from the security specialists as well as the participants’ feedback regarding the 
proposed model are discussed. The chapter concludes with the presentation of the 
final insider threat holistic model. 
 
Chapter Seven describes the management and controls for the factors produced in the 
final holistic insider threat model using the best practices. This chapter discusses the 
method used to develop these best practices which comprises two steps: first, 
understanding CERT best practices and addressing the gaps in the CERT best 
practices; second, using interviewees’ suggestions and several academic sources to 
address the shortcomings found in CERT best practices. Finally, this chapter presents 
a list of extra guidelines that complement CERT best practices, which can be used to 
minimise insider threats. 
 
Chapter Eight summarizes this study. This chapter provides answers to the research 
questions. The theoretical and practical contributions are presented. Finally, the 
limitations of the study and the future research opportunities are detailed.
 
Part of this chapter has been presented and published in the following conferences:  
 
1- Munshi, Asmaa, Peter Dell, and Helen Armstrong. 2012. “Insider Threat Behavior Factors: A 
Comparison of Theory with Reported Incidents”. In 45th Hawaii International Conference 
on System Science (HICSS), Maui, HI 2402-2411. IEEE.  
 
2- Munshi, Asmaa, and Tomayess Issa. 2012. “Insider Threat: A Critical Review of the Literature”. In 





~ 20 ~ 
 CHAPTER TWO:        2
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1   Introduction 
This chapter reviews the literature related to insider threat behaviour from three 
different sources: academic research, IT industry publications and published reported 
incidents. This review indicates that, to date, no insider threat model has been 
proposed that comprehensively addresses the issue of insider threat. This literature 
review describes in detail the risk of insider threat followed by an in-depth analysis 
of the factors (from the three sources) contributing to insider threat. Previous insider 
threat models are also explored.  
 
In addition, the gaps in the research are noted and the key contributions of the 
present research are discussed. The literature review identified a range of factors 
from the academic sources, published reported incidents and IT industry 
publications. This chapter presents a critique of theoretical factors identified in the 
academic literature by comparing these with actual reported incidents and IT industry 
publications. This comparison resulted in a number of insights gained into areas in 
which the theoretical literature gaps. Thus, further investigation is necessary in order 
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2.2   Scope of the Literature Search 
The data for this study have been collected from three different sources: academic 
research, IT industry publications and published reported incidents. The literature 
review follows a systematic approach as shown in section 2.2.1 below. 
2.2.1   Selection Criteria and Justification   
The first step of a literature study is to locate relevant academic literature through 
online database as a primary literature collecting approach. Conventionally, this is 
done by targeting related books, journals and conferences. Given the limited number 
of IS security researches, especially relating to insider threat research papers 
published in the leading IS journals suggested by Schwartz & Russo (2004), some 
additional IS security-specific journals were included. According to Siponen & 
Willison (2007) the three journals which include major publications on security are: 
Computers & Security, Information Management and Computer Security and 
Information Systems Security. In addition to these three journals this research also 
studies other security journal such as Information Security Technical Report, 
Computer Fraud & Security, Network Security and Infosecurty. Furthermore, five 
important online scholar databases were targeted: ACM Digital Library, IEEE 
Xplore, ProQuest, ScienceDirect and SpringerLink. These databases cover almost all 
of the ISWorld’s top 50 IS journals which include the aforementioned journals and 
most of the top 10 IS conferences (Schwartz and Russo 2004; Levy  and Ellis 2006). 
Thus, these databases are comprehensive enough to produce a literature set which 
can represent the current status of insider threat in IS research literature. Several 
search terms were determined for this research, and several synonyms and 
combinations of different words were utilized such as: ‘insider threat’, ‘internal 
misuse’, ‘insider attack’, ‘insider threat factors ’, ‘managing insider threat’, ‘insider 
threat behaviour’, ‘addressing insider threat’, ‘internal threat’, ‘information theft’, 
‘data leakage’ and ‘insider threat detection and  protection’. Figure 2.1 shows that 
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that the majority of the articles were covered by those search terms. The search 
aimed to find books, journal articles and conference proceedings. The initial search 
resulted in finding 50 articles from ACM, 69 articles from SpringerLink, 160 articles 
from IEEE Xplore, 50 articles from ProQuest (computing) and 80 articles from 
ScienceDirect, in total 409 articles (see table 2.1).  
 
The 409 articles were then analysed. This was done firstly by scanning the title and 
abstract of the articles and excluding irrelevant articles; this left 191. Secondly, the 
full text of each article was reviewed and those which were not focused on insider 
threat were discarded; this left 90 articles. 
 
The systematic academic literature search resulted in 90 papers which address the 
insider threat issue, describe the contributing factors, and propose solutions to this 
problem. The academic literature review results show that more than the half of the 
papers found were actually conference proceedings and only around 34 papers were 
from journals.  
 








50 ‘insider threat’, ‘internal misuse’, ‘insider attack’, ‘insider threat 
factors ’, ‘managing insider threat’, ‘insider threat behaviour’, 
‘addressing insider threat’, ‘internal threat’, ‘information theft’, 
‘data leakage’ and ‘insider threat detection and  protection’ 
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Figure 2.1: Search terms and number of articles  
 
The second step in a literature review is to study IT industry publications. Several 
important business online databases were targeted including Emerald, Factiva, 
Business Source Premier, JSTOR, ABI/Inform Complete, Business Source Complete 
and ProQuest, ACM Digital Library; these were the main data bases that were 
examined for data published during past ten years. Furthermore, several IT 
magazines were consulted including Network World, SC Magazine: For IT Security 
Professionals, Security Director's Report, Computerworld, InfoWorld and 
Communications of the ACM.  The same key words used in the first step of the 
literature study were used in this step, including: ‘insider threat’, ‘internal misuse’, 
‘insider attack’, ‘insider threat factors’, ‘managing insider threat’, ‘insider threat 
behaviour’, ‘addressing insider threat’, ‘internal threat’, ‘information theft’, ‘data 
leakage’ and ‘insider threat detection and  protection’. The search of magazines 
articles initially yielded 81 relevant items. The title and full text of each article were 
examined and any articles that not related to this study were discarded, leaving 30 
articles that discussed the risk of insider threat, several insider threat cases and the 
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The third step is to study published reported incidents. According to Cappelli, 
Moore, and Trzeciak (2012), CERT has the largest number of detailed insider threat 
cases in the world. CERT conducted a research on the insider threat during the last 
decade and established a comprehensive database. This database contains technical, 
behavioural, and organisational details of every insider threat case.  In 2001, the 
CERT program analysed about 150 cases and this number increased to 550 by 2011 
(Hanley et al. 2011). By 2012, the number had expanded to more than 700 insider 
threat cases (CERT 2012; Cappelli, Moore, and Trzeciak 2012). Thus, in this phase 
of the literature review, the reports generated by CERT are studied and analysed.  
 
According to CERT, insider threats fall into three main categories: IT sabotage, fraud 
and theft of intellectual property IP (Cappelli, Moore, and Trzeciak 2012), all of 
which are important to this study. The three core categories are (CERT 2012, 4): 
 IT sabotage: “an insider’s use of IT to direct specific harm at an 
organisation or an individual” 
 Fraud: “an insider’s use of IT for the unauthorised modification, addition, or 
deletion of an organisation’s data (not programs or systems) for personal 
gain, or theft of information that leads to an identity crime (e.g., identity theft 
or credit card fraud)” 
 Theft of intellectual property IP: “an insider’s use of IT to steal IP from the 
organization. This category includes industrial espionage involving 
outsiders” 
 
Figure 2.1 (adapted from CERT (2012, 6)) illustrates the sectors most affected by 
insider fraud, sabotage, and theft of IP. The differences among sectors are interesting 
and expected. For example, information technology is the sector that has suffered the 
most from theft of IP, followed by the commercial facilities sector. While, banking 
and finance sector experienced the most fraud cases, followed by the government 
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commercial facilities sector. The high percentage in the IT sector is possibly due to 
the advanced technical skills of the employees in this sector. 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Top Six Infrastructure Sectors for Fraud, Sabotage, and Theft of IP 
 
Further study of such cases in each sector can afford better insight into behaviour 
factors associated with insider threats in actual insider crimes. This researcher sought 
to study the internal incident cases from CERT to better understand the threat, and to 
gain insight into how insiders behave and the factors that influence insiders to behave 
in inappropriate ways. A total of fifteen reports derived from around 700 of CERT’s 
internal incident cases identified through public reporting were studied for this 
research. The insider incident reports provided by CERT program are summarised in 
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Table 2.2: CERT incident cases report  
Reports Insider threats categories 
Hanley et al. (2011), Moore et al. (2009) and Spooner et al. 
(2009) 
Theft of IP 
Cappelli et al. (2008), Keeney et al. (2005a), Band et al. (2006) 
and Moore, Cappelli, and Trzeciak (2008)  
IT sabotage 
King (2012) Fraud 
Cummings et al. (2012) Fraud in banking and finance 
sector 
CERT (2006), CERT (2009) and Lewellen et al. (2012) IT sabotage, fraud and Theft of IP  
Randazzo et al. (2004) IT sabotage, fraud and Theft of IP 
in banking and finance sector. 
Kowalski et al. (2008) IT sabotage, fraud and Theft of IP 
in Government sector  
Kowalski et al. (2008) IT sabotage, fraud and Theft of IP 
in IT and telecommunication 
sector  
 
The reviewed literature is comprehensive and includes both theoretical and empirical 
literature.  
2.3   Risk of Insider Threats 
The incidence of insider threats has continued to increase each year, and according to 
Brdiczka et al. (2012) there are indications that this trend will continue. The 
protection of confidential data and information such as intellectual property, 
customer data and patient records from unauthorised access by employees is a major 
concern for all organisations. Since employees need to access such information in 
order to carry out their daily tasks,  the detection and prevention of unauthorised 
employee access are very challenging tasks (Gafny et al. 2010). Although insider 
attacks may occur less frequently than external ones, insiders have a high impact on 
information since they are familiar with their targets and security countermeasures in 
place (Chinchani et al. 2005 ). Almost all definitions of the insider maintain that the 
insider has free access, is more trusted and has better information about internal 
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the security than is  an outsider. As a result, the insider attack can cause significant 
harm to an organisation (Probst, Hansen, and Nielson 2007). 
 
According to Cole and Ring (2005), both types of attack -insider and outsider- can 
cause harm to an organisation, although the insider threat is usually worse for the 
following reasons: 
 Insider threat is easier to implement: Insiders who pose the threat have all or 
most of the access they require. In addition, insiders have good knowledge of 
their target which allows them to succeed in the attack with less chance of 
being caught. On the other hand, the external attacker has less idea about 
what is going on at the other end, has little knowledge about the internal 
security countermeasures, and does not have authorised access to the system. 
Hence, the outsider is carrying out an almost blind attack which makes the 
attack more difficult than it is for the insider. Although some inside attacks 
are sophisticated, many of them are very basic and simple because in most 
cases the attacker has enough knowledge and access required to commit the 
attack. 
 Current solutions do not scale: Most organisations’ security devices such as 
firewalls and intrusion detection/ prevention systems are designed to prevent 
an outsider attack. Firewalls are designed to block access to selected ports, 
which can prevent an outsider attack but does not prevent the insider attack. 
If the insider requests access to some data to perform his job, the firewall will 
permit it which simply allows the insider to transfer the data to an 
unauthorised party. Intrusion detection/prevention systems get rid of known 
signatures of attack. While most signatures of the external attacks are known, 
those of most internal attacks are not. Moreover, organisations have minimal 
internal protection measures. Most of them perform poorly in terms of 
controlling access and do an even poorer job of establishing reliable policies. 
Limiting access and implementing consistent policies is the essential key to 
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 Insider threats have a high chance of success: Insiders have practically all of 
the information and access they need which almost guarantees their success. 
Even though organisations might have appropriate access control and reliable 
policies in place, the insider threat will have a higher chance of success than 
does the external threat for the predictable future. 
 Less chance of being caught: Since the insiders are familiar with the 
environment and have access, they are technically not violating the 
organisation’s rules. Hence, the chances of being detected are much less. 
Even if attackers access data which they are authorised to access but use it 
inappropriately, this is much harder to detect. 
 
 
All insider attacks such as sabotage, fraud and theft, can lead to financial loss to the 
organisation, financial instability, reduced competitive advantage, loss of employees, 
loss of clients and loss of consumer confidence (Cole and Ring 2005). Gonzalez and 
Sawicka (2002) found that human factors contributed to 80 – 90% of organisational 
accidents. Many industry statistics have confirmed the riskiness of the insider threat: 
 According to a US Federal Bureau of Investigation survey conducted in 2004, 
the average losses resulting from successful external attacks was $56,0000. 
While the average losses from a successful insider attack was $2.7 million, 
almost 50 times greater. Moreover, since 2000, approximately 80% of 
information security incidents have been the result of insider attacks 
(Thompson, Whittaker, and Andrews 2004). 
 Another survey of insider incidents conducted of banking and financial 
institutions showed that 30% of incidents had resulted in losses in excess of 
$500,000 each (Randazzo et al. 2004). 
 CERT, a centre of Internet security expertise, reports that 22,716 
vulnerabilities (from 1995-2005) and 319,992 incidents (from 1988-2003) 
were caused by insiders who had authorised access to the organisation’s 
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 A U.S. Secret Service study and CERT focus on insider cybercrimes and 
indicate than when managers make deliberate decisions to improve 
organisational performance and productivity, they often produce the 
unintended result of increasing the organisation’s exposure to insider attacks 
(Randazzo et al. 2004; Martinez-Moyano et al. 2008a).  
 Insider threat is an extremely serious problem as indicated in Blackwell 
(2009)’s study which demonstrates that 68% of respondents believed that 
insiders present a major threat to their intellectual property and sensitive 
information. Insiders not only can cause direct harm to an organisation’s 
assets, but by providing them with an access route, the organisations are 
gradually becoming more responsible for the activities of workers who 
violate policy and regulations (Martinez-Moyano et al. 2008a). 
  Another study was conducted by the British Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI) in association with PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC). In their 
survey, published in 2004, around 33% of the respondents claimed that their 
worst security incident came from insiders. Moreover, DTI and PWC 
demonstrate that the incidence of insider abuse cases has doubled since 2002, 
mainly after organisations’ adoption of internet-related technologies 
(Magklaras and Furnell 2005). 
 Furthermore, Computer Crime and Security Survey CSI’s conducted in 2007, 
2008 and 2011 all acknowledged the increase in the number of insider crimes.  
In 2007, CSI reported that 59% of respondents had experienced insider 
misuse of organization resources and 26% of respondents had in excess of 
40% of their total financial losses from insider attacks (Hunker 2008). 
Moreover, a 2008 survey demonstrated that there are four categories which 
present as the highest. The incidence of insider abuse was the second most 
common occurrence in organisations at 44% (Richardson 2008). A Computer 
Crime and Security Survey CSI conducted in 2011 confirmed significant 
trends in computer crimes such as an obvious increase in the sophistication of 
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 A Cyber Security Watch Survey conducted in January 2011 showed that 
around 43% of participants had experienced an insider attack incident 
between 2004 and 2010, and 46% of the participants stated that insider 
attacks were more costly than other attacks (Holmlund et al. 2011; CERT 
2012). 
 According to a CERT study on organised insider threat crime, the average 
costs of these crimes exceeded $3M, with some cases resulting in $50M in 
losses (King 2012). 
 
The insider threat is an extremely serious problem since it has grown quickly and 
could happen at any time. The following section discusses the different models for 
insider threat detection and prevention, and describes the area and factors that each 
model focuses on in dealing with the insider threat.  
 
2.4   Factors that Influence Insider Threat 
Behaviour  
The major factors contributing to insider threat behaviour that emerged from the 
investigation of past research literature are: access and level of trust, the insider 
holding a technical position and/or having technical skills, motivation to carry out the 
abuse, outsourcing providing the opportunity, insider knowledge, cultural factors, 
lack of information security policies, psychological factors, remote access and 
gender. Each of these factors is considered in turn. 
2.4.1 Access and Level of Trust 
The academic literature relating to insider threats suggests that insiders can cause 
significant harm as they can avoid the physical and logical controls available to 
protect the organisation. Most organisations give their employees more access than 
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one of the most difficult types of attack to detect and prevent, since the insider uses 
his or her authorised  access rights to perform illegal tasks (McNamara 1998; Cohen 
2001; Furnell 2004; Nykodym, Taylor, and Vilela 2005; Bellovin 2008; Fyffe 2008; 
Willison and Warkentin 2013). Sarkar (2010, 126) stated that “The abuse of system 
access and privileges are common. Most insider attacks generally start with abusing 
the system, and then violating security policies”. Some organisations are now being 
asked to grant increased access to data. With the increased access there is a major 
increase in the possibility of theft and abuse (McNamara 1998; Cohen 2001; Furnell 
2004; Nykodym, Taylor, and Vilela 2005; Fyffe 2008; Bellovin 2008). Therefore, 
organisations should limit the employees’ access to confidential data to minimise 
negative financial impacts and regularity consequences (Sarkar 2010).  
 
Insiders’ privileged access allows them to easily abuse organisational trust  for 
personal gain (Liu, Wang, and Camp 2009). Wood (2000, 1) claim that the “insider 
should have no problem getting the privileges they need to mount an attack”. In 
particular, because insiders may have privileged access to their target, they can 
sometimes switch to an unauthorised privileged mode to mount a specific attack. 
Quite simply, the knowledgeable insider may employ somebody who has privileged 
access to launch an attack and the insider might be the person who is responsible for 
monitoring or enforcing the security policy of the target organisation (Wood 2000). 
Privileged access makes it simpler for the insider to cause serious harm to the 
organisation than other insiders with ordinary access. Some of this harm can be 
caused by inadequate defence mechanisms, but for the most part, it is privileged 
access which allows harm to occur. Yet the privileged access which allows harm is 
also necessary to enable insiders to perform their proper job functions (Walton and 
Limited 2006; Contos 2007; Dallaway 2008; Liu, Wang, and Camp 2008) According 
to Althebyan and Panda (2008, 558) “Both privileges and knowledge help 
individuals in planning successful attacks while making it difficult for the 
organisation to discover and/or prevent them”. System masters include all 
authorised employees within the organisation who have managerial privileges access 
to the majority of the system’s resources. Top system and network administrators are 





~ 32 ~ 
category of authorised  employee is given clearly constitutes a significant level of 
risk to the organisation (Magklaras and Furnell 2002) .  
 
As discussed previously in section 1.3, it is important to consider physical access as 
well as system access. Malicious insiders do not necessarily need privileged 
computer access to cause significant damage to their organisation, since they have 
free physical access to some or all facilities in their organisation, which allows them 
to access sensitive and confidential areas. This effortless access to the physical 
facilities allows them to make significant changes or steal vital and private data 
(Dallaway 2008). According to Walker (2008, 288) “even the most physically or 
logically isolated military networks have to extend enough trust to users in order to 
perform the duties they are assigned. Therefore, some degree of access is usually 
available for utilization by a malicious insider”. Swartz (2007) suggests that 
organisations should monitor their employees’ access to sensitive information and 
detect unauthorised access in order to provide better protection for their sensitive 
information.  
 
Academic researchers claim that the level of trust that malicious insiders enjoy is one 
of the important factors that permits them to launch a successful insider attack. This 
level of trust offers the essential privileges needed to enable internal misuse of the 
organisation (Magklaras and Furnell 2005; Contos 2007). An insider’s position is an 
important factor which allows damage to be done to the organisation, since insiders 
are in a good position to do so in comparison with outsiders (Kemp 2005). Insiders 
have free logical and physical access; they are more trusted, and have better 
information about their organisation’s internal processes and the potential weak 
points in the security policy - factors which permit them to easily harm their 
organisations (Okolica, Peterson, and Mills 2006). 
 
Similarly, IT industry publications highlight the importance of the access factor in 
insider threats. These publications concur that granting access to staff creates a 
degree of exploitation of vulnerable knowledge across the organisation’s network 
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Lynch 2006; Roberts 2007; Chickowski 2009; Blades 2010). Employees may have 
access to customers’ and employees’ data and more vulnerable production and 
financial data can also be made available to employees in a company. Such data may 
be easily transmitted through simple access of the internet. For example, without the 
right policy and tools in place, it can be very easy for any staff member to send out 
confidential customer data to a competitor through email, or for an engineer to send 
out a source code to another company, or for an administrative employee to leak out 
company earnings or shares by means of a simple instant phone call or message 
(Ansanelli 2005).  
 
Organisations should be aware of all access paths to the information available to all 
employees.  An access path is a way into the organisation’s information via an access 
point that leads into the system. This includes swipe cards, accounts and private 
virtual networks. An access path that is anonymous to management is not necessarily 
prohibited; however, organisations should moderate unknown access paths ways by 
recognizing them and frequently reviewing their validity in terms of their business 
needs (How to Weed out the New Insider Cybersecurity Threat  2007; Addressing 
the Insider Threat  2007). Organisations must be cautious of who has access to their 
information, and should ask themselves: is our company’s data secure or can it be 
easily pasted into a flash drive or photographed with a phone? (Castle 2009).  
 
In addition, organisations face a big challenge when trusted employees who have 
authorized access abuse their trust, as organisation cannot control when such trusted 
employees become  malicious (Ortega 2006). If employees abuse the trust placed in 
them, it could potentially cost their organisations millions of dollars (Khanna 2005). 
Cybercrimes are often committed by trusted insiders, who use their authorized access 
to breach  security (Bauch 2011). According to Thompson and Ford (2004, 3) state: 
“The problem of insider threat is trust. Insiders must be trusted to perform their 
work duties. The problem occurs when insiders intentionally or unintentionally 
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Furthermore, system administrators and other users with privileged access pose a 
greater threat than do other employees. Most of the detected insider threats occur 
through such accepted privileged access protocols (Chickowski 2009). The main 
concern regarding privileged access is how to guarantee that IT personnel have 
suitable access only to the information they require (Messmer 2010; Addressing the 
Insider Threat  2007).  
 
Passwords are crucial to one being granted access to an organisation’s information. 
Therefore, it is important to frequently monitor the process of changing passwords to 
grant access to a company’s information. It is also vital that upon termination of 
contracts or after layoffs, passwords too should be terminated (Messmer 2008). 
However, although it is crucial to disable password access after termination, that is 
not the last of it. Organisations should have full knowledge of who remains with 
access to their information, and the pathways still available into their information 
(How to Weed out the New Insider Cybersecurity Threat  2007; Kirkpatrick 2008). 
 
One of the decisive tasks facing all establishments today is that of “Access 
Management”. This is an important protection measure to ensure that granted access 
is limited only to those employees who require such information to do their jobs. 
This is a challenge that must be addressed by incorporating human resources systems 
with primary access control systems. There is also rapid development of single sign-
on and multi-factor verification. These guidelines for granted access can contribute 
to further security measures that protect the organisation’s infrastructure from 
outside and inside threats (Financial Institution Security Risks and Concerns: The 
Top Eight  2007). Although one person should be authorised to have full access to a 
company’s system, experts recommend dividing an approved level of access among 
employees according to their duties. Hence, instead of granting access to the entire 
IT staff, access should be limited and divided among IT personnel according to 
departments and systems. For instance, engineers responsible for maintaining e-mail 
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Evidence from reported incidents supports the theoretical position developed in the 
academic literature and IT industry publications: that access is a significant factor in 
insider threats. The majority of reports regarding insider threats confirmed that 
access is one of the most important factors insiders usually abused when stealing 
information. According to Spooner et al. (2009), all of the insiders in the cases they 
studied had some level of privileged access to the information they stole. Moore et 
al. (2009) and King (2012) state in their report that the majority of insiders had 
authorised access to the information they stole. Moreover, CERT (2006) found that 
over 75% of the insiders had authorised access when they committed their theft. In 
approximately 71% of the cases, the insiders relied on some form of authorised 
access (Cummings et al. 2012). At the time of the incident, 78% of the insiders were 
authorised  users with active computer accounts according to a study by (Randazzo et 
al. 2004). Almost 88% of the insiders had authorised  access to the information in 
question, and those who did not have authorised  access to the information were 
former employees (CERT 2009). However, other reports indicate that less than 50% 
of the insiders had authorised access to the system at the time of incident (Keeney et 
al. 2005a; Moore, Cappelli, and Trzeciak 2008; Kowalski et al. 2008; Hanley et al. 
2009). 
2.4.2  Insider Knowledge  
Academic literature suggests that employees normally have great knowledge about 
their organisation, and are usually familiar with some or all of the internal processes 
of their target systems (Dallaway 2008). Some researchers refer to an insider as 
“anyone who has intimate knowledge of internal operations and processes”(Steele 
and Wargo 2007, 20). In addition to their free access to documents and data, insiders 
have wide knowledge of their organisation’s system and procedure (Wood 2000). 
For example, insiders are almost always aware of the policies, procedures, security 
countermeasures and the associated vulnerabilities which relate to them, or they have 
the ability to acquire that knowledge without arousing suspicion (Magklaras and 
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Neumann (2010, 23) “Some differences are likely to exist in the knowledge 
available, the knowledge required, and the knowledge actually used in perpetrating 
various types of insider misuse. Understanding these differences may be useful in 
analyses associated with detected misuses”. For instance, insiders have the ability to 
locate valuable information since they have greater knowledge of what to look for. 
 
IT industry publications also support the importance of insider knowledge factor in 
insider threats. According to Neumann (1999, 160), “Insiders may have various 
advantages beyond just allocated privileges and access, such as better knowledge of 
system vulnerabilities and the whereabouts of sensitive information, and the 
availability of implicitly high human levels of trust within sensitive enclaves”.  
Employees use the knowledge obtained from their legitimate tasks for illegitimate 
gain (Willison and Siponen 2009).  
 
Insiders can be anyone in a company: an employee, an administrator or a contractor; 
whoever it may be, it is important to note that the more knowledge they have, the 
more sabotage they can do (Khanna 2005; Castle 2009). Despite the fact that the 
attacks committed by external hackers are more likely to occur, employees inside an 
organisation often pose silent but more harmful threats than those outside the 
organisation, due to their close knowledge about the organisational systems and the 
permissions they receive either appropriately or inappropriately for their work 
activities (Hu et al. 2011). Organisations must be aware that all employees know the 
organisation’s vulnerabilities and how to best take advantage of such weakness to 
meet their objectives (Kirkpatrick 2008). The e-crime Survey and Ponemon 
Institute’s Cost of Cyber Crime Study 2010 reveal that insider incidents are often far 
more costly than outsider breaches. This is likely because of the insider’s knowledge 
- they are aware of the organisation’s vulnerabilities and weaknesses and their 
security measures. Hence, insiders know what areas to target and how to obtain the 
information required (Blades 2010). Although, outsider attack may occur more 
frequently than insider, it is not as costly as an insider threat. This is because outsider 
threats face cracking codes, firewalls, intrusion prevention systems, email anti-virus 
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knowledge is a resourceful asset he/she has to their advantage (Kirkpatrick 2008). 
Insider attack show planned targeted areas which an insider knows have weak 
security measures or vulnerable information. Perhaps a more direct approach is to 
launch an attack that targets theft of credit card details, or specific vulnerabilities. 
Targeted attacks are expected to have a bigger influence (Castle 2009).  Moreover, 
the knowledgeable insider often has the ability to bypass established access controls. 
For example, an administrator with account creation and management privileges can 
easily masquerade as another user or administrator in order to conceal his or her 
activities (Ortega 2006; Buckley 2010). 
 
Although much of the academic literature and IT industry publications reviewed 
above suggest that the knowledge held by employees is an important factor in insider 
threat behavior, the empirical evidence from reported incidents reviewed in this 
study has found no evidence to support such assertions. 
2.4.3  Insider Technical Skills 
Academic literature suggests that the insiders’ technical skills and position in the 
organisation gives them a significant influence on cyber-crime. Attacks committed 
by employees in a technical position such as system administrator can result in a 
major financial loss to the organisation, more so than attacks by any other 
employees. This could be due to the increased level of access they have and their 
ability to hide their crimes. On the other hand, the financial losses resulting from 
other employees’ attacks’ will be less (Nykodym, Taylor, and Vilela 2005; 
Magklaras and Furnell 2005; Althebyan and Panda 2008; White and Panda 2009). 
The collaboration between a system administrator and an employee for the purpose 
of carrying out a crime might be extremely hard to detect and prevent since they are 
working at different levels of the hierarchy which may allow them to hide or cover 
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Furthermore, employees sometimes use their IT skills to harm an organisation’s 
system through activities such as downloading and using hacker tools, gaining access 
to the system after termination, and the setup and use of backdoor accounts. Insiders 
usually have the skills which are generally limited to the systems they are familiar 
with which may increase their opportunity to compromise these systems. Some 
researchers consider the level of employee sophistication as a potential factor which 
can influence their ability to commit insider crime. The levels of IT sophistication 
are set out below (Cohen 2001; Theoharidou et al. 2005):  
 Advanced: end users with a high level of sophistication, who have mastery of 
applications and system.  
 Ordinary: end users with a medium level of sophistication in the use of some 
applications.  
 Novice: end users with a low level of IT sophistication.  
 
Moreover, Magklaras and Furnell (2005) classified the end user’s sophistication in 
terms of three essential characteristics. 
 Breadth of knowledge: they indicate that advanced users are able to utilize a 
greater range of IT tools than intermediate or novice users. 
  Depth of knowledge: The level of knowledge of some application or IT sub-
domain which could be achieved either by training or individual experience is 
relative to the level of user sophistication. 
 Finesse: the end user’s ability to solve IT problems in effective and 
innovative ways is also considered as end user sophistication. 
 
Similarly, IT industry publications emphasize the importance of technical skills as a 
factor contributing to insider threats. The most serious threat scenario to modern 
networks is the technically skilled outsider or insider who violates security for 
personal gain (Ortega 2006). Research shows that relatively sophisticated attack tools 
were used by insiders who compromise computer accounts or create unauthorized 
backdoor accounts to launch their attacks (Secret Service, Cert Analyze Insider 
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were likely to be technical employees and most often they have utilised several 
sophisticated attack tools.  
 
Technically skilled employees pose a great risk to any organisation. Around 86% of 
insider threats were committed by technical employees most of whom were system 
administrators or were granted privileged system access (How to Weed out the New 
Insider Cybersecurity Threat  2007). Many organisations face such threats from 
trusted employees who have technical skills, are in a technical position and have 
been granted access to critical information (Lynch 2006; How to Weed out the New 
Insider Cybersecurity Threat  2007). 
 
A thorough examination of incidents of insider threats reveals that most of the 
insiders who committed acts of sabotage held technical positions within the 
organisation. Unfortunately, such organisations endure financial losses that definitely 
negatively affect business operations. Eventually, such insider threat attacks cause 
greater damage to their business reputations (Lynch 2006). Organisations should 
acknowledge the threat of a technology-driven world, where computer operators 
could cause more damage than any harm that an ordinary employee could do by 
theft. 
 
While theoretical academic literature and IT industry publications argue that 
employees in technical positions with technical skills are a factor in insider threats 
behaviour, empirical evidence from reported incidents varies according to the 
different types of insider crime. Most of the reports studied suggest that the guilty 
insiders held technical positions such as system/database administrators, engineers 
and programmers. According to Spooner et al. (2009), in all of the incidents they 
analysed the insider worked was either a scientist or a computer engineer. Some 
reports mentioned that around 70% of the insiders were employed in technical 
positions, which included system administrators, programmers and engineers 
(Keeney et al. 2005a; Moore, Cappelli, and Trzeciak 2008; Kowalski et al. 2008; 
Hanley et al. 2009; CERT 2009). Moreover, Moore et al. (2009) and Hanley et al. 
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had held technical positions. On the other hand, the majority of the insiders in the 
cases analysed by King (2012) and Cummings et al. (2012) were employed in non-
technical positions. Additionally, some researchers claim that less than 20% of the 
insiders were employed in a technical position (Randazzo et al. 2004; CERT 2006; 
Kowalski et al. 2008; Cappelli et al. 2008; Cummings et al. 2012).  
 
Moreover, some of the insiders used sophisticated technical means to perform their 
attacks. Generally, they used several technical methods such as writing a script or 
program, including a logic bomb, or placing a virus on client computers, utilizing 
password crackers and downloading remote system administration tools. Randazzo et 
al. (2004)  assert that approximately 10% of the incidents they analysed involved 
sophisticated tools or techniques. According to some insider incident reports, 
approximately 30% of the insiders used one or more sophisticated techniques to 
assist them in the attack, such as writing a script or program, establishing a backdoor 
account, or compromising another employee’s account (Keeney et al. 2005a; CERT 
2006, 2009; Hanley et al. 2009). Only two reports suggest that over half of the cases 
involved sophisticated technical methods (Cappelli et al. 2008; Kowalski et al. 
2008). 
 
The differences in the level of importance ascribed to technical skills is not 
surprising given that some insider threats will require sophisticated technical skills 
while others will not. What is unclear from the empirical case evidence available is 
the relative proportions of attacks that require no particular skill, attacks that require 
technical skills, and those that would require certain skills where those skills can be 
from a third party, such as downloading an exploit from the Internet. 
2.4.4  Motivation 
Academic literature asserts that motivation is one of the significant factors leading to 
insider threats (Wood 2000; Furnell 2006; Fyffe 2008; Walker 2008; White and 





~ 41 ~ 
attacking their organisation. They often have direct physical access to the computer 
and they are familiar with the resource access controls. The motive for a malicious 
attack can be grouped into three main areas: IT sabotage, theft for financial gain, and 
theft for a business advantage. According to Furnell (2004, 7), motivations include 
“greed, revenge, stress, and espionage, as well as being exacerbated by factors”. If 
employees want to attack their organisations, they are usually motivated by three 
things: greed, malice and/or fear. Greed is a factor when the attacker desires to 
achieve something from the attack, more often financial gain. Malice is a motivator 
when the attacker desires to cause harm to their organisation, usually as an act of 
revenge. Fear operates when the employee is being forced or blackmailed to perform 
the attack (Jones 2008b). Correspondingly, White and Panda (2009) categorised the 
motivation behind insiders’ attacks into three main categories: IT sabotage, financial 
gain, and business advantage. Some of the recent attacks have been motivated by 
financial gain: attackers hope to gain by selling the organisation’s data that resides in 
the database. Most often, insiders deliberately abuse the system to obtain sensitive 
data for financial or business gain. Moreover, Wood (2000) classified insider 
motivation into four groups. He believes that the insider is attempting to impose 
some kind of undesirable outcome within the organisation in order to achieve the 
following goals: profit, provoke change, subversion and personal motive. Whether 
the motivation is deliberate or accidental, it represents a significant risk of 
inappropriate user activity (Fyffe 2008). The malicious insider’s motivation could 
involve the hope of direct personal gain, or the insider may have been recruited by 
competitive organisations that financially reward them for their betrayal (Walker 
2008).  
 
Once an employee is motivated to start the attack, s/he needs the opportunity to 
perform a harmful action. An opportunity is easily afforded by vulnerabilities such as 
weaknesses in access control, insufficient tasks separation, inherent technical 
vulnerabilities, or uncontrolled internet access (Jones 2008b). Some researchers have 
discussed opportunity as a motivational factor, and how the ease of access can 
motivate employees to abuse their organisation (Bloombecker 1984; Forester and 
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motivational factors. One of these is ‘the land of opportunity’, where malicious 
insiders abuse security gaps through their daily work. According to Forester and 
Morrison (1994), experts in computer crime have confirmed that opportunity more 
than anything else generates this kind of behaviour (Theoharidou et al. 2005; Robert 
and James 2006). If the insiders have a motive for harming their organisation as well 
as logical or physical access, and they familiar with the environment of the 
workplace, they can present a serious threat to the organisation (McNamara 1998; 
Shaw 2006). 
 
Likewise, IT industry publications support the importance of the motivation factor in 
insider threats. Research has shown various motives behind threats of cybercrime. 
Some are created by foreign competition, while others are for personal gain (Ortega 
2006). Some employees may want to violate the organisation for revenge, as a 
strategy for their professional advancement, or in some cases employees just may 
simply be looking for a quick way to skim off some finances. Unfortunately, the 
motives that drive each threat vary from one to another. Hence, it is very important to 
discuss the motives behind these threats for future protection screening (Blades 
2010). 
 
A study by Vista Research in 2002 revealed that insider threat represents 70% of the 
security violation, which is often committed by disgruntled employees (D'Arcy and 
Hovav 2007).  Although there is a common statement that insider threats are made by 
a disgruntled employee or for a financial scam, some research which has examined 
threats and conducted surveys in this area show that this proposed motive may be 
just a myth. Nevertheless, a study of incidents from a behavioural and a technical 
perspective reveals that great deals of threats were motivated by the prospect of 
financial gain (Kirkpatrick 2008; Blades 2010). Hence, the advancement of an 
insider’s position through financial gain or career benefit is identified as a primary 
motivator. Some research has linked financial gain or benefit to an insider’s greed. 
Greed is often referred to as motivation for theft, in particular of proprietary 
information. Hence, reports cite greed as a motivational factor that drives insider 
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specific motive. Moreover, they added that being in debt also may drive a threat to 
gain more money (Lynch 2006; Kirkpatrick 2008). Moreover, unsatisfied individuals 
may act in ways to attract negative attention. Disgruntled employees have the urge to 
avenge themselves by causing the organisation financial losses or simple loss of 
reputation. In the case of disgruntled employees, these unsatisfied employees want 
the organisation to report an insider threat to the police, stating that a disgruntled 
employee has done such and such, which will affect the company’s reputation. 
Disgruntled employees want to harm or embarrass the organisation. However, in 
such cases it is easier to uncover the potential threats of an insider. In many cases, 
there were warning signs that disgruntled employees would launch an attack. Hence, 
organisations are responsible of monitoring such behaviours to look for signs of 
threat (D'Arcy and Hovav 2007; Kirkpatrick 2008; Willison and Siponen 2009). The 
USSS/CMU-SEI financial services study on insider threat incidents shows that in 
85% of the cases, someone close (a co-worker, a friend, or a relative) knew of the 
insider’s plans, motives and actions against the organisation. In the banking and 
finance sector, 19% of insiders were seen as disgruntled. About 27 % of the insiders 
had displayed obvious signs to the supervisor and co-workers that an attack was 
being planned. Such behavioural attitudes include increasing complaints that show 
dissatisfaction about the wages, an increase in time wasted on the cell phone in the 
office, refusal to work or communicate with new supervisors, increased outbreaks 
and conflicts, and isolation from co-workers (Kirkpatrick 2008).   
 
In addition, some employees are motivated by patriotism. Espionage activities to 
obtain intelligence may in some cases be sanctioned and organized by foreign 
governments (Bauch 2011). There are several reasons for this: to keep local 
companies aware of their global competitors, and to retain the stability of their 
economic status.  For many years France, China, Latin America and the former 
Soviet Union have used espionage as a common strategy to promote their country’s 
economy. Such motives are very professionally planned and executed and are hard to 
prevent. Such employees usually have excellent performance charts and show no 
suspicious signs.. For example, two former distinguished employees from China 
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secrets to transfer to a joint venture with a Chinese telecommunications company 
(Kirkpatrick 2008). The rise of profit-driven cybercrime is the major motivator in 
many cases, while the involvement of foreign nationals and political motivations 
raises the spectre of network-based attacks against critical national infrastructure 
(Ortega 2006).  
 
Furthermore, in some ongoing research it has been noted that some insider threats 
may be motivated by terrorism because the insider wants to threaten or harm those 
who have different ideologies or beliefs or goals from their own. For example, an 
insider could carry out a threat in the name of a terrorist group to harm the company 
or others because of their different ideological beliefs. In ongoing investigations, 
suspected plots of insider threats have been researched domestically and 
internationally (Kirkpatrick 2008). 
 
 Research has also indicated that insider threats can stem from the urge to advance 
one’s career. The perpetrator in such cases commits to a threat by information theft 
of vulnerable data or codes that may be used to secure another job. In other 
circumstances, the insider may feel unsatisfied with the company’s management 
policies or targets. Hence, the insider feels that he/she may do better by competing 
against his/her own company in the market place. Such insider threats may include 
exposing the company’s secret information or assets. For example, a retired manager 
stole blueprints of his organisation and sold these to a Chinese organisation to set up 
his own company (Kirkpatrick 2008).  
 
As mentioned earlier, there are various motives that drive insider threats, all of which 
should be addressed seriously by organisations. Organisations must be aware of the 
valuable information they hold and who has access to such information. Also, 
organisations must consider meeting their employees’ needs in terms of career 
satisfaction and financial gains.   
 
Evidence from reported incidents supports the theoretical positions found in the 
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is one of the significant factors in insider threats. Motivation has been discussed in 
many incidents reports, which have divided insider motivations into three main 
categories: financial gain, revenge and business advantages. Most insiders in the 
banking and finance sector were motivated by financial gain, rather than a desire to 
damage the information or the organisation’s infrastructure. Insiders stole 
information to sell it, and modified data to achieve financial benefits for themselves. 
 
Financial motivation accounts for less than half of the insider incidents; other 
motives include revenge, frustration with organisation management, culture or policy 
dissatisfaction, and sometimes that insiders were persuaded by outsiders (CERT 
2006; Cappelli et al. 2008; Kowalski et al. 2008; Hanley et al. 2009). On the other 
hand, all of the insiders involved in organised crime cases attacked the organisation 
for financial gain (King 2012). Most of the insiders’ cases analysed by King were 
motivated by financial gain and were employed by outsiders to commit their crimes. 
Organised crime is “involving multiple insiders who often work in different areas of 
the organisation and who know how to bypass critical processes and remain 
undetected. Those insiders affiliated with organised crime are either selling 
information to these groups for further exploitation or are directly employed by 
them”(King 2012, 1).  
 
Researchers have suggested that as many as 84% of the incidents were motivated by 
revenge (Keeney et al. 2005a; Moore, Cappelli, and Trzeciak 2008), the second 
category of motivation. In Hanley et al. (2009),  80% of the incidents were motivated 
by a desire for revenge against their company. According to CERT (2006), CERT 
(2009) and Cummings et al. (2012) over half of the incidents they analysed were 
vengefully committed as retaliation for a negative event such as transfers or 
termination, salary or employer dissatisfaction, new managers, and demotions.  
Kowalski et al. (2008) found that only around 20% of insiders were motivated by 
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The final category of motivation is business advantages. All incidents studied by 
Spooner et al. (2009) and CERT (2009) were cases in which insiders stole 
intellectual property in order to gain a business advantage. Sometime insiders stole 
the information to get a direct advantage at a new job or to start a new competing 
business. According to Moore et al. (2009), 32% of the insiders analysed were acting 
to gain an immediate advantage at a new job and in 22% of the cases analysed by 
Cummings et al. (2012), the insider was motivated by competitive business 
advantage. 
 
If the insiders have a motive for harming their organisation as well as logical or 
physical access either authorised or unauthorised, and they are familiar with the 
environment of the workplace, they can present a serious threat to the organisation  
(Shaw 2006). 
2.4.5  Information Security Policy 
Researchers in the academic literature claim that information security policy is one 
of the key factors that influence the insider threat behaviour (Cohen 2001; Magklaras 
and Furnell 2002; Pramanik, Sankaranarayanan, and Upadhyaya 2004; Furnell 2006; 
Walton and Limited 2006; Bishop et al. 2008; Hu et al. 2012; Crossler et al. 2013). 
Insider threats are affected by several aspects related to information security policy 
including the implementation of inappropriate policy for the information security and 
the technology, insufficient security training and awareness and out-dated security 
policy. Installing an appropriate information security policy, keeping it up to date 
and providing suitable training and awareness are vital tasks which require far more 
than just writing a security manual. Each organisation needs to know who has access 
to the data, what their own access policies are, and what actions they take to access 
data (Pramanik, Sankaranarayanan, and Upadhyaya 2004). According to Canavan 
(2007, 7) "information security policy defines the organisation ’s attitude to 
information, and announces internally and externally that information is an asset, 
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modification, disclosure, and destruction". Information security policy provides 
guidelines that organisations can follow to protect their physical and information 
technology assets. All employees should follow the security policy to minimise the 
risk and to respond to any security incidents effectively. In general, a security policy 
determines that actions that are authorised for a specific user and purpose. For 
example, a security policy may state that employee X is authorised to read Y records 
in order to update the data. If employee X deletes the records, he is violating the 
security policy. The security policy will also be violated if he reads the records for 
the purpose of selling the information. Moreover, the security policy is violated if 
anyone else uses employee X’s user account to read the records. This example 
reveals that security policies may state rules that are difficult to put into action. Users 
are able to misuse their privileges because the computer systems do not recognize 
people, only user accounts (Bishop et al. 2008).  Therefore, organisations require a 
detailed security policy that focuses on human factors as well as physical and 
technical factors (Gaunt 1998).  
 
Security policy, procedure, controls, guidelines and training are isolated from 
changes. Some executives responding to the EIU (2009) survey assert that their 
organisations have formulated IT policies to regulate the use of devices by 
employees, but not many have started to introduce these guidelines to employees: 
“only 21% of surveyed firms provide training on the use of personal communications 
devices and only 17% do this for social networking applications. More worryingly, 
only 20% have plans to increase awareness in the future” (Furnell 2004, 4). 
 
Some evidence suggests that the problems faced by organisations from internal 
threats are being reported along with matching evidence of insufficient security 
training and awareness (Furnell 2006). Security training and awareness are two areas 
on which an organisation must focus, and apply these in order to reduce the insider 
threats. Awareness among all kinds of employees is a vital element of the 
information security policy performance of any organisation (Albrechtsen and 
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 An information security culture is defined as “the attitudes, assumptions, beliefs, 
values and knowledge that employees/stakeholders use to interact with the 
organisation’s systems and procedures at any point in time”(Da Veiga and Eloff 
2010, 198).  If employees know that there is an effective security culture and that 
their colleagues apply it, this could make a difference. It would seem logical to 
expect that if organisations were to adopt a more responsible approach, the change 
will reduce the insider threat risks (Cohen 2001). Conversely, security culture could 
assist the insider to harm his/her organisation (Da Veiga and Eloff 2010). The bad 
news is that some existing security cultures are not keeping up to date and have no 
quick way to change (Walton and Limited 2006).  
 
However, even if the security policy is appropriate and up to date, misuse of the 
policy is carried out by human factors either by violation or abuses (Magklaras and 
Furnell 2002). Therefore, human factors are the central issue. Security policy 
violation occurs when employees do not heed the organisational security policies. 
These include, for instance, copying or transferring confidential information to 
mobile devices, disabling security configurations, and leaking sensitive data to 
outsiders. Abuses of the information security policy include any employees’ actions 
using computers against the organisation’s established policies and procedures for 
personal gain. For instance, this may include accessing information and systems 
illegally, illegitimated copying of sensitive information, and selling sensitive 
information to a third party for personal gain (Guo 2013).   
 
IT industry publications support the theoretical positions found in the academic 
literature, indicating that information security policy is one of the significant factors 
in insider threats.  Establishing a suitable security policy is a fairly straightforward 
process, although it may be overlooked (Blades 2010). According to D'Arcy and 
Hovav (2007, 116) “users’ awareness of security-policy statements and guidelines 
decreases the likelihood that they will engage in IS misuse”. It is a challenge for 
organisations to find the balance between security policies and measures and 
productivity where there is no “one size fits all” policy; this depends on the industry 
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study should have a policy that offers little or no flexibility. Even financial service 
organisations require strictly fixed policies that guarantee the safety of sensitive 
client information. Hence, security measures are often seen as a competitive 
advantage in such sensitive industries. Organisations must understand their industry 
requirements in order to determine the type of security policies they need to achieve 
productivity in a secure manner (Khanna 2005; Blades 2010; Ford 2012). Once the 
level of security needed is identified, which depends on the nature of the business, 
then the appropriate policies can be established and implemented (Hu et al. 2011). 
 
Although most organisations have long-standing policies that govern email usage 
and network access, they fail to estimate or address the impact of new technologies 
that may pose further security risks. Technologies such as viruses, removable media 
storage devices such as USB thumb drives, iPods, and smart phones should be 
addressed in security policies. If the impact of new technologies and trends is not 
addressed, over time this may certainly lead to substantial security breaches (Steele 
and Wargo 2007). An information security officer at the University of Rochester in 
New York suggests that the best way to address insider threat is to establish an 
ongoing awareness program. Such a program should include IT staff, end users, 
corporate executives and external partners (Jaikumar 2005). Having a comprehensive 
security policy is one thing, but actually implementing such policy is something 
different altogether. Unfortunately, security measures are often considered to slow 
the process of productivity. Moreover, many organisations implement policies and 
forget them once they are there. However, without appropriate enforcement, and 
reminders of the policies put in place, employees, like their organisations, will forget 
that such policies are there for a reason and will find ways to circumvent the process 
of policies to speed up their productivity and be able to leave work early (Steele and 
Wargo 2007). 
 
Organisations are reluctant to ask their employees to take time out to update their 
skills through training programs to ensure they are taking the right measures 
regarding security. Nevertheless, a security policy is useless if not taken seriously. 
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communication to understand that they are expected to follow policies and 
procedures. As mentioned earlier, organisations find it a challenge to keep their 
employees interested in training facilities; thus organisations must create inspired 
ways to increase employee participation in training and education (Steele and Wargo 
2007; Blades 2010). Such training programs must explain or give examples of 
security breaches that may have occurred. Employees must understand the 
consequences that may rest on their shoulders if a breach occurs. It is also very 
useful to emphasise the organisation’s custodial role in protecting data related to 
their customers and employees. One of the few things that scare individuals is 
identity theft; therefore, an explanation of how such activities could occur in an 
organisation and how this could potentially breach security, is also very effective. 
Hence, the need to protect one’s own identity is seen a useful method to keep 
employees always engaged in such training programs. More importantly, the 
changing landscape of technology should be emphasised. Awareness must be raised 
of such technologies and the risks they create. Therefore, employees must know how 
new devices, gadgets and software programs fit into the policy, and how the risks 
that such technologies bring to the table can be minimized (How to Weed out the 
New Insider Cybersecurity Threat  2007). It is an ongoing challenge to keep such 
mandatory training alive and repetitive without making it boring. Keeping training 
programs interesting can be difficult; therefore, organisations may want to consider 
using a third party to provide such training services. Moreover, for ongoing 
reminders of policies and security measures, administration should always send out 
reminders and emails as methods of keeping their employees up to date and 
reminded (Steele and Wargo 2007; Addressing the Insider Threat  2007).  
 
Despite the fact that theoretical academic literature and IT industry publications 
argue that security policy and policy culture are factors in insider threat behaviour, 
empirical evidence from reported incidents varies. It is noted that studies vary in 
terms of the scope of incidents examined; while this might explain different findings 
for factors such as motivation, it does not necessarily explain differences in 
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In 70% of the cases studied by Randazzo et al. (2004), insiders had broken through 
or tried to break through systemic vulnerabilities in processes, procedures or policies 
to launch their attacks. In 61% of these cases, the insiders exploited weaknesses 
inherent in the design of the hardware, software, or network. While, in 39% of cases, 
the insiders were unaware of the technical security measures in their organisation. 
Kowalski, Cappelli and Moore (2008) assert that in 62% of the cases they studied, 
the insiders violated systemic vulnerabilities in policies, processes, procedures or 
applications. Most of these violations occurred because of a lack of physical and 
technical access controls, thereby facilitating the insider theft. Moreover, Kowalski et 
al. (2008) claim that in half of the incidents they analysed, the insiders exploited the 
vulnerabilities in established business processes or controls, such as insufficiently 
enforced policies for separation of duties. Insiders were able to circumvent latent 
defects in business processes; they also exploited weaknesses in technical policies 
and procedures. In addition, 33% of incidents occurred because of security policy 
violation (Cappelli et al. 2008). On the other hand, Spooner et al. (2009) declare that 
none of the insiders exploited any technical vulnerability or security policies when 
carrying out their thefts.  
2.4.6  Psychological Factors 
The greatest security threat arises from the authorised employee. “People design, 
develop, and use as well as misuse information systems. It is, therefore, necessary to 
understand the psychology of people involved in both malicious and non-malicious 
insider activity”(Sarkar 2010, 114). Some resarchers have attempted to study the 
psychological profiles of insiders who were likely to offend, before the incident. 
Many researchers want to know how to spot potential insider attackers before they 
attack. However, for several years the criminal justice system has unsuccessfully 
sought to develop a profile of the internal threat criminal. Criminologists are not yet 
close to reliably discovering potential criminals in advance. Criminals differ in their 
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Thus, while it should be possible to identify some types of very antisocial behaviour, 
it remains very difficult to identify other offenders because they can conceal 
themselves from prior detection. The presence of false positives obstructs these 
efforts. It is also difficult to identify internal threats in advance, because it is 
currently not possible to identify serious criminal intent or behaviour. In addition, 
insiders’ threat activity can gradually evolve from non-malicious intent to more 
malicious intent (Pfleeger 2008).  
 
A psychological screening could be performed before an employee is hired (Sarkar 
2010). A rigorous psychological evaluation might be sufficient to identify possible 
inside attackers although it might also prove to be offensive to the non-attackers who 
must be employed. Furthermore, the time spent to evaluate the candidate 
psychologically decreases the time available to consider whether or not the employee 
would be beneficial to the organisation (Pfleeger 2008). 
 
As a result of this dilemma, even if such a psychological test existed, its use might be 
counterproductive. Predictions do not seem reliable in the budding field of 
psychological profiling. The relative lack of cases to work with, the poor 
understanding of the best definition of average acceptable behaviour, and the 
ambiguity in the identification of the boundary between acceptable and unacceptable 
behaviour, all combine to make the development of useful psychological profiles 
difficult (Pfleeger 2008).  
 
However, Shaw, Ruby, and Post (2005) assert that there are numerous features that, 
when found together, could indicate and increase the possibility of identifying 
potential harmful behaviour on the part of the insider. These features are: computer 
dependency, a history of personal and social frustrations, ethical lapses, a sense of 
entitlement, reduced loyalty and lack of empathy (Sarkar 2010).  
 
Another major use for psychology is a positive one: the development of ways to 
support good behaviour. Some researchers seek ways to use psychology to keep 
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psychology than for profiling. The difference between profiling and motivational 
methods is that profiling must be precise, producing few false positives and false 
negatives. The risk of a false positive is that of not hiring a good employee or 
refusing somebody who has not yet demonstrated harmful behaviour; the risk of a 
false negative is the failure to detect or prevent an attack (Pfleeger 2008).  
 
While the theoretical academic literature is diverse in regard to the psychological 
factors, IT industry publications support the significance of such risk factors in 
insider threat. There are some psychological characteristics which, when exhibited 
by an employee, could indicate an increase in the likelihood of inappropriate 
behaviour; these include: a sense of entitlement, computer addiction, personal and 
social frustrations, rationalize their violations, lack of empathy and reduced loyalty.  
Some studies show that a key characteristic of many of the insider attackers was a 
sense of personal entitlement. This is a personal feeling that one is special and better 
than others, and therefore should be better recognized or privileged. This feeling, 
accompanied by pre-existing anger toward authority figures, creates a desire for 
revenge.  In these cases, psychological factors and emotions may spur employees to 
plan an attack. According to Professor R. Caldwell, a computer scientist who led 
separate studies in 1990 and 1993 recognized that some individuals suffer from 
“revenge syndrome.” Some unfortunate individuals experience a series of negative 
incidents in their lives and frequently have a history of personal and social 
frustration. In most cases, abused and neglected children display this syndrome 
which is characterised by feelings of anger, hostility towards authority, lack of social 
skills, and a tendency to attack and walk out on the system (Steele and Wargo 2007). 
  
According to psychologists, computer-addicted characters are more likely than non-
addicted users to become aggressive, lonely people who are incapable of making 
friends or being team players. Psychologists report that such people are mainly 
interested in exploring networks, and breaking through security codes and measures 
in order to compete and challenge the professionals. Moreover, many insiders do not 
believe that their violations and actions are criminal or unethical. Instead, some 
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self-consciousness that may prevent others from committing such violations. 
Similarly, a research on ethical limitations within the “information culture” 
conducted by S. Harrington and published in 1995 reported that almost 7% of 
computer experts do not object to hacking or doing harm to a network. 
Unfortunately, according to their rationale, if a network is not sufficiently secured, it 
is only fair game to crack it. In addition, some studies reported that  IT employees 
had the tendency to identify more with their expertise and skills rather than with their 
employer. Similarly, a study of computer fraud conducted by the U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services in 1986, found that computer programmers and experts 
who engaged in scams felt more loyal to their skills than to their employer (Steele 
and Wargo 2007).  
 
According to Hu et al. (2011), employees with low self-control are more likely to 
commit the violations. In contrast, individuals who have strong moral beliefs are less 
likely to abuse their organisation even if the opportunities exist.  
 
In light of the implication that insiders are irritated first and attack later, the MERIT 
learning tool emphasises the relationship between them. This suggests that an insider 
threat may be detected before it actually occurs if the managers or supervisors are 
able to detect suspicious or concerning behaviour. Concerning behaviour includes 
decrease in performance, and behavioural antics that cause frustration and 
unpleasantness to others. Managers are urged to keep a close eye on employees who 
are disgruntled after a negative work-related episode. It is also recommended that 
they monitor the employee’s online activity after the incident. In cases of such 
obvious and unexpected changes of attitude, companies may have a window of 
opportunity to detect a hidden security threat and perhaps prevent an incident from 
taking place.  Although the organisation cannot monitor all employees’ online 
actions, it is easier to target suspicious employees and monitor them. Targeted 
monitoring of online activity by employees of concern can assist in the detection and 
prevention of insider threats (How to Weed out the New Insider Cybersecurity 
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Organisations should ensure that their recruitment screening policies enable thorough 
background checks of their employees. Managers should be made aware of red flags 
that can be observed in the employee’s attitudes and communication skills 
(Kirkpatrick 2008) 
 
Although the theoretical academic literature is diverse in regard to the psychological 
factors, empirical evidence from reported incidents support the IT industry 
publications that personal predispositions and behaviours are a common factor in 
internal incident cases. According to the United States Secret Service and CERT, 
about 80% of insiders who performed attacks on their organisations had 
demonstrated negative behaviours before the incident, and 92% had experienced a 
negative occupational event such as a demotion, transfer, warning, or termination 
(Cole 2008). According to Moore, Cappelli, and Trzeciak (2008) the majority of the 
insiders in the MERIT cases who committed IT sabotage demonstrated the impact of 
personal predisposition. Personal predisposition is “a characteristic historically 
linked to a propensity to exhibit malicious insider behaviour” (Moore, Cappelli, and 
Trzeciak 2008, 12). Personal predispositions can be identified by some obvious 
characteristics such as alcohol and drug addiction, physical partner abuse, violations 
arrests, hacking, and security violations. Most insiders in the studied cases had 
common personal predispositions which indicated an increased threat of performing 
malicious activities (Band et al. 2006). Personal predispositions may explain why 
some insiders perform malicious actions, while other employees exposed to the same 
situation do not act maliciously. Researchers emphasize that, in 97% of the IT 
sabotage cases, insiders came to the attention of supervisors or colleagues because of 
troublesome behaviour before the incident (Moore, Cappelli, and Trzeciak 2008). An 
estimated 80% of the criminal insiders behaved in inappropriate ways prior to the 
incident, and 30% of them were arrested prior to an attack (Keeney et al. 2005a). 
According to Cappelli et al. (2008), 60% of the insiders had exhibited several 
incidents of concerning behaviour or activity before the incident occurred, such as 
delays, absences and poor job performance. Their figures indicate that 55% of the 
criminal insiders displayed a noticeable worrisom behaviour prior to the attack and 
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in 43% of cases the insiders demonstrated inappropriate behaviour before the attack 
and about 31% of the insiders had been previously arrested. These individuals were 
arrested for: financial or fraud offences (14%), nonfinancial offences (6%), drugs or 
alcohol offences (3%) and violent and other offences (6%).  
 
2.4.7 Cultural Factors 
Organisational culture shapes the employees’ behaviour and this may dominate the 
security policies and processes (Sarkar 2010). Organisational culture is defined as 
“the shared values, norms and expectations that direct the way people approach 
their work and interact with each other” (Colwill 2009, 5). According to Royds 
(2009), most of the data losses reported by the government of the UK since the 
HRMC incident show that only 5% occur because of technology issues while 95% 
occur as a result of cultural factors or people’s behaviour. The culture of an 
organisation can influence the behaviour of employees and eventually contributes to 
the effectiveness of an organisation. In almost all organisations, information is 
considered to be a critical asset; consequently, an ideal organisational culture should 
incorporate information security controls in the daily tasks and implicit behaviour of 
employees (Thomson and von Solms 2006). Most organisations experience some 
kind of transformation at some stage in their development. Original organisation 
cultures are often dismantled and rebuilt, including the concepts and behaviours used 
to achieve security. However, if cultural changes are not addressed explicitly, they 
can cause fear, ambiguity and doubt in employees, which can impact on their 
attitudes to security (Ashenden 2008; Crinson 2008).  
 
Additionally, culture differences can affect the insider threat behaviour since the 
acceptable traditions for doing business differ according to region and area. For 
example, some practices considered illegal in the Western world may be acceptable 
in other parts of the world, such as the giving of substantial gifts (Colwill 2009). 
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result of the culture differences, but also can be a product of the nature of the 
interface between them. Cultural differences to some extent produce a clash, which is 
exacerbated the more the conflicting cultures interact with each other.  
 
 
Although much of the academic literature reviewed suggests that cultural factors are 
important in insider threats behaviour, not many IT industry publications support this 
claim. Only one paper discussed culture as a factor.  Kirkpatrick (2008) claims that 
employees with different cultural backgrounds may have different levels of 
awareness of law and ethics regarding theft. This can increase the problem of insider 
threat. Moreover, some countries expect their citizens to help their home country 
when working abroad. 
 
Moreover, empirical evidence from reported incidents reviewed in this study varies 
in its support of the highlighted factor. No single country or region was frequently 
represented. According to Kowalski et al. (2008), insiders did not share a common 
national or regional culture and they had different demographic profiles. Insiders had 
come from diverse cultures: 42% were African American, 39% Caucasian, 8% Asian 
and 5% were Hispanic. Furthermore, Spooner et al. (2009) confirm that insiders 
come from different lands: 50% were American, and 40% were foreign nationals 
including Chinese and Taiwanese. Another study by Keeney et al. (2005a) 
emphasised that insiders were demographically diverse with regard to culture and 
ethnic background, age, gender and marital status. On the other hand, Cummings et 
al. (2012) maintain that only eight cases out of 46 (17%) involved citizens of a 
foreign country, while 83% of the cases were American. 
2.4.8  Outsourcing  
The academic literature maintains that there are rapidly increasing numbers of third-
party workers being given long-term access to organisations’ systems and critical 
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the position of several ‘outsiders’ to ‘insiders’ and may blur the difference between 
an organisation’s employees and members of the third party (Shaw, Ruby, and Post 
1998). Many organisations outsource IT tasks to third parties who have the expertise 
for such tasks. There is a high risk of data abuse when outsourcing jobs with 
confidential data to a third party (Sarkar 2010). Contractors’ employees may be 
given a level of logical and physical access equal to that of  an organisation’s full-
time employees (Shaw, Ruby, and Post 1998). The dynamics of the labour force in 
the market and the increased rate of worker turnover could lead to an increase in the 
vulnerability of organisations, to loss of intellectual property and the probability of 
high value or high impact knowledge being transferred to a competitor or other 
external sources. This provides the opportunity for malicious insiders, who now have 
access to collections of information that have not previously been collected, to harm 
the organisation (Whitworth 2005; Colwill 2009). According to Cole and Ring 
(2005), outsourcing is becoming a norm for almost all organisations regardless of 
size. They point out that outsourcing presents new challenges and concerns that all 
organisations should to be aware of. Through outsourcing, the organisation will 
increase the scope of insiders to include the outsourcing company.  
 
Similarly, IT industry publications emphasize that outsourcing could contribute to 
insider threats. According to (Bucki 2011, 1), outsourcing is “any task, operation, 
job or process that could be performed by employees within an organisation, but is 
instead contracted to a third party for a significant period of time. In addition, the 
functions that are performed by the third party can be performed on-site or off-site”. 
An organisation signs an agreement with another outside company to perform the 
tasks or functions of an entire department. In both cases, the management control is 
in the hands of an outsider. In such cases, organisations must understand that each 
company is driven by different standards, missions and managerial styles; most 
importantly, organisations must understand that all outsourced employees or 
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Outsourcing organisations should consider the associated risks. Outsourcing 
employees could put vulnerable and confidential information at risk and increase the 
possibilities of security breaches. Each and every business runs on the valuable 
knowledge it has gained through its business experience.  Confidentiality could be 
compromised if such valuable knowledge is easily handed over to outsourced 
employees, since confidential information is at risk of being transferred elsewhere. 
Organisations should take into account the level of information that outsourced 
employees have access to, their knowledge, and sharing proprietary. Therefore, 
organisations should first investigate the outsourcing company to ensure their data 
will remain protected. Then, companies should state clear warnings in the contract 
and include a penalty clause in case an incident occurs (Blades 2010; Financial 
Institution Security Risks and Concerns: The Top Eight  2007). 
 
While academic literature and IT industry publications suggest that outsourcing is an 
important factor affecting behaviour in insider threats, the empirical evidence from 
reported incidents reviewed for this study has found that outsourcing or the 
introduction of contractors are not major factors, as only 8.7% of all CERT insider 
threat cases involved contractors (Lewellen et al. 2012). Many reports did not 
indicate this as a significant factor; and those reports which mentioned this factor did 
not give it much attention. Most of the reports studied state that contractors were 
involved in less than 20% of insider incidents. According to Kowalski et al. (2008),  
16% of the insiders at the time of the incident were contractors, sub-contractors, or 
temporary employees. In all insider incidents analysed by Kowalski, Cappelli and 
Moore (2008), 18% only were contractors. Cappelli et al.(2008) declare that in only 
two out of fifteen cases they analysed were there contractors or outsourcing 
employees involved, and all were current employees. 
2.4.9 Remote Access  
Some of the academic literature discusses the importance of remote access in insider 
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establish a great opportunity for the insiders to attack their organisation. As stated by 
Sarkar (2010, 123)“Working from home, working strange hours or remotely could 
mean that the employee do not wish his activities be noticed by his co-workers or his 
supervisors”. Shaw (2006) examined several law enforcement files and noticed that 
in most of the cases, the employees attacked remotely. Moreover, mobile devices 
were able to access the organisation’s network remotely and load sensitive data, 
exposing the data to possible loss or theft as the data on mobile devices are usually 
not encrypted or backed up. According to Sarkar (2010, 120), “any device like a 
laptop, a PDA or a mobile that accesses a corporate network or stores data is a 
potential risk to intellectual property or sensitive customer data. These portable 
devices are a great source of data leakage”.  Disgruntled employees who have 
authorised access to confidential information could copy this information to their 
mobile devices and sell it to third parties for personal gain (Aldhizer and Bowles 
2011). 
 
IT industry publications support the theoretical positions found in the academic 
literature, indicating that remote access is a factor in insider threats. According to IT 
industry publications, remote access is one of the factors contributing to insider 
threat. Remote access technologies similar to Virtual Private Networks (VPN) give 
individuals the privilege to access a private company’s system from a computer 
anywhere in the world. Although there are numerous advantages to remote access 
such as business convenience, especially for those who need to work from home or 
who are travelling (Data Insecurity—Is Not Knowing the Cause Part of Your 
Problem?  2008), the risks are also considerable. Viruses may be lodged onto the 
network or system through remote access. Hence, information theft may be easily 
committed through remote access (Griffin 2009; Bauch 2011). Researches have 
shown that mobility has indirectly caused insider threats of information theft or 
breaches. The granting of remote access increases the risks although employees may 
be unaware of such breaches (Secret Service, Cert Analyze Insider Computer 
Sabotage  2005; Data Insecurity—Is Not Knowing the Cause Part of Your Problem?  
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Misuse of It Resources  2009). Moreover, establishing and maintaining unauthorized 
remote access can lead to serious malicious actions (Bauch 2011). 
  
Despite the fact that theoretical academic literature and IT industry publications 
argue that remote access is a factor in insider threat behaviour, empirical evidence 
from reported incidents varies. Some of the reports show that a high percentage of 
the crimes are committed through remote access, while others report only a small 
percentage. Employees can access the organisation’s networks from outside the 
workplace, from their homes or elsewhere. Several researchers claim that the number 
of crimes which were carried out through remote access is significant. In 87% of the 
cases studied by Keeney et al. (2005a), the victim organisations gave their employees 
remote access, and in 56% of the incidents, the attacks were carried out through 
remote access. Most of the insiders in IT sabotage cases used remote access to launch 
their attack, and in 30% of the fraud cases, the insiders used remote access (CERT 
2006). According to Moore, Cappelli, and Trzeciak (2008) in 64% of the cases they 
studied, the insiders used remote access to attack. Half of the cases reported in 
(Hanley et al. 2009) used remote access to attack. In about 43% of the cases, the 
insider attacks were conducted via remote access from outside the workplace 
(Kowalski et al. 2008). Randazzo et al. (2004) report that 30% of the attacks were 
carried out from the insiders’ homes via remote access and 57% of those were 
attacks carried out both from the workplace and from home.  On the other hand, 
some reports maintain that less than 20% of the incidents were conducted via remote 
access (Cappelli et al. 2008; Moore et al. 2009; Spooner et al. 2009; Hanley et al. 
2011). 
2.4.10 Gender 
There is almost no academic or IT industry literature investigating gender as a factor 
in insider threat behaviour. In contrast to the academic literature’s silence on the 
importance of gender, empirical evidence from reported incidents overwhelmingly 
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According to Moore et al.  (2009), in 82% of overall CERT cases, the insider was 
male and 91% of the insiders who stole intellectual property were male. Another 
study indicates that 94% of the insiders were male (Hanley et al. 2011).  Males 
committed 90% of the crimes studied by Spooner (2009). In another study, 96% of 
the insiders were male (Keeney et al. 2005a). Insiders who carried out IT sabotage 
were mainly male and males constituted 80% of the insiders who stole secret 
proprietary information (CERT 2006). The majority of the insiders were also male in 
the research by CERT (2009) and Hanley et al. (2009). However, some reports 
indicate that the numbers of males and females were equal; in a study presented by 
Kowalski et al. (2008), 50% of the insiders in cases were male and 50% were female. 
Cappelli et al. (2006; 2009) support the contention that half of the insiders were male 
and the other half female in cases of fraud and theft for financial gain. On the other 
hand, 31% of the insider fraud cases analysed by Cummings et al. (2012) were 
committed by males and 69% were committed by females. Likewise, King (2012) 
found that the majority of the insiders in the analysed cases were female. 
2.5   Insider Threat Models  
One of the major obstacles to the detection and prevention of insider attack is that 
very few studies on this subject have been designed to solve the problem in a broad, 
comprehensive manner. Most of the models which have been studied for this 
research focus on the insider threat for specific problems within specific 
organisations. Several models have recently been presented to detect and prevent 
insider threat and most of these have focused on technical issues; however, very few 
have discussed the social, cultural and demographic factors. Insider threat models 
that are representative of the research space are set out below:  
 
 Parker (1998), developed a model based on a list of factors which includes 
skills, knowledge, resources, authority, and motives and used it to insider and 
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factors which relate to insider behaviour such as culture and background. 
Wood (2000) proposes a model based on the insider’s motivation. The insider 
should have a motive for the attack, a target, and the ability to launch the 
attack. This model focuses only on one factor and does not consider other 
factors such as technical and social factors. 
 Gonzalez and Sawicka (2002) developed a systems dynamic simulation 
model to discover complex security problems; the purpose of their research 
project was to gain an understanding of the role of human factors in 
information security systems. They used a simple case to demonstrate how 
system dynamics may provide insight into the people security problem and 
help in designing robust security policies. The model focuses on human 
factors and does not address other insider threat issues such as the 
technological and organisational environments.  
 Magklaras and Furnell (2005) presented a model for insider threat prediction 
based on one factor which is end user sophistication. This model considers 
the sophistication of an end user as a potential factor that influences their 
ability to comment insider misuse. The Magklaras and Furnell model ignores 
many other factors that relate to insider misuse such as insider motivation, 
access, culture and psychological factors.  
 Hu, Bradford and Liu (2006) developed a model for detection of insider 
attacks by intrusion detection systems based on the assumption that an insider 
is described by job function. However, the influence of social insider factors 
is not considered in this model.  
 Althebyan and Panda (2007) developed a model of insider threat prediction, 
focusing on two: the insider's knowledge and existing dependencies among 
objects in the system. Their model limits the possibilities for the insider to 
gain access to documents and obtain sensitive information from the 
organisation. This model however, focuses on cyber insiders and does not 
consider social insiders.  
 Another model presented by Jones (2008a) focused on organisational factors 
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malicious insider and to mitigate their threat to the organisation. 
Nevertheless, the influence of human and technical factors is not considered 
in this model.  
 Moore, Cappelli, and Trzeciak (2008) presented a system dynamics model of 
the insider IT sabotage problem, where the insider’s main aim is to harm 
some parts of the organisation such as business operations, information and 
the system or network. Their model mostly focuses on one primary problem; 
they did not consider any other types of insider threat such as fraud or the 
theft of sensitive information.  
 Pfleeger et al. (2010) presented an insider threat model which described 
insiders and their actions based on the organisation, the environment, the 
system, and the individual. They gave several examples of inappropriate 
insider action such as theft of intellectual property, tax fraud and proliferation 
of e-mail responses, and demonstrated how each situation arose and how it 
could be addressed. This model could be considered as a good step in 
understanding insider threat because previous research focused on malicious 
insiders, while their study suggests that unintentional insider action can be 
just as debilitating to any organisation. However, their model does not 
address several factors such as remote access, whether the insider is 
outsourced, the descriptions of insider motivation for instance, whether an 
insider’s action was motivated by financial gain or by revenge. 
  Sasaki (2011) proposed an insider threat detection model generating a trigger 
that made malicious insiders carry out suspicious actions such as deleting 
files and e-mails. This model focused mainly on technical issues without 
considering other factors such as personal and organizational issues.  
 The last model considered here is that of Brdiczka et al. (2012) who 
presented an approach for insider threat detection by combining inconsistency 
detection from social and information networks with psychological profiling 
of individuals. Their approach could be implemented in any organisations' 
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However, this model omits many factors such as organisational, 
environmental and cultural factors. 
 
2.6 Research Gap  
Most of the studies that were examined include insider threat models but these 
models were not empirically validated or tested and most of the papers present non-
validated defence methods against insider threat. In addition, nearly all of the 
previous models focus mainly on one primary problem, and only one model 
addressed four factors. None of the reviewed models addresses all the ten factors 
identified in the literature and very few models consider both technical and human 
factors (see Table 2.4). Little can be found in the previous sources regarding social, 
cultural and demographic factors and their effects on the insider threat. Moreover, 
the scopes of prior studies have been limited to specialised areas, resulting in isolated 
findings, where many factors related to insider behaviour, such as culture, 
background and education, have been omitted. Hence, there is a research gap, 
because although a number of academic research models explain the insider threat 
behaviour factors, none of these captures all factors. These missing aspects constitute 
knowledge gaps. Providing specific models of the insider threat without making a 
holistic contribution only adds to the obstacles preventing insider threat, as stated by 
Huth et al. (2013, 2) “an approach is necessary to provide holistic solutions to the 
problem of insider threats”. Thus, there is a need for a holistic model that combines 
all these different factors, thereby more accurately reflecting the real world situation. 
 
Furthermore, as well as the need for a holistic model, there is a need to verify each of 
the factors in the holistic model, because of the disagreement of the academic 
literature and the previous cases some areas. The factors contributing to insider threat 
were not equally supported by all three sources (academic, IT industry publications 
and reported incidents) studied for this research.  Research has produced conflicting 
results. For example, academic sources support the importance of a security policy as 
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found that security policies have limited effect. As can be seen from Table 2.5, the 
practitioner view does not match the academic view, as some sources strongly 
support some factors while other sources have highlighted others. There are areas 
where the academic research does not sharply reflect the actual insider threat 
incidents. Therefore, further investigation is necessary in order to identify the main 
contributing factors to insider threat behaviour.  
 
Therefore, the overall aim of this research is to develop a holist insider threat model 
of the factors that influence insider threat behaviour. To the best of the researcher’s 
knowledge, there is no published study that provides a holistic view of the insider 
threat contributing factors that address the three sources studied for this research 
(academic, IT industry publications and reported incidents). Therefore, this study 
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Parker (1998)           
Wood (2000)           
Gonzalez and Sawicka (2002)           
Magklaras and Furnell (2005)           
Althebyan and Panda (2007)           
Jones (2008a)           
Pfleeger et al (2010)           
Sasaki (2011)           
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Table 2.4: Insider threat contributing factors and the three sources 
Factors Academic sources IT industry publications Reported Incidents 
Access and level 
of trust 
The following references support access and 
level of trust as a factor: 
 (McNamara 1998; Wood 2000; Cohen 2001; 
Furnell 2004; Kemp 2005; Nykodym, Taylor, 
and Vilela 2005; Walton and Limited 2006; 
Okolica, Peterson, and Mills 2006; Contos 
2007; Swartz 2007; Althebyan and Panda 2008; 
Bellovin 2008; Dallaway 2008; Fyffe 2008; 
Liu, Wang, and Camp 2008; Walker 2008; Liu, 
Wang, and Camp 2009; Sarkar 2010; Willison 
and Warkentin 2013) 
The following references support access and 
level of trust as a factor: 
 (Thompson and Ford 2004; Ansanelli 2005; Secret 
Service, Cert Analyze Insider Computer Sabotage  
2005; Khanna 2005; Lynch 2006; Ortega 2006; 
Addressing the Insider Threat  2007; Financial 
Institution Security Risks and Concerns: The Top 
Eight  2007;  How to Weed out the New Insider 
Cybersecurity Threat  2007; Roberts 2007; 
Kirkpatrick 2008; Castle 2009; Chickowski 2009; 
Wehrum 2009; Blades 2010; Messmer 2010; Bauch 
2011) 
The following references support access and 
level of trust as a factor: 
 (Randazzo et al. 2004; Keeney, Cappelli, et al. 
2005; CERT 2006;  Moore, Cappelli, and 
Trzeciak 2008; Kowalski et al. 2008; CERT 
2009; Moore et al. 2009; Hanley et al. 2009; 




The following references support  insider 
knowledge as a factor: 
(Wood 2000; Magklaras and Furnell 2005; 
Steele and Wargo 2007; Althebyan and Panda 
2008; Dallaway 2008; White and Panda 2009; 
Neumann 2010). 
The following references support insider 
knowledge as a factor: 
 (Neumann 1999; Khanna 2005; Ortega 2006; 
Kirkpatrick 2008; Castle 2009; Willison and 
Siponen 2009; Buckley 2010; Blades 2010; Hu et 
al. 2011). 
There were no references addressing insider 
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Factors Academic sources IT industry publications Reported Incidents 
Gender There were no references addressed gender 
as a factor 
There were no references addressed gender as a 
factor 
The following references support gender as 
a factor: 
(Keeney, Cappelli, et al. 2005; Cappelli et al 
2006; CERT 2006; Kowalski et al 2008; 
Moore et al  2009; Spooner 2009; Cappelli et 
al 2009; Hanley et al. 2009;  CERT 2009; 
Hanley et al. 2011, Cummings et al. 2012; 
King 2012)  
Insider 
Technical Skills 
The following references support insider 
skills as a factor: 
 (Cohen 2001; Nykodym, Taylor, and Vilela 
2005; Magklaras and Furnell 2005; 
Theoharidou et al. 2005; Althebyan and Panda 
2008; White and Panda 2009). 
The following references support insider skills as 
a factor: 
(Secret Service, Cert Analyze Insider Computer 
Sabotage  2005; Ortega 2006; Lynch 2006; How to 
Weed out the New Insider Cybersecurity Threat  





The following references support insider 
technical skills as a factor: 
(Keeney, Cappelli, et al. 2005; Moore, 
Cappelli, and Trzeciak 2008; Cappelli et al. 
2008; Kowalski et al. 2008; Hanley et al. 
2009; Spooner et al. 2009; CERT 2009; Moore 
et al. 2009; Hanley et al 2011). 
The following references provide only weak 
support  
Randazzo et al. 2004; CERT 2006; Hanley et 
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Factors Academic sources IT industry publications Reported Incidents 
Motivation The following references support motivation 
as a factor: 
 (Bloombecker 1984; Forester and Morrison 
1994; Hitchings 1995; McNamara 1998; Wood 
2000; Furnell 2004; Theoharidou et al. 2005; 
Robert and James 2006; Furnell 2006; Shaw 
2006; Fyffe 2008; Jones 2008b; Walker 2008; 
White and Panda 2009; Sarkar 2010; Crossler et 
al. 2013). 
 
The following references support motivation as a 
factor: 
 (Ortega 2006; Lynch 2006; D'Arcy and Hovav 
2007; Kirkpatrick 2008;  Willison and Siponen 
2009; Blades 2010; Bauch 2011 ) 
The following references support 
motivation as a factor: 
 (CERT 2006 ; Cappelli et al. 2008; Kowalski 
et al. 2008; Hanley et al. 2009) King 
2012(Keeney, Cappelli, et al. 2005; Moore, 
Cappelli, and Trzeciak 2008) CERT (2006 ), 
CERT (2009) and Cummings et al. (2012) 
Hanley et al. (2009) Kowalski et al. (2008) 
Outsourcing The following references support 
outsourcing as a factor: 
(Shaw, Ruby, and Post 1998; (Whitworth 2005; 






The following references support outsourcing as 
a factor: 
(Khanna 2005; Financial Institution Security Risks 
and Concerns: The Top Eight  2007; Blades 2010; 
Bucki 2011) 
The following reference provides only weak 
support:  
(Kowalski, Cappelli and Moore 2008; Cappelli 
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Factors Academic sources IT industry publications Reported Incidents 
Information 
security policy 
The following references support 
information security policy as a factor: 
(Gaunt 1998; Cohen 2001; Magklaras and 
Furnell 2002; Pramanik, Sankaranarayanan, and 
Upadhyaya 2004; Furnell 2004; Furnell 2006; 
Walton and Limited 2006; Canavan 2007; 
Bishop et al. 2008; Albrechtsen and Hovden 
2010; Da Veiga and Eloff 2010; Hu et al. 2012; 
Crossler et al. 2013; Guo 2013). 
The following references support information 
security policy as a factor:   
(Khanna 2005; Jaikumar 2005; Addressing the 
Insider Threat  2007; Steele and Wargo 2007; 
D'Arcy and Hovav 2007; How to Weed out the 
New Insider Cybersecurity Threat  2007; Blades 
2010; Hu et al. 2011; Ford 2012) 
The following references support 
information security policy as a factor: 
(Randazzo et al. 2004; Kowalski, Cappelli and 
Moore 2008; Kowalski et al. 2008)  
The following reference provides only weak 
support:  
(Cappelli et al. 2008) 
The following reference provides no 
support:  
(Spooner et al. 2009) 
Psychological 
factors 
The following references support the 
psychological factor: 
(Shaw, Ruby, and Post 2005; Sarkar 2010) 
 





The following references support the 
psychological factor: 
(Steele and Wargo 2007; How to Weed out the 
New Insider Cybersecurity Threat  2007; 
Kirkpatrick 2008; Hu et al. 2011) 
The following references support the 
psychological factor: 
Keeney, Cappelli, et al. 2005; Band et al. 
2006; Cole 2008; According to Moore, 
Cappelli, and Trzeciak 2008; Cappelli et al. 
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Factors Academic sources IT industry publications Reported Incidents 
Cultural factors The following references support cultural 
factors:  
Thomson and von Solms 2006; Ashenden 2008; 
Crinson 2008; Royds 2009; Colwill 2009; 
Sarkar 2010; Luo and Shenkar 2011) 
 
The following references support cultural 
factors:  
(Kirkpatrick 2008) 
The following references support cultural 
factors: 
 (Keeney et al. 2005; Kowalski et al. 2008; 
Spooner et al. 2009)  
 
The following reference provides only weak 
support:  
(Cummings et al. 2012). 
Remote access The following references support remote 
access as a factor: 
(Cole and Ring 2005; Shaw 2006; Sarkar 2010; 








The following references support remote access 
as a factor: 
(Secret Service, Cert Analyze Insider Computer 
Sabotage 2005; Data Insecurity—Is Not Knowing 
the Cause Part of Your Problem?  2008; Castle 
2009; Assessing the Seriousness of Security 
Threats from Employee Misuse of It Resources 
2009; Griffin 2009; Bauch 2011). 
The following references support remote 
access as a factor: 
(Randazzo et al. 2004; Keeney, Cappelli, et al. 
2005; CERT 2006; Moore, Cappelli, and 
Trzeciak 2008; (Kowalski et al. 2008;  Hanley 
et al. 2009) 
 
The following references provide only weak 
support:  
(Cappelli et al. 2008; Moore et al. 2009; 
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2.7  Summary  
Chapter Two provides a critical review of the relevant literature related to this 
research from three different sources: academic research, IT industry publications 
and published reported incidents. It describes in detail the risk of insider threat as 
well as the previous insider threat models, the gaps in the previous research were also 
discussed in detail. This review highlights the crucial need for a holistic insider threat 
model and reemphasizes the significance of this research, because the academic 
research provided diverse models that reflect differences and disagreements. 
Moreover, none of the previous models captures all the factors that emerged from 
this review.  
 
In addition, a detailed analysis of the factors contributing to insider threat, gathered 
from the three different sources, provided sound evidence in support of the need for 
more investigation in order to verify each factor. The factors that emerged from the 
three different sources (academic sources, IT industry publications and published 
reported incidents) were not equally supported by all the sources since some sources 
have highlighted some factors while other sources have supported others. Thus, this 
chapter highlights the need for a holistic insider threat model, investigating the 
important contributing insider threat factors from all three sources in order to 
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 CHAPTER THREE:       3
RESEARCH OBJECTIVE, 




Chapter Two reviewed the insider threat literature from three different sources: 
academic research, IT industry publications and published reported incidents. The 
scope of the literature search and the selection criteria were detailed. It also described 
in detail the risk of insider threat as well as the insider threat contributing factors. 
Finally, Chapter Two highlighted the research gaps. 
 
This chapter addresses the main elements that drive this research, the research 
objectives and corresponding research questions. It starts with the research objectives 
followed by the research questions and significance of the research. The research 
objectives and research questions sections will address the ‘what’ of the research 
while significance will justify the ‘why’ of this study. Finally, the candidate research 
model will be presented at the end of this chapter.  
3.2 Research Objective 
The crucial need for a holistic model of insider threat was evidenced in Chapter Two, 
as most of the previous models focus on some factors while ignoring others. The 
overall aim of this research is to develop a conceptual insider threat model that can 
frame a holistic view of insider threat behaviour and inform the development of best 
practices to manage the insider threat. This research studied the insider threat in an 
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developing a holistic insider threat model. To do so, the researcher conducted a 
thorough examination of social, technical and organisational factors. As discussed in 
section 2.6, previous research in this area focused on quite narrow and specific areas 
and most of the models and frameworks developed so far specialise in either people 
to people relationships, segmentation of tasks, access to information or network 
architectures (Huth et al. 2013). The very rigorous and structured search approach in 
Chapter Two revealed that, to date, no published prior research has taken a holistic 
view of the insider threat. Huth et al. (2013) support this, stating that researchers still 
struggle to develop a holistic approach that addresses and defines the insider threat 
problem. 
 
Therefore, the main objective of this research is to gain a holistic view of the insider 
threat by understanding the factors that influence insider threat behaviour, both by 
individuals and organisations, and then develop security measures (best practices) to 
manage insider threat behaviour.  
3.3 Research Questions  
The literature from three sources reviewed in Chapter Two revealed the lack of 
agreement concerning the factors that contribute to insider threat. Some sources 
strongly support some factors while other sources have highlighted others. To 
examine this issue, the factors contributing to insider threat should be accurately 
determined and it is essential to conduct further investigation in order to identify 
these factors. Hence, the main purpose of this research is to develop a holistic insider 
threat model by understanding the factors that influence insider threat behaviour. 
Accordingly, the first research question is:      
RQ1: What are the factors that influence the insider to behave 
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In addition, section 2.3 clearly demonstrated that the incidence of insider threats has 
steadily increased year by year, and there are indications that this trend will continue 
(Brdiczka et al. 2012). A comprehensive security guideline is necessary in order to 
minimise the insider threat risk. This leads to the second research objective which is 
the development of the best practices to manage insider threat behaviour to mitigate 
the risk. Correspondingly, the second research question is: 
RQ2: How can organisations manage insiders’ potential abuse of 
security?  
3.4 Research Significance 
The insider threat is a complex problem involving both human factors and 
computational elements; this threat is managed by a combination of technical and 
behavioural strategies. This research makes two important contributions: theoretical 
and practical.  
3.4.1    Theoretical Contribution  
Theoretical significance refers to the coverage of the literature, the contribution to 
knowledge in the field of study and future research opportunities within the field of 
study. This research proposes a new conceptual insider threat model for a holistic 
view of insider threat behaviour to present an insight into the insider threat - 
including people, tools, technology and environment. The significance of this model 
lies in its understanding of the insider threat from a wider perspective instead of a 
single view. The proposed model adds to the knowledge base for further research and 
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3.4.2    Practical Contribution  
As stated by Brdiczka et al. (2012), the incidence of insider threats has experienced a 
continuous increase each year, and there are indications that this trend will continue. 
Previous studies illustrated in section 2.3 revealed that insider threat leads to great 
financial losses in organisations. A Cyber Security Watch Survey conducted in 
January 2011 showed that around 43% of participants had experienced an insider 
incident between 2004 and 2010 and 46% of the participants stated that insider 
attacks were more costly than other attacks (Holmlund et al. 2011; CERT 2012). 
According to a CERT study, the average costs of insider threat exceed $50M in 
losses (King 2012). These losses demonstrate that the insider threat is a serious 
problem which costs organisations a great deal. 
 
This research will minimise the problem of the insider threat by providing best 
practices to manage insider behaviour. The contributions of this research are 
applicable to business and user needs especially in security and IT departments. The 
proposed best practises will contribute to avoiding and preventing insider threats in 
organisations. These best practises will be useful in different organisations and for 
audiences who are aware of organisational security issues such as the Chief 
Information Security Officer (CISO).  
3.5 Candidate Holistic Insider Threat (HIT) Model 
and the Factors  
The candidate HIT model is an amalgamation of the factors derived from academic 
sources, IT industry publications and incident reports. The literature review revealed 
nine factors that contribute to insider threat behaviour namely: access and level of 
trust, insider knowledge, insider technical skills, motivation, information security 
policy, psychological factors, cultural factors, outsourcing, remote access and 
gender. Table 2.4 in section 2.6 illustrates that some insider threat factors were 
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sources. Therefore, the combinations of academic sources, IT industry publications 
and reported incidents factors result in the development of the candidate HIT model.  
 
Factors in the candidate HIT model and their explanation are given below: 
3.5.1 Individual Characteristics 
Two factors are combined together (psychological factors and gender) as both relate 
to personal characteristics. In 82% of overall CERT cases, the insider was male 
(Moore et al 2009; Hanley et al. 2011). According to Cummings et al. (2012), the 
high incidence of males does not indicate that they are more likely to commit insider 
threat as much, as it might reflect the distribution of men in these roles within the 
organisations.  
 
However, there are a number of personal features that could predict harmful 
behaviour. These features include: psychological factors, personal factor (such as 
personal predispositions) and inappropriate or concerning behaviour prior to the 
incident (Shaw, Ruby, and Post 2005; Steele and Wargo 2007; Cappelli et al 2008; 
Sarkar 2010; Hu et al. 2011).  
 
As explained in section 2.4.6, examples of psychological factors include social 
frustrations and computer dependency. Personal predispositions can be recognized 
by some noticeable features such as alcohol and drug addiction, physical partner 
abuse, violations arrests, hacking, and security violations (Band et al. 2006). Personal 
predisposition is a common feature in many insider threat cases (Band et al. 2006; 
Moore, Cappelli, and Trzeciak 2008; Cole 2008). Furthermore, inappropriate or 
concerning behaviour (such as delays, absences and poor job performance) prior to 
the incident could indicate an increased threat of potential malicious activities 
(Cappelli et al 2008). Many criminal insiders behaved in inappropriate ways prior to 
the incident (Keeney, Cappelli, et al. 2005; Cappelli et al 2008; Kowalski et al. 
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revealed a noticeable concerning behaviour or activity before the incident which 
indicates that individual characteristics could contributing to insider threat.  
3.5.2 Outsourcing  
Outsourcing is any task, operation or job performed by a third party. This task cannot 
be completed by employees within an organisation for reasons such as a shortage of 
time, employees or skills (Shaw, Ruby, and Post 1998). Although most organisations 
find outsourcing is beneficial, the risk of security violation or compromised 
intellectual property rights is increased (Sarkar 2010; Blades 2010). 
 
As explained in section 2.4.8, outsourced employees increase the risk of insider 
threat behaviour as sometimes they are given the same logical and/or physical access 
as the organisation’s full time employees (Shaw, Ruby, and Post 1998). In addition, 
engaging a relatively high number of outsourcing agreements could expose the 
confidential data to serious threat (Whitworth 2005; Colwill 2009). Therefore, all 
organisations must take into consideration the threat posed by the outsourced 
employees and carefully consider their level of access and their knowledge.   
3.5.3 Information Security Policy 
An information security policy is a guideline that the organisation can follow to 
protect its physical and information technology assets (Canavan 2007). All 
employees should strictly follow the security policies guideline to minimise the risk 
of any potential threats and to be able to respond to any security incidents efficiently 
(Hu et al. 2012; Crossler et al. 2013). Overall, security policy identifies the activities 
that are authorised for a specific user and purpose.  
 
As discussed in section 2.4.5, an appropriate security policy should depend on the 
business and the sensitivity of data. All organisations should be aware that when 
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information security policy training and awareness, and keep their information 
security policy up to date (Cohen 2001; Magklaras and Furnell 2002; Pramanik, 
Sankaranarayanan, and Upadhyaya 2004; Furnell 2006; Walton and Limited 2006; 
Bishop et al. 2008; Hu et al. 2012; Crossler et al. 2013). Training and awareness 
programs are very essential in order to minimise the risks of the insider threat 
(Jaikumar 2005). Likewise, the appropriate enforcement and reminders of the 
established policies will help to mitigate the risk (Steele and Wargo 2007). An 
inappropriate information security policy will increase the risk of the insider threat; 
therefore, all organisations must consider how best to implement an appropriate 
information security policy, and keep it up to date. 
3.5.4 Remote Access  
Remote access allows employees to access the organisation’s networks from outside 
the organisation’s physical boundaries. In this study, remote access is introduced as 
access by an employee who can gain entrance into the organisation’s networks from 
outside the workplace, either from their home or other place, through mobile devices 
or any other device. As discussed previously in section 2.4.9, giving employees 
remote access to organisational information will increase the security risks (Keeney, 
Cappelli, et al. 2005; CERT 2006; Sarkar 2010). Such risks include viruses as these 
could be transferred to the organisation’s network through untrusted devices, and 
information theft can easily be committed via this access (Griffin 2009; Bauch 2011). 
Furthermore, allowing mobile devices to access organisational information remotely 
from outside the organisation’s physical boundary poses a great threat to the 
information since these devices are a source of data leakage (Sarkar 2010). Remote 
access increases the risk of insider threat since it could lead to information theft or 
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3.5.5 Cultural Factors   
This study divides the cultural factors into organisational culture and 
national/regional culture (see section 2.4.7). Organisational culture is the shared 
values and norms that provide ways for employees to achieve their tasks and to 
interact with each other (Thomson and von Solms 2006; Colwill 2009; Sarkar 2010). 
Organisational culture shapes employees’ behaviour and it may direct the security 
policies. Thus, if the organisational culture tolerates unethical behaviour, the 
employee definitely will behave inappropriately. 
 
Furthermore, culture differences increase the risk of insider threat behaviour since 
the employees come from different cultural backgrounds with different levels of 
awareness of law, and ethics regarding theft. In addition, cultural differences 
sometimes lead to clashes between employees and the organisation which in turn 
may increase the insider threat. (Bond 2004; Crinson 2008; Royds 2009; Casali and 
Day 2010; Colwill 2009; Sarkar 2010). Therefore, cultural differences sometimes 
play a role in explaining the abuse of the organisation's system or information. 
3.5.6 Motivation   
The motivation for a malicious attack is grouped into three main areas: revenge, theft 
for financial gain, and theft for a business advantage (Furnell 2004) as mentioned in 
section 2.4.4. Most often, insiders intentionally misuse their organisation to obtain 
data for financial or business gain (White and Panda 2009). Malicious insider’s 
motivation could include the desire for direct personal gain or sometimes the insider 
may have been recruited by competitive organisations that financially reward them 
for their disloyalty. Moreover, the insider could be persuaded by the outsider when 
the employee is being forced or blackmailed to perform the attack  (Wood 2000; 
Furnell 2006; Fyffe 2008; Walker 2008; White and Panda 2009; Sarkar 2010; 
Crossler et al. 2013). Studies show that unsatisfied employees have the desire to 
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insider incidents take place after the insider has been involved in a negative work-
related event (Lynch 2006; Kirkpatrick 2008). Insider motivation is considered as an 
important factor contributing to insider threat; if the insiders have a motive for 
harming their organisation, and moreover have access, they can easily misuse their 
organisation. 
3.5.7 Access and Level of Trust   
Section 2.4.1 illustrated that the misuse of access is one of the most common types of 
attack and is considered one of the most difficult types of attack to detect and prevent 
(Fyffe 2008; Willison and Warkentin 2013). Many organisations give their 
employees more access and trust than what they essentially need to do their job 
(Cohen 2001; Furnell 2004; Nykodym, Taylor, and Vilela 2005; Bellovin 2008; 
Willison and Warkentin 2013). High level of trust offers the crucial privileges that 
malicious insiders need to allow them to carry out a successful insider attack 
(Magklaras and Furnell 2005; Contos 2007). A privileged employee, more than 
others, can cause serious harm to organisations (Sarkar 2010; Willison and 
Warkentin 2013). For example, employees in technical positions who have a system 
administrator or privileged system access can present a serious threat to the 
organisation.  
 
Furthermore, it is essential to immediately disable employees' access when they are 
terminated. Access to an organisation's physical and technical systems by individuals 
who previously had legitimate access can create a significant threat to the 
organisation. (McNamara 1998; Cohen 2001; Furnell 2004; Nykodym, Taylor, and 
Vilela 2005; Bellovin 2008; Fyffe 2008; CERT 2009; Willison and Warkentin 2013). 
Physical and logical access is one of the most important factors contributing to 
insider threat. Therefore, organisations should be aware of all access paths to the 
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3.5.8 Insiders' Knowledge 
Insiders’ knowledge refers to any employees using the knowledge gained from their 
legitimate jobs for illegal gain (Willison and Siponen 2009). Insiders can be anyone 
within the organisation including full-time employees, contractors or administrators. 
As explained in section 2.4.2, whoever they are, the more knowledge they have the 
more harm they can do (Khanna 2005; Castle 2009).  Insiders often have a great deal 
of knowledge about their organisation; they are usually aware of the potential value 
of the organisation’s information and the methods required to grant access to this 
information. Moreover, insiders have a great knowledge about policies, procedures, 
security countermeasures and their weaknesses (Magklaras and Furnell 2005; 
Dallaway 2008; Althebyan and Panda 2008; White and Panda 2009; Bishop et al. 
2010). Thus, insiders are well-informed about the areas that can be targeted and how 
to obtain the information required.   
3.5.9 Technical Skills 
Technically skilled employees are considered as the most serious threat to any 
organisation networks (Ortega 2006). As earlier described in section 2.4.3, insiders 
can use their technical skills to harm an organisation’s system via a number of means 
including hacker tools, writing a script or program that includes a logic bomb, 
placing a virus on client computers, utilizing password crackers, downloading remote 
system administration tools, gaining access to the system after termination and the 
setup, and using backdoor accounts (Cohen 2001; Magklaras and Furnell 2005; 
Theoharidou et al. 2005; Sarkar 2010). Insiders often have the technical skills that 
are usually related to the system they are familiar with, which gives them a better 
opportunity to misuse this system. 
 
According to Cohen (2001) and Theoharidou et al. (2005), the level of employee 
sophistication can influence their ability to execute insider threat. They divided the 
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high level sophistication), ordinary (end users with a medium level sophistication) 
and novice (end users with a low level of IT sophistication). Organisations should 
acknowledge the threat of a technology-driven world, where a technically skilled 
employee could cause greater harm than can any ordinary employee. 
As discussed in section 2.6 of the previous chapter, there is a crucial need for a 
holistic model of insider threat to address all the contributing factors, as most of the 
previous models focus on one factor while ignoring the others. This study has taken 
into consideration all the factors that have been addressed by the previous literature. 
The candidate HIT model is presented in Figure 3.1 to illustrate these factors. 
 
The candidate HIT model will be utilized in the preparation of a survey method in 
Chapter Five. In the quantitative phase of the study, the factors in the candidate HIT 
model are validated. The outcome from the survey is the enhanced HIT model with 
the factors that influence the insider threat behaviour. Thus, the candidate HIT model 
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3.6    Summary 
This chapter discussed in detail the research objectives, research questions and 
research significance. This study has two main objectives: (1) to develop a holistic 
conceptual insider threat model by understanding the factors that influence insider 
threat behaviour and (2) to develop best practices to manage insider threat behaviour. 
In addition, this chapter presented the research questions, followed by the discussion 
of the two main contributions of this study: theoretical and practical contributions. 
Finally, Chapter three presented the candidate HIT model and an explanation of each 
factor in the model was also provided.  
 
The next chapter will explain in detail the research methodology and the research 
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 CHAPTER FOUR:          4
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY     
 
4.1 Introduction 
In Chapter Three, the research objectives and the research questions provided the 
foundation for this chapter as they help to determine the selection of the research 
methodology. Given the research gap whereby there is no holistic insider threat 
model, the research objective aims to develop and evaluate the holistic insider threat 
model. These processes ideally need a mixed method approach in order to develop 
and assess the HIT model. 
 
In this chapter, the mixed method research design is described and the reasons for 
adopting this method will be justified. This is followed by explanations of the 
research phases. There are two major phases in this study: developing a conceptual 
holistic insider threat model and developing best practices to manage the abusive 
behaviour. The sample selection, data collection, and data analysis for each of the 
sequential stages are explained. This chapter addresses the ‘how’ of the study. 
4.2 Research Method 
This study poses real challenges with regard to methodology because of the difficulty 
of collecting data relating to the insider threat. In order to examine insider threat, it is 
essential to collect data from insiders themselves and real life cases. However, 
insiders are very difficult populations to survey and also cases of insider threat are 
often unreported; even when they are reported, they are confidential and information 
about them is protected. Therefore, accessing these data to study the insider threat is 
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collected from experienced security professionals who dealt directly with the insider 
threat cases, which is a good way of assessing the model. Furthermore, finding an 
appropriate sample of experienced security professionals is one of the challenges for 
this study because of the specialised nature of the knowledge. In order to solve this 
problem, the researcher employed an outside agency to help recruit the required 
participants without any difficulties.  
 
This study adopts a mixed method approach in order to assist in the research phases 
and to understand the research problem. Both quantitative and qualitative data 
collection methods were utilized at different points in the research. 
 
The use of both quantitative and qualitative data collection in a single study is known 
as a mixed method research (Tashakkori and Teddlie 2003). Mixed method research 
is defined as “the class of research where the researcher mixes or combines 
quantitative and qualitative research techniques, methods, approaches, concepts, or 
language into a single study”(Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004, 17).  
 
The mixed method approach could be difficult for a single researcher, because the 
researcher must be familiar with both qualitative and quantitative research. The 
researcher needs to study both qualitative and quantitative methods and understand 
how to combine them appropriately (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004; Yin 2006; 
Mengshoel 2012; Creswell and Clark 2007). 
 
Researchers recommend the combined use of both qualitative and quantitative 
research methods as this strengthens the study and produces a more comprehensive 
knowledge base essential to the development of theory and practice (Mingers 2001; 
Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004; Creswell 2008; Ford 2012). According to Creswell 
(2003, 24) “A mixed methods design is useful to capture the best of both quantitative 
and qualitative approaches”.  Mingers (2001) state that mixed methods offer a wider 
range of data that delivers richer and more reliable results than a single research 
method, especially in the field of information systems.. Furthermore, the merging of 
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research problem and questions than the use of a single method (Creswell and Clark 
2007; Creswell 2008). Miles and Huberman (1994, 42) state that combining 
quantitative and qualitative data provides “a very powerful mix”. For example, the 
researcher might survey a large number of people using closed-ended questions and 
then following this up with an open-ended interview question for a few people to 
collect their voices and opinions about the topic. “In these situations the advantages 
of collecting both quantitative data qualitative data prove advantageous to best 
understand a research problem” (Creswell 2003, 24). Therefore, quantitative and 
qualitative data were collected and analysed in order to address and answer the 
research questions. This study adopts the mixed methods approach since the 
combination of quantitative and qualitative methods provides a more in-depth 
understanding of the research gaps than the use of a single method.  It also allows a 
wide range of information to be collected to answer the research questions; 
moreover, it is considered to be the best way to develop theory and practice. 
 
The Explanatory Mixed Methods Design number III in Figure 4.1 is selected to help 
define the research process. Rather than gathering data simultaneously, the 
quantitative and qualitative data was collected sequentially in two phases (Ivankova, 
Creswell, and Stick 2006). The rationale for this is that the quantitative data 
collection and analysis provide a wide view of the research problem; then an in-depth 
analysis of the collected qualitative data is required to refine and enhance the result 
and to explain the wide view (Creswell and Clark 2007). The Explanatory Mixed 
Methods Design allows the researcher to “Collect quantitative data first in the 
sequence. This is followed by the qualitative data collection. Researchers often 
present these studies in two phases, with each phase clearly identified in headings in 
the report. This type of mixed method the researcher uses the qualitative data to 
refine the result from the quantitative data”(Creswell 2008, 560). In this type of 
mixed method design, the priority is the quantitative data collection and analysis. 
This is achieved by presenting the quantitative method first with a substantial sample 
of data collections. Then, in the second phase, it is essential that a small amount of 
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According to Creswell (2008) and Ivankova, Creswell, and Stick (2006), this type of 
mixed methods design combines the best of both quantitative and qualitative data 
collection methods. In the first phase, the quantitative results will be obtained from a 
large number of individuals, and then in the second phase, the finding will be 
evaluated and refined via an in-depth qualitative method. 
 
The objective of the Explanatory Mixed Methods Designs number III aligns with this 
study in the sense that the quantitative method will assist the researcher to identify 
the factors which will adjust the candidate HIT model. While, qualitative method 
aims to validate the enhanced HIT model and to ensure that it represents a holistic 














Figure 4.1: Explanatory Mixed Methods Design number III  
(Creswell 2008, 557) 
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4.3 Research Phases 
The adoption of mixed methods inevitably requires a phased research approach. In 
this study, a quantitative stage is conducted first, followed by a qualitative stage as 
explained in section 4.2. Hence, this study is conducted in phases. In phase one, a 
holistic model is developed from the literature and then tested quantitatively, 
followed by a qualitative stage to verify the results from the previous stage. This 
phase addresses the first research question. In addition, phase two is conducted to 
develop the best practices in order to manage the factors in phase one; this addresses 
the second research question. The sequential phases of the mixed methods research 
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Figure 4.2: Sequential phases of the mixed methods research design 
The Best Practices  
Phase 2: Developing Best Practices to Manage Insider 
Threat Behaviour 
1- Use CERT’s best 
practices as a baseline to 
start with  
2- Identify CERT’s best 
practices gaps  
3- Adding missing 
practices from interviews 
data and acdemic sources 
The HIT Model  
Phase 1: Developing a Conceptual Holistic Insider Threat 
(HIT) Model  
Stage 1: Developing the 
candidate HIT model                                                       
Stage 2: Test the 
candidate HIT model 
(Quantitative) 
Stage 3: Evaluating the 
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4.4 Phase 1: Developing a Conceptual Holistic 
Insider Threat (HIT) Model  
Phase one is carried out in three stages: developing the candidate HIT model, testing 
the candidate HIT model through quantitative data collection and evaluating the 
enhanced HIT model via qualitative data collection.   
4.4.1 Stage 1:  Developing the candidate HIT Model  
The first stage in phase one commenced with an extensive review of the literature 
related to insider threat. In this stage, the researcher reviewed and studied three 
sources: academic research (such as conference proceedings, journal articles and 
books), IT industry publications (such magazines and Web white papers) and 
published reported incidents (such as CERT reports), to cover different aspects of the 
insider threat (details in section 2.2). The critical review concluded that although 
there are a number of academic research models explaining the insider threat 
behaviour factors, none of them addresses all factors.  
 
The factors contributing to insider threat that emerged from the literature review as 
discussed in section 2.6 were not equally supported by all three sources studied for 
this research. Therefore, there is a need for a holistic model to address all these 
factors together with a verification of each factor due to the conflicting results from 
the three sources. This review leads to a gradual building of the candidate HIT 
model. Combining all factors from three sources will inform the development of the 
candidate HIT model to include all factors suggested by academic research, IT 
industry publications and published reported incidents as detailed in section 3.5. 
 
The collected data were analysed using content analysis to identify factors that are 
suggested or confirmed by previous sources include academic sources, published 
reported incidents and IT industry publications. Qualitative content analysis 
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on valid inference and interpretation” (Zhang and Wildemuth 2009, 2). Content 
analysis includes two approaches: inductive and deductive. The inductive process is 
often used to derive themes and categories from the data through careful examination 
and continuous comparison. While the deductive process uses the concepts or 
variables generated from theory or previous studies (Patton 2002; Berg and Lune 
2011).   
 
The inductive content analysis (Mayring 2000a) process guided the data analysis. 
According to Mayring (2000b, 4), the main idea of the inductive content analysis is 
to formulate 
“a criterion of definition, derived from theoretical 
background and research question, which determines the 
aspects of the textual material taken into account. Following 
this criterion the material is worked through and categories 
are tentative and step by step deduced. Within a feedback 
loop those categories are revised, eventually reduced to main 
categories”. 
 
The researcher followed systematic steps recommended by Creswell (2008). Firstly, 
the researcher closely read the academic research, CERT reports of insider incident 
cases and IT industry articles. During this step, the key words were highlighted. 
Secondly, the identified key words were labelled and categorised into themes 
constituting the main factors which include: access and level of trust, insider 
knowledge, insider technical skills, motivation, information security policy, 
psychological factors, cultural factors, outsourcing, remote access and gender 
(coding done through NVivo version 10). Once the main factors had been identified, 
a third step was taken to reduce any overlapping should one segment of text be coded 
according to more than one theme. Finally, the researcher constantly reviewed the 
data and the developed themes. In this step, two themes (factors) were combined as 
explained in section 3.4.1. Hence, the factors in the candidate HIT model are: 
individual characteristics, outsourcing, information security policy, remote access, 
cultural factors, motivation, access and level of trust, insiders' knowledge and 
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4.4.2 Stage 2:  Testing the candidate HIT Model 
(Quantitative Stage)  
In this stage, the candidate insider threat model is evaluated using the quantitative 
approach which focuses on “deduction, confirmation, theory/hypothesis testing, 
explanation, prediction, standardized data collection, and statistical 
analysis”(Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004, 18). The quantitative stage in this study 
involved the administration of an online survey in Jun 2012. The survey method is 
one of the most common data collection approaches in quantitative research (Myers 
1997; Creswell 2003). The survey method has many benefits including the economy 
of the design, being less expensive than the other method, and usually providing 
greater anonymity than the other method (Creswell 2003; Cavana, Delahaye, and 
Sekaran 2001). 
 
A survey is a “system for collecting valid information from or about people to 
describe, compare, or explain their knowledge, attitudes, and behaviour” (Fink 
2010, 152). The data from the survey method can be collected either directly or 
indirectly: directly by asking individuals to answer questions, indirectly by recording 
people’s written or oral thoughts and opinions (Fink 2010). Thus, the survey method 
is suitable for investigating the answers for RQ1 outlined in Chapter Three, since this 
research question is concerned with the factors that affect insider behaviour and the 
data is collected directly from the participants through an online survey.  
 
In order to select the appropriate research methods to evaluate the candidate HIT 
model, numerous processes were involved. Firstly, the literature was reviewed and 
studied in-depth to identify the existing methods. Secondly, the target population was 
identified and the best way to communicate with them was determined. Thirdly, the 
practical constraints were considered. Subsequently, it was established that the most 
appropriate method for evaluating the model is the electronic survey approach. 





~ 96 ~ 
collection to a minimum, and enable large amounts of data to be collected within a 
short time frame (Gordon and McNew 2008).  
 
The use of an online survey has many advantages such as fast data retrieval, high 
quality data without typographical errors because the data is automatically stored, 
and the ability to integrate that data into statistical and graphical solutions. In 
addition, the response can be anonymous, especially among researches who collect 
sensitive information (Gordon and McNew 2008). This survey assessed a 
respondent’s experience and knowledge of insider threat behaviour factors and 
required information about demographics, employment, and whether they had 
previously faced an insider threat problem in their workplace; all these questions 
could be considered to elicit personal and sensitive information. Therefore, the use of 
an online survey was considered the most appropriate evaluation method for the 
candidate HIT model. 
 
There are three types of online survey: e-mail, Web-based and personal digital 
assistants (PDAs) or hand-held devices (Gordon and McNew 2008). There are 
several advantages to collecting the data through a Web-based survey (Creswell 
2008; Gordon and McNew 2008).  Although a Web-based survey has some 
drawbacks (e.g. if the server is down, participants cannot access the survey, and it 
requires programming skills), there are several benefits of using this type of online 
data collection. The following are the several advantages of the Web-based 
survey(Gordon and McNew 2008, 606, 607): 
Web 
 The response can be relatively anonymous. 
 The data can be automatically stored inside a database for later data mining 
and analysis. 
 Transcription costs are non-existent 
 Multimedia elements can now be easily added to any survey in a Web 
environment 
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 In some online Web survey services, data can be saved directly to an SPSS 
 
The Web-based survey was chosen to collect the data for this study. According to 
Boas and Hidalgo (2013), the online survey tools that are usually used by scholars 
include Qualtrics, SurveyGizmo or SurveyMonkey to construct, manage and handle 
the survey. The survey was distributed to the participants through the Qualtrics 
website (www.qualtrics.com). Qualtrics is an online survey tool that has a credible 
reputation to develop and capturing survey results, it allows users to perform online 
data collection and analysis (Boas and Hidalgo 2013).   
 
Having selected the survey as the preferred data collection tool, an appropriate 
population sample had to be decided. The focus of this research is to study the 
insider threat behaviour and to identify its contributing factors. The data collected in 
this stage is used to verify the candidate HIT model. Because the insider threat is a 
security issue (Chinchani et al. 2005),valuable information about insider threat can 
be collected from the top security management level since they directly handle and 
deal with the insiders. The decision was made to evaluate the model based upon data 
gathered within the USA, because most of the collected data which assisted in the 
development of the insider threat model were from the USA (academic literature, IT 
industry publications and publish reported incidents). This ensures that the model is 
evaluated in the same context that it was developed. 
 
The collected data was analysed using SPSS (Statistical Package for the Social 
Sciences) version 20.0. The focus in this stage is to validate the factors identified in 
the literature. The researcher tested the candidate HIT model through a preliminary 
analysis of the survey. The factor analysis technique was utilized to identify an 
improved list of factors. There are two types of factor analysis: Exploratory Factor 
Analysis, and Confirmatory Factor Analysis (Alhija 2010). In Exploratory Factor 
Analysis (EFA), the researcher investigates the number of variables as the title 
suggests (Williams, Brown, and Onsman 2010). EFA “explore the underlying 
dimensions of a construct. The primary considerations inherent in the use of factor 
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statistical considerations, and reporting considerations, is exploratory in nature” 
(Alhija 2010, 162).  The Exploratory Factor analysis technique was utilized to 
identify groups of inter-related factors to produce an improved set of robust factors. 
The factor analysis offered an improved list of factors, which is considered to be a 
more consistent interpretation of the data than the original grouping. The survey 
design and analysis are presented in Chapter Five.  
4.4.3 Stage 3:  Evaluating the Enhanced HIT Model 
(Qualitative stage)  
This stage aims to evaluate whether the enhanced HIT model produced from the 
factor analysis comprised all the important insider threat contributing factors.  In this 
stage, the enhanced HIT model from the previous stage was evaluated through the 
qualitative method.  Qualitative research often relies on a small sample due to the in-
depth nature of studies and analysis (Cormack 1991). The strength of qualitative 
research is “its ability to provide complex textual descriptions of how people 
experience a given research issue. It provides information about the “human” side of 
an issue – that is, the often contradictory behaviors, beliefs, opinions, emotions, and 
relationships of individuals” (Mack et al. 2005, 1). Interviews are one of the most 
common types of qualitative method approaches (Creswell 2003; Westerman 2006; 
Mack et al. 2005).  According to Mack et al. (2005, 2), interviews are “optimal for 
collecting data on individuals’ personal histories, perspectives, and experiences, 
particularly when sensitive topics are being explored”. This phase aims to collect 
data from experienced industry professionals that reflect their experiences regarding 
the insider threat factors and security measures to control these factors. Thus, the 
interview method is suitable for validating the answers for RQ1 and investigating the 
answers for RQ2 outlined in Chapter Three. 
 
Although a face-to-face interview is the traditional way of conducting a interview, 
during the last few decades, data have been collected by different means such as 
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Telephone interviews “can be as productive as more traditional face to face 
methods” (Bolderston 2012, 68). Hanna (2012) suggests that although interviewing 
people by telephone may lead to the loss of some subtleties associated with face-to-
face interviews, this  helps the researcher to ‘stay at the level of text’ and avoid 
adding context material to the data. One of the important advantages of the telephone 
interview is the practical benefit associated with arranging and scheduling the 
interview, and the flexibility to change the time which is very useful, especially if 
participants are busy people. Furthermore, telephone interviews are very suitable and 
convenient as a means of collecting data from participants in different and distant 
locations from the researcher (Egan, Chenoweth, and McAuliffe 2006; Bolderston 
2012). Phone interviews were very useful for this research as they provided the 
researcher with more flexibility when arranging the interviews and the researcher 
was not required to travel to other countries in order to collect the data. 
 
In addition, Skype is considered as an alternative to traditional face-to-face 
interviews (Bertrand and Bourdeau 2010; Hanna 2012). Collecting data through 
Skype offers synchronous face-to-face communications with the participants. 
Moreover, Skype allows the researcher to overcome the “criticisms associated with 
losing visual and interpersonal aspects of the interaction” (Hanna 2012, 242) since 
the researcher can record both video and audio communications of the interview. 
Collecting data through Skype in this study provided the researcher with the benefits 
of the face-to-face interview without having to travel to the participants’ locations.  
 
Interviews by email for the purpose of qualitative research were first conducted in 
the late 1990s (Egan, Chenoweth, and McAuliffe 2006). Email interviews offer 
greater flexibility to participants who are not able to be interviewed by telephone or 
Skype due to their busy schedule.  According to Reid, Petocz, and Gordon (2008), 
McCoyd and Kerson (2006) and Creswell (2008), email interviews are 
acknowledged as an acceptable alternative mode for interviewing participants in 
research studies. Email interviews, unlike other interviews that are conducted on one 
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(Gibson 2010). The advantage of using email interviews is that “participants can 
choose when to respond to questions. Many people clearly spend time and effort 
writing, reviewing and editing their response before they send it” (Gibson 2010, 3). 
Although, email interviews tend to be slower than the other types of interviews used 
in this study, they can provide rich information. In most of the email interviews 
conducted for this study, the participants provided detailed answers to each question 
and some of them supported their answers with examples. Although email interviews 
took longer to conclude, there was no need for transcription, thereby making it easier 
for the researcher to begin analysing the data.  
 
The three interview types are a convenient means of collecting data from 
geographically remote participants (Egan, Chenoweth, and McAuliffe 2006; 
Bolderston 2012). Therefore, in this study the researcher provided three options: 
interview by telephone, Skype or email. In this way, participants were able to choose 
the method that was most convenient for them without impacting on the quality of 
the collected data.  
 
The data for this stage was collected through semi-structured interviews. The 
interviews were carried out between October 2012 and December 2012. In-depth, 
semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions were used to collect 
qualitative data for this study. Fontana, Andre, and Frey. (1994) described 
interviewing as “the art of science”. Semi-structured interviews are defined by 
Longhurst (2009, 580) as “the verbal interchanges where one person, the 
interviewer, attempts to obtain information from another person by asking 
questions”. In-depth, semi-structured interviews are one of the most commonly used 
qualitative methods since they give the opportunity for more in-depth investigation 
since the interviewer is able to probe further and elicit more detailed responses from 
the interviewees. In addition, in-depth, semi-structured interviews are more useful 
than other methods since they investigate and attempt to understand complex 
behaviours, experiences, and opinions. Moreover, they offer to the interviewers and 
interviewees the time and space to explore issues thoroughly. According to 
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particularly useful for investigating personal, sensitive, or confidential issues which 
informants might find difficult to disclose and discuss in a group interview or focus 
group”. A semi-structured interview is not just a random conversation or an 
integrative session. The researcher is guided by a willingness to understand and learn 
from the respondent, and creates an informal yet fruitful interaction that is guided by 
a series of interesting questions. Semi-structured interviews are intended to construct 
knowledge and reveal meanings through words, gestures, implications, jokes, facial 
movement and social fabricated talk and personal stories (Warren 2001; Dearnley 
2005). 
 
The enhanced HIT model was evaluated by the Chief Information Security Officer; 
the rationale for interviewing these people is the same as the rationale for the survey 
in stage two. The recorded data were transcribed and then analysed using the two-
step content analysis approach recommended by Miles and Huberman (1994). 
Firstly, the interview responses were examined individually, and then secondly, they 
were cross-examine and the findings from each individual interview were integrated. 
The outcome of this phase was the final HIT model that contains a comprehensive 
set of insider threat factors. This holistic model provides the foundation for the next 
phase of the study. The interview design and analysis are detailed in Chapter Six. 
4.5 Phase 2: Developing Best Practices to Manage 
Insider Threat Behaviour 
While the previous phase provides data and analyses that enable the researcher to 
answer the research question one, it does not provide an answer for research question 
two. The qualitative data collected for this study supports two goals. The first goal is 
to evaluate the HIT model to provide an answer for RQ1. The second goal is to 
collect information about the best practices to control and manage the factors in the 
HIT model to provide an answer for RQ2.  In this phase, the interview data that were 
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During the interviews, the researcher ensured that the data collected not only 
answered research question, one but also provided answers to research question two. 
 
This phase seeks to manage and control the factors produced in phase one by 
developing a set of security measures (best practices) to manage insider threat 
behaviour based on the factors in the HIT model. These best practices are the 
outcome of collecting CERT best practices for each factor, identifying any gaps in 
CERT’s best practices, adding missing practices (from interviews data and academic 
sources) and finally synthesizing these into an integrated, coherent list of best 
practices (details in Chapter Seven).  
4.6    Summary  
This chapter described the research methodology and design. The mixed methods 
selection was explained and justified. The advantages and disadvantages of the 
mixed methods approach were presented. This was followed by detailed descriptions 
of the quantitative and qualitative data collection methods used in this study. This 
study has two main phases: (1) developing a conceptual HIT model and (2) 
developing best practices to manage the abusive behaviour. Phase one includes three 
stages: (1) developing the candidate HIT model, (2) test the candidate HIT model 
through quantitative data collection and (3) evaluating the enhanced HIT model via 
qualitative data collection.  
 
In the previous chapter (Chapter Three) stage one of the first phase was described 
and in section 3.5 the candidate HIT model was presented. The next chapter (Chapter 
Five) will discuss stage two of the first phase: testing the candidate HIT model 
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 CHAPTER FIVE:     5
QUANTITATIVE PHASE AND 
ENHANCED RESEARCH MODEL  
5.1 Introduction  
Chapter four explained in detail the methodology adopted for this research and 
Chapter Three presented the candidate HIT model. This integrative model was 
derived from three sources (academic, IT industry publications and published reports 
of incidents) and provides the groundwork for this phase of the study.  
 
This chapter discusses the following in greater detail: survey design, target 
population and analyses of the survey. It also covers the main changes in the 
candidate HIT model and how the factor analysis results produced an improved list 
of factors. At the end of Chapter Five, an enhanced HIT model is presented. 
5.2 Survey Development 
5.2.1 Target Population 
The target population for this survey are all from the United States of America 
(USA) and from the top security management level as discussed previously in 
section 4.4.2. The participants have one of the following job titles: IT Security 
Manager, Principal Cyber Security Manager, Security Systems Administrator and 
Senior IT Security Consultant. The individuals who accepted the invitation to 
participate in this survey came from a wide cross-section of industries including 
mining, utilities, construction, manufacturing, wholesale trade, retail trade, 
transportation and warehousing, information, finance and insurance, real-estate and 
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companies and enterprises, administrative and support and waste management and 
remediation services, educational services, health care and social assistance and arts, 
entertainment, and recreation. 
 
As discussed in section 4.2, one of the challenges for this study was to obtain access 
to the required population with the aforementioned specific job titles that are located 
in different regions from that of the researcher. The target population were recruited 
through an outside agency (Qualtrics). The survey contained a couple of questions to 
verify and to ensure that the participants were appropriate as a sample. Qualtrics 
distributed the survey to 568 individuals, with 100 completed, 247 unacceptable, 
with an overall 31% response rate which is considered acceptable (Cavana, 
Delahaye, and Sekaran 2001).  
5.2.2    Survey Design 
The development of the survey required a thorough understanding and accurate 
interpretation of the previous models of insider threat behaviour which were derived 
from three sources (academic research sources, published reports on reported 
incidents, and IT industry publications). This also took into consideration the 
research questions for this study.  
 
The survey design process consisted of the following steps. 
 Design the hard copy of the survey. 
 Review the survey questions with the supervisors. 
 Receive approval from the university’s Ethics Committee. 
 Design a preliminary version of the online survey. 
 Conduct a pilot test. 
 Design the online survey. 
 Distribute the survey. 
 Receive the responses. 
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 Enhance the model. 
 
The survey used in this research was structured in a simple manner and was a 
maximum of three pages in length. It was estimated that the average time needed to 
complete the online survey would be 15 minutes. The survey for this study 
comprised six questions in two sections, as shown in Appendix 1.  
 
The types of question used in this survey were:  
 Multiple choice – single answer  
 Matrix of choice – multiple answers  
 Six-point Likert scale 
 Free text boxes.  
 
The first section of the survey asked the participants demographic questions such as 
their gender, job title, experience. These questions were a combination of multiple 
choices (single answer) and matrix of choice (multiple answers).  
 
In the second section of the survey, the participants were asked two questions. The 
first question presented the nine insider threat behaviours factors; for each factor 
there were three variables presented in three statements in addition to three 
controlling statements (to control the common method bias in the survey (Conway 
and Lance 2010)) totalling thirty statements in all. This question used a six-point 
Likert scale to measure each item. The scale ranged from 1 to 6 and consisted of the 
following values: strongly agree, agree, neutral, disagree, strongly disagree and 
unable to judge.  
 
According to Chomeya (2010), the reliability of Cronbach’s alpha coefficient value 
of the six-point Likert scale is higher  than the five-point Likert scale. Moreover, the 
validity from alpha coefficient of the six-point Likert scale yielded a higher 
reliability than the five-point Likert scale. This scale was chosen because of its 
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The second question in this section asked the participants to add their comments on 
the insider threat factors.  
 
A cover letter was attached to explain the objectives of the survey and the purpose of 
the study. The potential participant was also informed of the anticipated time 
required to complete the survey. Special instructions regarding each question and 
how to complete the survey were provided.  
 
A preliminary version of the survey was developed and presented to a panel of 
experienced academics in research design and structure. These academics were 
members of the researcher’s thesis committee who systematically review and 
evaluate survey designs and questions. Several well-conceived changes were made 
according to their recommendations and review. 
5.2.3    Reliability and Validity of the Survey  
5.2.3.1 Pilot Test  
According to Oppenheim (1992) and Fink (2010), a pilot test can determine the 
validity, reliability and practicality of the survey instrument. The extent to which 
respondents understand the survey’s questions will determine the quality of the 
survey data. A pilot test of the survey helps the researcher to ascertain whether 
respondents understand the survey’s questions and respond as intended.  Fink (2010) 
suggests that a group of five to ten individuals who are similar to the potential 
respondents in demographic and experience can evaluate each survey questions 
individually or in a group. 
 
In order to improve the reliability and quality of the survey, this survey was piloted 
using ten respondents in May 2012 who manually read through and answered the 
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Furthermore, a second pilot test was conducted using a Web-based method. The pilot 
test also used Qualtrics to ensure that the entire survey design was suitable and 
valuable for the potential data collected and free of defects. A total of ten 
respondents were selected by Qualtrics to test the survey. This was intended to 
determine whether there were any existing questions or data items that could present 
problems to the respondents before the official study was conducted.  
5.2.3.2 Common Method Bias 
Common method bias usually arises from having a common rate, a common 
measurement context, a common item context or from the characteristics of the items 
themselves (Podsakoff et al. 2003; Siemsen, Roth, and Oliveira 2010; Malhotra, 
Kim, and Patil 2006). According to Cote and Buckley (1987), method bias is the 
error in a measure as a result of how the data is collected. If a model has multiple 
constructs and these measures are utilised, these constructs may share a common 
method bias because the condition that the data was collected through one source and 
their similarity in construction (Donaldson and Grant-Vallone 2002). To avoid the 
significant impact of the method, the researchers need to prove the construct validity 
of the measures used. Researchers should be able to justify that the measures they 
chose have construct validity and provide evidence that they have taken into account 
common method bias in the design of their study (Conway and Lance 2010). 
 
Two techniques were used to avoid common method bias and to prevent bias in the 
participants’ responses to the survey.  
Firstly, three controlling statements are added: 
 The risk of insider threat behaviour is increased by the lack of customer 
and/or client participation in product development.  
 The risk of insider threat behaviour is increased by a poor level of health and 
fitness among employees.  
 The risk of insider threat behaviour is increased by organisation ownership 
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Respondents should not agree with these three statements included in the survey 
because they are not related to the study at all. These statements were also chosen 
because they make no sense whatsoever. They have been added to the survey to test 
and control respondents’ awareness and bias. Respondents who agreed with the three 
statements were excluded from the study. However, none of the respondents agreed 
with these control statements, indicating that the survey responses were not affected 
by common method bias, thereby demonstrating the rigour of this study. 
   
 Secondly, all questions were ordered in a random manner to ensure that respondents 
understood the questions and did not relate each question to the previous ones. The 
researcher decided not to present the questions relevant to each factor in a particular 
order to prevent respondents from answering the questions similarly. Thus, the 
questions were presented in a manner to test the respondents’ awareness of control. 
5.2.3.3 Internal Consistency 
According to (Fink 2010, 158), a survey’s internal consistency “refers to the extent 
to which all the items or questions assess the same skill, characteristic, or quality”. 
Cooper and Schindler (1998) state that reliability in a scales-based survey relates to 
the consistency of scale performance to ensure that the result will be free of random 
and systematic errors. Cronbach’s alpha coefficient was calculated to provide an 
indication of whether the items in a scale were assessing the same construct. Alpha 
coefficient is a widely-used method for assessing internal consistency and reliability 
of a survey. This method was developed by Cronbach (1951) to measure the 
reliability of a scale for a specific sample group, since it is essential that items within 
a scale assess the same construct. The range of alpha coefficients is between 0 
(inconsistent) to 1 (perfectly consistent). The higher the constant, the more reliable it 
is. An alpha coefficient of 0.70 is widely considered to be an acceptable value (Hair 
et al. 2010; Cooper and Schindler 1998). Internal consistency was obtained for this 
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5.3 Preliminary Analysis  
In this section, the researcher discusses the analysis of the survey data. As previously 
mentioned, this survey is divided into two sections. The first part consists of the 
demographic questions and the second section consists of the insider threat behaviour 
factors questions. SPSS version 20.0 was used to analysis the collected data. This 
information is presented both in tabular and graphical form for the convenience of 
the reader the tables contains the numeric values where the graphs communicate the 
proportion. 
5.3.1 Section One: Demographic Analysis 
As mentioned earlier, of the 568 distributed surveys, the researcher received a total 
of 100 completed surveys. The majority (86%) of the participant responses were 
from males, while the number of responses from female participants was relatively 
small (14 or 14%). Moreover, the participants in this survey were divided into four 
categories according to their job title: IT Security Manager, Principal Cyber Security 
Manager, Security Systems Administrator and Senior IT Security Consultant. Most 
of the participants were IT security managers; 60% and 88.33% of this category were 
males (53 male and 7 female). Security Systems Administrators accounted for 15% 
of the participants (11 male and 4 female), Senior IT Security Consultant represented 
14% (12 male and 2 female) of the total participants and finally, eleven participants 
11% (10 male and 1 female) were Principal Cyber Security Managers (See Figure 
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Table 5.1:  Sample Demographics (N=100) 
Gender Response Percentage 
Male 86 86% 
Female 14 14% 
Total 100 100% 
Job Title Response Percentage 
IT Security Manager 60 60% 
Principal Cyber Security Manager 11 11% 
Security Systems Administrator 15 15% 
Senior IT Security Consultant 14 14% 
Total 100 100% 
 
Table 5.2:  Participants’ gender and job titles  
Job Title Gender 
Male Female Total 
IT Security Manager 53 7 60 
Principal Cyber Security Manager 10 1 11 
Security Systems Administrator 11 4 15 
Senior IT Security Consultant 12 2 14 
Total  86 14 100 
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Furthermore, the majority of the participants 87% (76 Male and 11 Female) were 
experienced in dealing with insider threat, while only 13% (10 Male and 3 Female) 
had never experienced insider threat previously as shown in Figure 5.2. Therefore, 
the sample was highly qualified to comment on insider threat behaviour, further 
contributing to the rigour of this research. Most IT security managers 88.33% had 
previously experienced insider threat, while only 11.67% had not. Similarly, 81.82% 
of the principal cyber security managers had experienced insider threat, and only 
18.18% had never.  Eighty per cent of the security systems administrators had 
previously experienced insider threat, and just 20% had not. Likewise, most senior IT 
security consultants (92.86%) had experienced insider threat, while 7.14% had not. 
Table 5.3 and Figure 5.3 present participants’ job titles and their experience in 
dealing with insider threat behaviour. 
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Table 5.3: Participants’ job titles and their experience in dealing with insider threat 
behaviour 
Do you have experience in dealing with insider threat behaviour? 
Job Title Yes No Total 
IT Security Manager 53 7 60 
Principal Cyber Security Manager 9 2 11 
Security Systems Administrator 12 3 15 
Senior IT Security Consultant 13 1 14 




Figure 5.3: Participants’ job titles and their experience in dealing with insider threat 
behaviour 
 
As mentioned previously, the participants for this study came from various industry 
sectors including mining, utilities, construction, manufacturing, wholesale trade, 
retail trade, transportation and warehousing, information, finance and insurance, real-
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management of companies and enterprises, administrative and support and waste 
management and remediation services, educational services, health care and social 
assistance and arts, entertainment, and recreation. The industries in this study were 
classified according to NAICS, the North American Industry Classification System 
which is used by Federal statistical agencies to classify the business establishments 
in the USA for the purpose of collecting and analysing statistical data. Table 5.4 
indicates the numbers of participants from each industry.  
 
Table 5.4: Numbers of participants from each industry and their gender 
Industry Response Percentage 
Male  Female Total 
Mining 1 0 1 1% 
Utilities 3 1 4 4% 
Construction 5 0 5 5% 
Manufacturing 17 3 20 20% 
Wholesale Trade 1 0 1 1% 
Retail Trade 4 0 4 4% 
Transportation and Warehousing 3 1 4 4% 
Information 5 0 5 5% 
Finance and Insurance 15 4 19 19% 
Real Estate and Rental and Leasing 1 0 1 1% 
Professional, Scientific, and Technical 
Services 
16 2 18 18% 
Management of Companies and 
Enterprises 
2 0 2 2% 
Administrative and Support and Waste 
Management and Remediation Services 
2 0 2 2% 
Educational Services 6 0 6 6% 
Health Care and Social Assistance 8 2 10 10% 
Arts, Entertainment, and Recreation 5 1 6 6% 
 
5.3.2 Section Two: Insider Threat Factors  
This section examines the nine major factors contributing to inappropriate insider 
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published reports of incidents and from IT industry publications. These factors 
include: psychological factors, outsourcing providing the opportunity, information 
security policy, remote access facilities, cultural differences, motivation to carry out 
the abuse, access and level of trust, insider knowledge and technical skills.  
 
This section discusses separately the three statements for each of the nine factors. 
The participants were asked to indicate their level of agreement (strongly agree (1), 
agree (2), neutral (3), disagree (4), strongly disagree (5) and unable to judge (6)) with 
each statement. The mean and percentage were calculated for each factor.  
 
Descriptive statistics were computed to indicate how respondents answered the range 
of items in the survey and to understand the key variables. The researcher divided the 
analysis of the second section of the survey into nine parts, each of which discusses 
one of the proposed factors in order to demonstrate the analysis process.   
5.3.2.2   Participants’ Overall Responses to Section Two 
The participants’ average responses to the 27 statements pertaining to the increased 
risk of insider threat behaviour is based on their experience, was between 1.96 and 
2.77 – corresponding to a value of “strongly agree” or “agree” (1 = strongly agree, 2 
= agree, 3 = neutral, 4 = disagree, 5 = strongly disagree, 6= unable to judge). Three 
statements had an average response between 3.0 and 3.24; all three statements were 
closer to neutral. Table 5.5 lists the statements in ascending order of the mean value 
of all participants’ responses. 
 
Descriptive statistics were computed to indicate how the participants responded to 
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Table 5.5:  Descriptive statistics 
 
The risk of insider threat behaviour is 


















































...the implementation of inappropriate information 
security policy. 
1 6 1.96 0.83 0.91 100 
...organisational culture that tolerates unethical 
behaviour. 
1 5 1.96 0.99 0.99 100 
...not promptly canceling access of ex-employees. 1 5 2.1 1.08 1.04 100 
...outdated information security procedures or 
policies. 
1 5 2.1 0.88 0.94 100 
...a technically skilled insider who violates the 
security for personal gain. 
1 5 2.13 1.12 1.06 100 
...insiders being motivated to harm their 
organisation. 
1 6 2.15 1.24 1.11 100 
...psychological factors such as social frustrations 
or computer dependency. 
1 5 2.18 0.8 0.89 100 
...insiders' knowledge of the potential value of the 
organisation's information. 
1 5 2.22 1 1 100 
...outsourced employees being given the same 
logical and/or physical access as the organisation’s 
regular employees. 
1 6 2.26 1.08 1.04 100 
...insufficient information security policy training 
and awareness. 
1 6 2.34 1.14 1.07 100 
...insiders being unduly motivated by financial 
gain. 
1 5 2.38 1.23 1.11 100 
...insiders' knowledge of the methods used to detect 
insider threat behaviour. 
1 6 2.41 1.11 1.06 100 
...granting access to third- parties contracted to 
conduct work within the organisation. 
1 5 2.44 0.83 0.91 100 
...insiders' knowledge of methods to grant access to 
the organisation's information. 
1 5 2.45 0.98 0.99 100 
...inappropriate or concerning behaviour prior to 
the incident such as delays, absences and poor job 
performance. 
1 5 2.47 1.14 1.07 100 
...insiders being vulnerable to coercion by outsider. 1 5 2.48 1.28 1.13 100 
...allowing authorised mobile device to access 
organisational information from outside the 
organisation physical boundary. 
1 6 2.48 1.08 1.04 100 
...high levels of access to IT systems given to 
employees. 
1 5 2.51 1.26 1.12 100 
...the organisation engaging a relatively high 
number of outsourcing agreements. 
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The risk of insider threat behaviour is 


















































...cultural clash between employees and the 
organisation. 
1 5 2.54 1.06 1.03 100 
...personal factors such as alcohol and drug 
addiction or violent behaviour. 
1 6 2.54 1.36 1.17 100 
...giving employees remote access to organisational 
information. 
1 6 2.75 1.22 1.1 100 
...employees' level of technical sophistication. 1 5 2.76 0.97 0.99 100 
...employees from backgrounds where acceptable 
practices differ. 
1 6 2.77 1.29 1.14 100 
...high levels of trust given to employees. 1 6 3 1.47 1.21 100 
...employees working from home. 1 6 3.22 1.32 1.15 100 
...employees having formal training in computer 
science, IT or similar. 
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5.3.2.3  Participants’ Responses to Each Factor  
Individual characteristics 
There are numerous personal characteristics that could indicate an increased 
possibility of harmful behaviour on the part of the insider as detailed in section 3.5.1. 
Table 5.6 summarises the statements and the responses to the individual 
characteristics factor. 
 
Table 5.6:  Individual characteristics 
 
Please indicate your level of 






The risk of insider threat 

















































































...psychological factors such as 
social frustrations or computer 
dependency. 
22 47 23 7 1 0 2.18 
...personal factors such as alcohol 
and drug addiction or violent 
behaviour. 
19 35 27 12 6 1 2.54 
...inappropriate or concerning 
behaviour prior to the incident such 
as delays, absences and poor job 
performance. 
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Figure 5.4: Individual characteristics 
 
The researcher included three statements to evaluate the personal characteristics 
factor. As can be seen in Figure 5.4, most participants agreed 69% (22% (SA) + 47% 
(A)) that psychological factors such as social frustrations or computer dependency 
may increase the risk of insider threat behaviour, while only 8% (7% (D) + 1% (SD)) 
of the participants disagreed. On the other hand, 23% were neutral (N) and neither 
agreed nor disagreed that social frustrations or computer dependency may increase 
the risk of an insider threat behaviour.  
 
54% of participants agreed (19% (SA) + 35% (A)) that personal factors such as 
alcohol and drug addiction or violent behaviour may increase the risk of an insider 
threat behaviour, and just 18% (12% (D) + 6% (SD)) of the participants disagreed, 
while 27% of the respondents were neutral (N).  
 
Additionally, 61% of participants  agreed (15% (SA) + 46% (A)) that inappropriate 
or concerning behaviour prior to the incident such as delays, absences and poor job 
performance, may indicate an increased risk of an insider threat behaviour; in 
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behavior is increased by
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However, 22% of the participants were neutral (N) about the statement that 
inappropriate or concerning behaviour prior to the incident could indicate and 
increased risk of insider threat behaviour. 
 
The outcome supports the proposition that the personal characteristics can be 
considered as one of the factors that increase the risk of insider threat behaviour. The 
percentage in Figure 5.4 and the mean from Table 5.6 indicates that more than the 
half of the participants agreed about all three statements. Moreover, this was 
confirmed by participants' comments. An IT security manager claimed "in my 
experience the likely hood of a problem depends on the personalities involved.  
Organisations need to be sure they are not making it easy to get to sensitive data, but 
there is a balance between security and utility.  It comes down to people". Another 
IT security manager said "A threat inside or outside will be acted out by 
unscrupulous peoples". Finally, a Principal Cyber Security Manager stated "Insider 
threat behaviour is affected by the psychology of human beings living in this world". 
Outsourcing 
The researcher provides three statements to evaluate whether outsourcing is an 
important factor contributing to inappropriate insider threat behaviour (outsourcing 
described in detail in section 3.5.2).  Table 5.7 presents the statements and the 
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Table 5.7: Outsourcing 
 
Please indicate your level of 





The risk of insider threat 

















































































...outsourced employees being given 
the same logical and/or physical access 
as the organisation’s regular 
employees. 
22 46 21 7 3 1 2.26 
...the organisation engaging a 
relatively high number of outsourcing 
agreements. 
15 36 32 15 1 1 2.54 
...granting access to third- parties 
contracted to conduct work within the 
organisation. 
15 38 37 8 2 0 2.47 
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As can be seen in Figure 5.5, most participants agreed 68% (22% SA + 46% (A)) 
that the risk of insider threat behaviour is increased by outsourced employees being 
given the same logical and/or physical access as the organisation’s regular 
employees, while only 10% (7% (D) + 3% (SD)) of the participants disagreed. On 
the other hand, 21% were neutral (N) and neither agreed nor disagreed with the 
statement; only one participant was unable to judge.  
 
About half of the participants 51% agreed (15% (SA) + 36% (A)) that if 
organisations engage a relatively high number of outsourcing agreements, this is 
most likely to increase the risk of insider threat behaviour; however, 16% (15% (D) + 
1% (SD)) of the participants disagreed. A total of 32% of the participants were 
neutral (N); only one participant was unable to judge.  
 
Moreover, 53% of participants agreed (15% (SA) + 38% (A)) that granting access to 
third parties contracted to conduct work within the organisation increases the risk of 
insider threat behaviour; however, no more than 10% (8% (D) + 2% (SD)) of the 
participants  disagreed. Thirty-seven per cent of the participants were neutral (N); 
none of the participants was unable to judge. 
 
The responses regarding the outsourcing factor were mixed. The participants' 
responses for this factor were varied since the percentage in Figure 5.5 indicates that 
most of the participants agreed that the risk of insider threat behaviour is increased 
by outsourced employees being given the same logical and/or physical access as the 
organisation’s regular employees. On the other hand, responses to other statements 
were not that clear. Half of the participants agreed that the risk of insider threat 
behaviour is increased by the organisation engaging a relatively high number of 
outsourcing agreements and granting access to third parties contracted to conduct 
work within the organisation, while almost 30% of them disagree. Table 5.7 shows 
that the mean of the participants’ responses to each statement were [2] agree; thus the 
researcher concludes that another analysis method needs to be utilised in order to 
identify whether or not the outsourcing factor should be considered as a factor 
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Information Security Policy  
An organisation can become a victim as a result of its security policy in several ways 
including the implementation of inappropriate security policy, insufficient 
information security policy training and awareness, and out-dated information 
security procedures or policies as described in section 3.5.3. Table 5.8 summarises 
the statements and the responses to the information security policy factor. 
 
Table 5.8: Information security policy 
 
Please indicate your level 




The risk of insider threat 


















































































...the implementation of 
inappropriate information 
security policy. 
31 51 11 6 0 1 1.96 
...insufficient information 
security policy training and 
awareness. 
20 45 21 10 3 1 2.34 
...outdated information security 
procedures or policies. 
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Figure 5.6: Information security policy  
 
As can be seen in Figure 5.6, the majority of participants agreed 82% (31% SA + 
51% (A)) that the risk of insider threat behaviour is increased by the implementation 
of inappropriate information security policy, while only 6% (6% (D) + 0% (SD)) of 
the participants disagreed. On the other hand, 11% were neutral (N) and neither 
agreed nor disagreed; only one participant was unable to judge.  
 
Moreover, 65% (20% (SA) + 45% (A)) of the participants agreed that insufficient 
information security policy training and awareness will increase the risk of insider 
threat behaviour, while 13% (10% (D) + 3% (SD)) of the participants disagreed. A 
total of 21% of the participants were neutral (N), while just one participant was 
unable to judge.  
 
Seventy-five per cent of participants  agreed (26% (SA) + 49% (A)) that out-dated 
information security procedures or policies will increase the risk of insider threat 
behaviour, whereas only 9% (7% (D) + 2% (SD)) of the participants  disagreed. 
Sixteen per cent of the participants were neutral (N) and none of the participants was 
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Information security policy is an essential factor contributing to inappropriate insider 
threat behaviour. The majority of the participants' responses indicated the importance 
of information security policy as can be seen in Figure 5.6. Most participants agreed 
that the risk of insider threat behaviour is increased by implementation of 
inappropriate information security policy, insufficient information security policy 
training and awareness and out-dated information security policy. Furthermore, the 
means presented in Table 5.8 suggest that the participants agree that information 
security policy is a very important aspect of insider threat behaviour. 
 
Participants' comments also supported the significance of information security 
policy; an IT security manager stated "Having strong policies here is critical.  Also, 
having an internal system to detect the possibility of insider threat behaviour is 
equally important". Another IT security manager claimed "The idea is to have a 
strict security policy, enforce it and test it. Educate all the employee, personnel and 
contractors accessing you facilities and networks". Moreover, A Senior IT Security 
Consultant maintained that "Security policy is everything and sticking to that policy". 
Finally, one of the principal Cyber Security Managers claimed "insider threat is 
always a danger.  Making sure the right policies are in place to help in reducing 
risks". 
Remote Access  
Remote access allows employees to access the organisation's network from anywhere 
in the world. The researcher provided three statements to evaluate whether remote 
access is an important factor contributing to inappropriate insider threat behaviour 
(remote access described in detail in section 3.5.4). Table 5.9 presents the statements 
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Table 5.9: Remote access 
 
Please indicate your level 
of agreement to each 
statement:  
 
The risk of insider threat 


















































































...employees working from home. 6 24 26 31 12 1 3.22 
...giving employees remote 
access to organisational 
information. 
13 31 29 23 3 1 2.75 
...allowing authorised mobile 
device to access organisational 
information from outside the 
organisation physical boundary. 
15 42 28 11 3 1 2.48 
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The researcher included three statements to evaluate the remote access factor. As can 
be seen in Figure 5.7, although 30% (6% (SA) + 24% (A)) of participants agreed that 
working from home increases the insider threat behaviour, 43% (31% (D) + 12% 
(SD)) of them disagreed. Twenty-six per cent were neutral (N) and neither agreed 
nor disagreed that the risk of insider threat behaviour could be increased by an 
employee working from home. Only one participant was unable to judge.  
 
On the other hand, 44% of participants agreed (13% (SA) + 31% (A)) that giving 
employees remote access to organisational information increases the possibility of 
insider threat, while 26% (23% (D) + 3% (SD)) of the participants disagreed. A total 
of 29% of the participants were neutral (N) and one participant was unable to judge.  
 
Similarly, more than half of the 57% of participants agreed (15% (SA) + 42% (A)) 
that allowing authorised mobile devices to access organisational information from 
outside the organisation’s physical boundaries could increase the risk of insider 
threat behaviour; however, no more than 14% (11% (D) + 3% (SD)) of the 
participants  disagreed. However, 28% of the participants were neutral (N) and one 
participant was unable to judge. 
 
The participants’ responses regarding remote access factor were varied. Despite the 
fact that the percentage in Figure 5.7 shows that the participants disagreed that 
working from home could increase the insider threat behaviour, Table 5.9 indicates 
that the mean for this statement is neutral. Alternatively, Table 5.9 indicates that the 
mean for the other two statements were [2] agree. Therefore, the researcher 
concludes that another analysis method is essential in order to identify whether or not 
remote access is a factor contributing to insider threat. 
Cultural factors   
Cultural factors in this study cover the organisational culture and national/regional 
culture as described in section 3.5.5. Table 5.10 summarise the statements and the 
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Table 5.10: Cultural factors   
 
Please indicate your level 
of agreement to each 
statement:  
 
The risk of insider threat 


















































































...organisational culture that 
tolerates unethical behaviour. 
37 41 14 5 3 0 1.96 
...employees from backgrounds 
where acceptable practices differ. 
11 34 31 17 5 2 2.77 
...cultural clash between 
employees and the organisation. 




Figure 5.8: Cultural factors    
 
Figure 5.8 illustrates that the majority of participants agreed 78% (37% SA + 41% 
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that tolerates unethical behaviour, while only 8% (5% (D) + 3% (SD)) of the 
participants disagreed. On the other hand, 14% were neutral (N) and neither agreed 
nor disagreed.  
 
About 45% (11% (SA) + 34% (A)) of participants agreed that employees from 
various backgrounds where acceptable practices differ will increase the risk of 
insider threat behaviour; however 22% (17% (D) + 5% (SD)) of the participants 
disagreed and a total of 31% of the participants were neutral (N) concerning that 
statement and only two participants were unable to judge.  
 
Likewise, 48% (17% (SA) + 31% (A)) of participants agreed that cultural clash 
between employees and the organisation increases the risk of insider threat 
behaviour, and 15% (11% (D) + 4% (SD)) of the participants disagreed. 37% of the 
participants were neutral (N).None of the participants was unable to judge. 
 
To sum up, the results indicate that the responses concerning the importance of the 
cultural factor in increasing the risk of insider threat were mixed. The participants' 
responses for this part were divided, since the percentage in Figure 5.8 indicates that 
most of the participants agreed with the first statement (the risk of insider threat 
behaviour is increased by organisational culture that tolerates unethical behaviour), 
while fewer than half agreed with the other two statements (that employees from 
different backgrounds where acceptable practices differ and cultural clash between 
employees and the organisation increased the risk of insider threat behaviour). On the 
other hand, Table 5.10 demonstrates that the mean of the participants' responses for 
all three statements were [2] agree. Consequently, the need for a further analysis 
method is necessary. 
Motivation 
The motivation for deliberate insider threats could be considered as the fuel for the 
malicious actions as detailed in section 3.5.6. The researcher provided three 
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to inappropriate insider threat behaviour.  Table 5.11 summarises the statements and 
the responses to the motivation factor. 
 
Table 5.11: Motivation 
Please indicate your level 
of agreement to each 
statement:  
 
The risk of insider threat 


















































































...insiders being unduly motivated 
by financial gain. 
24 34 27 10 5 0 2.38 
...insiders being motivated to harm 
their organisation. 
29 45 15 5 5 1 2.15 
...insiders being vulnerable to 
coercion by outsider. 
20 38 21 16 5 0 2.48 
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Figure 5.9 shows that more than half of participants agreed 58% (24% SA + 34% 
(A)) that the risk of insider threat behaviour is increased by insiders being unduly 
motivated by financial gain, while 15% (10% (D) + 5% (SD)) of the participants 
disagreed. On the other hand, 27% were neutral (N) and neither agreed nor disagreed 
that insider threat behaviour is increased by insiders being motivated by financial 
gain. 
 
Almost three quarters of the participants 74% (29% (SA) + 45% (A)) agreed that 
insiders being motivated to harm their organisation increased the risk of insider 
threat behaviour, while only 10% (5% (D) + 5% (SD)) of the participants disagreed. 
Fifteen per cent of the participants were neutral (N), and only one participant was 
unable to judge.  
 
Moreover, 58% of participants agreed (20% (SA) + 38% (A)) that insiders being 
vulnerable to coercion by outsider increased the risk of insider threat behaviour. In 
contrast, 21% (16% (D) + 5% (SD)) of the participants disagreed and 21% of the 
participants were neutral (N). None of the participants was unable to judge. 
 
After reviewing the outcome of this part, the researcher concluded that motivation is 
a factor contributing to insider threat behaviour. Most of the participants' responses 
supported the importance of motivation, as can be seen in Figure 5.9. The majority of 
the participants agreed with the second statement (the risk of insider threat behaviour 
is increased by insiders being motivated to harm their organisation), and more than 
the half of the participants agreed about the other statements. Moreover, the mean 
presentation in Table 5.11 indicates that the participants agreed that motivation can 
produce insider threat behaviour.  
 
Additionally, participants' comments support the proposition that the insider 
motivation is an essential factor in insider threat behaviour, an IT security manager 
claimed that "Many good points here. Motivation for some will always very 
important". Another IT security manager maintained "Threat materialize based on 
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risk/reward calculation on the part of the individual". Moreover, A Senior IT 
Security Consultant stated "I think the main factor regarding insider threat 
behaviour is a disgruntled employee's desire to sabotage or give confidential 
information to another employer". Another Senior IT Security Consultant said "An 
insider's personal motivation, training experience, emotional state, cultural norms, 
all are pivotal factors toward insider threats". Finally, one of the principal Cyber 
Security Managers claimed that insider threat behaviour is "usually due to revenge or 
money''. 
Access and Level of Trust 
Misuse of access is one of the most difficult types of attack to detect and prevent, 
since the insider uses his or her authorised access rights to perform illegal tasks 
(access and level of trust described in detail in section 3.5.7). The researcher 
provided three statements regarding access and level of trust to evaluate whether it 
could be considered as an important factor contributing to inappropriate insider threat 
behaviour or not.  Table 5.12 summarises the statements and the responses to the 
motivation factor. 
 
Table 5.12:  Access and Level of Trust 
 
Please indicate your 
level of agreement to 
each statement:  
 
The risk of insider threat 


















































































...not promptly cancelling 
access of ex-employees. 
31 42 17 6 4 0 2.10 
...high levels of trust given to 
employees. 
10 29 25 24 11 1 3.00 
...high levels of access to IT 
systems given to employees. 
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Figure 5.10: Access and Level of Trust 
 
Figure 5.10 demonstrates that, most of the participants agreed 73% (31% SA + 41% 
(A)) that the risk of insider threat behaviour is increased by not promptly cancelling 
access of ex-employees, and only 10% (6% (D) + 4% (SD)) of the participants 
disagreed. On the other hand, 17% were neutral (N) and none of the participants was 
unable to judge.  
 
Thirty-nine per cent (10% (SA) + 29% (A)) of the participants  agreed that high 
levels of trust given to employees will increase the risk of an insider threat 
behaviour, but 35% (24% (D) + 11% (SD)) of the participants disagreed and 25% of 
the participants were neutral (N) regarding to this statement with only one participant 
being unable to judge.  
 
Approximately half of the participants 57% (18% (SA) + 39% (A)) agreed that high 
levels of access to IT systems given to employees will increase the risk of insider 





















The risk of insider threat behaviour is
increased by not promptly cancelling
access of ex-employees
The risk of insider threat behaviour is
increased by high levels of trust
given to employees
The risk of insider threat behaviour is
increased by high levels of access to









~ 133 ~ 
disagreed, 23% of the participants were neutral (N), and none of the participants was 
unable to judge. 
 
To sum up, the responses regarding access and level of trust factor were mixed. 
While most of the participant agreed with the first statement, less than half agreed 
with the second statement. The percentages in Figure 5.10 and the mean in Table 
5.12 indicate that most participants agreed that the risk of insider threat behaviour is 
increased when not promptly cancelling access of ex-employees. Moreover, Senior 
IT Security Consultant claimed "cancel ex-employee access immediately". However, 
the mean was neutral regarding the third statement (the risk of insider threat 
behaviour is increased by the high levels of trust given to employees). Thus, the 
researcher concludes that an additional analysis method is needed in order to find out 
whether access and level is a contributing factor to insider threat behaviour. 
Insiders' knowledge 
Employees have a great knowledge about their organisation and are usually familiar 
with some or all the internal processes of their target systems as described in section 
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Table 5.13: Insiders' knowledge 
 
Please indicate your level of 
agreement with each 
statement:  
 
The risk of insider threat 

















































































...insiders' knowledge of the potential 
value of the organisation's 
information. 
28 33 30 7 2 0 2.22 
...insiders' knowledge of the methods 
used to detect insider threat 
behaviour. 
18 40 31 7 2 2 2.41 
...insiders' knowledge of methods of 
granting access to the organisation's 
information. 
17 38 30 13 2 0 2.45 
 
 
Figure 5.11: Insiders' knowledge 
 
Figure 5.11 shows that 61%of the participants agreed (28% SA + 33% (A)) that the 
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value of the organisation's information to outsiders. Only 9% (7% (D) + 2% (SD)) of 
the participants disagreed. On the other hand, 33% were neutral (N) and none of the 
participants was unable to judge.  
 
Additionally, 58% (18% (SA) + 40% (A)) agreed that insiders' knowledge of the 
methods used to detect insider threat behaviour will increase the risk of such 
behaviour. However, only 9% (7% (D) + 2% (SD)) of the participants disagreed. A 
total of 31% of the participants were neutral (N),and two participants were unable to 
judge.  
 
Similarly, 55% (17% (SA) + 38% (A)) of participants agreed that insiders' 
knowledge of methods to grant access to the organisation's information will increase 
the risk of insider threat behaviour. Only 15% (13% (D) + 2% (SD)) of the 
participants disagreed, about 30% of the participants were neutral (N), and none of 
the participants was unable to judge. 
 
The outcome of this part of the survey has partially supported the proposition that 
insiders' knowledge is one of the factors that contributing to insider threat since only 
approximately half of the participants agreed with the three statements as can be seen 
in Figure 5.11. In addition, the mean presented in Table 5.13 indicates that the 
participants agreed that insiders' knowledge is a very important aspect of insider 
threat behaviour. Consequently, a further investigation and analysis is required to 
identify whether or not insiders' knowledge should be considered as a factor 
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Technical skills  
Insiders often have the technical skills which are usually limited to the system they 
are familiar with which may increase their opportunities to compromise this system 
(details in section 3.5.9). The researcher provides three statements to evaluate 
whether IT skills are an important factor contributing to inappropriate insider threat 
behaviour or not.  Table 5.14 summarised the statements and the responses to the IT 
skill factor. 
 
Table 5.14: IT skills 
 
Please indicate your 
level of agreement with 
each statement:  
 
 
The risk of insider threat 


















































































...employees having formal 
training in computer science, IT 
or similar. 
6 24 25 32 11 2 3.24 
...technically skilled insider 
who violates the security for 
personal gain. 
29 46 12 9 4 0 2.13 
...employees' level of technical 
sophistication. 






~ 137 ~ 
 
Figure 5.12: IT skills 
In the last part, the researcher included three questions to evaluate the technical skill 
factor. As can be seen in Figure 5.12, although 30% (6% (SA) + 24% (A)) of 
participants agreed that employees having formal training in computer science, IT or 
similar skills increased the insider threat behaviour, 43% (32% (D) + 11% (SD)) of 
them disagreed. Twenty-five per cent were neutral (N) and neither agreed nor 
disagreed with the statement. Two participants were unable to judge.  
 
On the other hand, the majority of participants (75% - 29% (SA) + 46% (A)) agreed 
that a technically skilled insider who violates the security for personal gain is 
increasing the insider threat, while only13% (9% (D) + 4% (SD)) of the participants 
disagreed. A total of 12% of the participants were neutral (N).  
 
Similarly, 46% (7% (SA) + 39% (A)) of the participants agreed that employees' level 
of technical sophistication increased the risk of insider threat behaviour. Twenty-six 
per cent (23% (D) + 3% (SD)) of the participants disagreed, and 28% of the 
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The results above indicate that employees' technical skill cannot be considered a 
significant factor contributing to insider threat behaviour, since the responses 
regarding this factor were varied. Despite the fact that the percentage in Figure 5.12 
shows that most of the participants agreed with the second statement (technically 
skilled insider who violates the security for personal gain is increasing the insider 
threat), about half of them disagreed with the first statement (employees having 
formal training in computer science, IT or similar skills could increase the insider 
threat behaviour). On the other hand, Table 5.14 indicates that the mean for the first 
statement is neutral. Alternatively, participants' comments confirmed the opinion of a 
Senior IT Security Consultant who stated "Most insiders planned for the attack well 
in advance, by using some of their technical skills and techniques like meaningful 
errors and preparatory behaviour". Therefore, the researcher concludes that another 
analysis method is essential in order to identify whether or not employees' technical 
skills contribute to insider threat. 
5.4 The Need for Factor Analysis  
As discussed previously in Chapter Two, the factors that emerged from a review of 
three different sources (academic sources, IT industry publications and published 
reported incidents) were not equally supported by all the sources. That is, some 
sources have highlighted some factors while other sources have supported others. 
This shows a significant contribution of this study, since the three sources provided 
competing models that reflect differences and disagreements. This study has taken 
into consideration all the factors that have been addressed by all three sources in 
order to yield the candidate list of factors that present a holistic approach. The 
researcher tested the candidate HIT model through the preliminary analysis of the 
survey.   
 
The preliminary analysis has revealed that there is a further debate regarding the 
factors because the analysis did not present an unequivocal list of factors that 
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information security policies, support for other factors varies (such as outsourcing, 
remote access and cultural factors). Moreover, the correlation matrix (see Appendix 
2) indicates that there is a strong correlation not only between each group of verbals 
for each factor but also between different groups. Although, the preliminary analysis 
shows that there are correlations between verbals for some factors, there are many 
correlations for the verbals across other factors. The preliminary analysis result did 
not definitely identify the underlying factors; therefore the presented factors required 
further analysis. 
 
All the above illustrated that the candidate factors are inconsistent, which may be 
because many of the suggested factors may be circumstantial rather than actually 
contributing to insider threats. For example, remote access does not contribute 
insider threat because all organisations grant remote access. However, remote access 
may be a tool that makes it easier for an insider to carry out a threat, the fact that he 
is influenced by other factors together with the remote access may constitute a 
stronger threat. Moreover, motivation alone as a factor will not be enough to 
commence a threat. An insider must have other facilitating factors along with his 
motivation in order to pose threat. Similarly, outsourcing does not necessarily 
indicate insider threat.  
 
Due to the competing models provided by the three different sources, and the results 
of the primary analysis, the need for another analysis is indicated. The factor analysis 
will show the relevance between factors and will present a distinct set of factors. The 
factor analysis will present a different, improved list of factors which will reflect a 
consistent interpretation of the data, unlike the original grouping.  
5.5 Factor Analysis  
Factor analysis provides another perspective of the survey results. Factor analyses is 
a data reduction technique, the general purpose of which is to reduce the variables to 
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analysis can perform data reduction by either identifying representative variables 
from a larger set of variables or generating a totally new set of factors smaller in 
number that partially or completely replace the original set of factors.  
5.5.1  Steps involved in Factor Analysis 
According to Pallant (2011, 182 & 183), there are three main steps in conducting 
factor analysis:  
5.5.1.1 Step 1: Assessment of the Suitability of the Data for Factor 
Analysis 
Two main issues should be considered when deciding whether or not factor analysis 
is suitable for this study: sample size and sample sufficiency.  
 Sample size  
Although many researchers recommend large sample sizes, some researchers 
consider that a smaller sample size such as 150 or less should be sufficient if the 
factor loading is high (Pallant 2011). Hair et al. (2010) suggest that a sample of 100 
participants requires a factor loading of .55 and above to be significant. Therefore, in 
this study, only a .55 and above factor loading was used. Table 5.15 presents the 







~ 141 ~ 















 Sample sufficiency test and sphericity test 
The second issue to be addressed is the sufficiency of the sample. SPSS provides two 
tests to determine whether factor analysis is suitable for the data: Bartlett’s test of 
sphericity (Bartlett 1954), and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling 
adequacy (Kaiser 1974). Bartlett’s test of sphericity should be significant (p = .05 or 
smaller) (Pallant 2011, 183). An acceptable result for Bartlett’s Test of Sphericity is 
when “the correlation matrix has significant correlations among at least some of the 
variables” (Hair et al. 2010, p. 104).  For the KMO test, a score of .70 is considered 
acceptable, while .80 or greater is excellent (Hair et al. 2010). 
 
The following Table 5.16 gives information about the two sample sufficiency tests 
for factor analysis. Table 5.16 indicates that the minimum standards have been met 
or exceeded; the KMO value is .874 which is above .7, and Bartlett’s test is 
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Table 5.16:  KMO and Bartlett's Test 
 
Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin Measure of Sampling Adequacy. .808 
Bartlett's Test of 
Sphericity 
Approx. Chi-Square 1195.412 
df 351 
Sig. .000 
5.5.1.2 Step 2: Factor Extraction 
Factor extraction "involves determining the smallest number of factors that can be 
used to best represent the interrelationships among the set of variables"(Pallant 
2011, 184). 
 There are a number of techniques for determining the number of factors to retain 
(Hair et al. 2010; Pallant 2011): 
 
 Kaiser’s criterion is a widely-used technique,   also known as the eigenvalue 
rule. Using this rule, only factors with an eigenvalue greater than 1.0 are 
retained.  
 A number of factors are determined by the researcher according to research 
objectives or prior research.  
 The scree test technique involves retaining all factors above the inflection 
point at which the direction of the curve changes dramatically and becomes 
horizontal (elbow), as these factors explain most of the variance in the data 
set. 
  Sufficient factors to meet a specified percentage of variance explained, more 
often 60% or greater.  
 
In order to determine how many factors to extract in this study, the researcher tried 
all previous techniques. However, Kaiser’s criterion was the most appropriate 
method. The researcher began by determining the number of factors according to the 
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help the researcher to find an accurate and meaningful list of factors. However, 
neither these techniques was of great assistance to the researcher in identifying the 
appropriate number of factors. 
    
The graph in Figure 5.13 shows a change (or elbow) in the shape after the second 
factor; there is an obvious break between the second and third components which 
means that components 1 and 2 describe the variance much more than the other 
components. However, these two components do not meet a specified percentage of 
variance which is often 60% or greater. Therefore, the researcher decided to extract 
eight factors according to Kaiser’s criterion technique.   
 
 
Figure 5.13: Scree Plot 
 
 Finally, Kaiser’s criterion was utilised, and only the components with eigenvalue of 
1 or above were extracted. The Total Variance Explained table below was used to 
determine how many components meet this principle. The first set of columns, 
labelled Initial Eigenvalues, was checked to find out the components with an 
eigenvalue of 1 or greater. Eight components recorded eigenvalues above 1 (8.346, 
2.209, 1.863, 1.527, 1.296, 1.144, 1.047, and 1.021). These eight components 
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Table 5.17: Total Variance Explained 
Component 
Initial Eigenvalues 
Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 















1 8.346 30.910 30.910 8.346 30.910 30.910 3.274 12.125 12.125 
2 2.209 8.180 39.090 2.209 8.180 39.090 2.701 10.003 22.128 
3 1.863 6.902 45.992 1.863 6.902 45.992 2.314 8.571 30.699 
4 1.527 5.656 51.647 1.527 5.656 51.647 2.196 8.134 38.833 
5 1.296 4.801 56.448 1.296 4.801 56.448 2.165 8.019 46.851 
6 1.144 4.236 60.684 1.144 4.236 60.684 2.031 7.521 54.373 
7 1.047 3.879 64.563 1.047 3.879 64.563 1.961 7.262 61.635 
8 1.021 3.781 68.345 1.021 3.781 68.345 1.812 6.710 68.345 
9 .909 3.366 71.711       
10 .821 3.041 74.752       
11 .810 3.001 77.753       
12 .685 2.537 80.290       
13 .617 2.286 82.576       
14 .566 2.095 84.671       
15 .505 1.871 86.542       
16 .473 1.753 88.295       
17 .449 1.664 89.958       
18 .430 1.594 91.553       
19 .411 1.524 93.077       
20 .339 1.254 94.331       
21 .288 1.066 95.397       
22 .270 1.001 96.398       
23 .240 .890 97.287       
24 .215 .795 98.083       
25 .205 .759 98.842       
26 .185 .685 99.526       
27 .128 .474 100.000       
5.5.1.3 Step 3: Factor Rotation and Interpretation 
Once the number of factors has been determined, rotation is the next step in order to 
assist with the researcher’s interpretation. The general purpose of the rotation method 
is to obtain simpler and theoretically more meaningful factor solutions. In many 
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ambiguities that often accompany initial un-rotated factor solutions (Hair et al. 
2010). The Varimax method was used to rotate the data in this study. The Varimax 
technique is a widely-used orthogonal approach which attempts to minimise the 
number of variables by keeping the high loading variables for each factor (Pallant 
2011; Alhija 2010).  After using the Varimax method, the researcher examined the 
rotated component matrix and started the interpretation with the first variable on the 
first component and moved horizontally from left to right looking for the highest 
loading value (positive or negative) for that variable on any component. Similarly, 
this was done with the second variable, again looking for the highest loading for that 
variable on any component, moving from left to right. This process was repeated for 
all other variables until all variables had been reviewed for their highest loading on a 
component. In this study, the minimum highest value was .55 according to Hair et al. 
(2010)’s suggestion. For easier interpretation, in options the researcher typed .55 in 
the Absolute value below section and in Coefficient Display Format section, the 
researcher clicked on Sort by size and Suppress small coefficients. See Table 5.18. It 
should be noted that in the following table, loadings below .55 have been excluded 
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Table 5.18: Rotated Component Matrix 
 
Component 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Cultural clash between employees and the organisation  .719        
 Organisational culture that tolerates unethical behaviour .618        
Insiders being unduly motivated by financial gain .614        
 Insiders' knowledge of the potential value of the organisation's 
information 
.612        
Technically skilled insiders who violate the security for personal 
gain. 
.551        
The implementation of inappropriate information security 
policy. 
  .787       
Out-dated information security procedures or policies.   .643       
 Insufficient information security policy training and awareness.    .556       
Inappropriate or concerning behaviour prior to the incident such 
as delays, absences and poor job performance  
   .813      
High levels of trust given to employees.    .688      
Employees from backgrounds where acceptable practices differ.     .841     
Insiders being vulnerable to coercion by outsider.     .574     
Allowing authorised  mobile device to access organisational 
information from outside the organisation physical boundary. 
     .776    
High levels of access to IT systems given to employees.      .609    
Giving employees remote access to organisational information.       .739   
Granting access to third- parties contracted to conduct work 
within the organisation. 
      .617   
Insiders' knowledge of the methods used to detect insider threat 
behaviour. 
       .751  
Employees' level of technical sophistication.        .55  
Employees working from home.         .749 
Psychological factors such as social frustrations or computer 
dependency. 
        .589 
          
 
Once the variables of each component had a significant loading, the researcher 
assigned a suitable name to each component. According to Hair et al. (2010), the 
names selected to represent a factor will be significantly influenced by variables with 
a higher loading. Therefore, the researcher carefully examined and studied all 
significant variables for each factor, emphasising variables with a higher loading in 
order to name a factor accurately reflecting the variables loading on that factor.  
Table 15.19 summarizes the improved extracted factors including the name, 
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Conflict between the 
organisation and an 
individual who is willing 
and able to seek personal 
gain at the organisation's 
expense 
8.346 Factor one represents 30.910 percent of the total variance in 
initial eigenvalues and 12.125 of the total variance after rotation. 
There are five variables in this factor. 
The first variable focused mainly on the conflict between the 
organisation and its employees as a result of the cultural clash.  
Similarly, the second variable also reflected some sort of conflict. 
If the organisation culture tolerates unethical behaviour, this will 
significantly affect the employees’ behaviour, which at the end 
could lead to conflict between the organisation and employee.  
The third variable reflects the motivation for the individual, while 
the remaining two variables reveal the ability of the individual to 
commit the threat. This circumstances affect the name of factor 
one; thus, this factor called “conflict between the organisation and 
an individual who is willing and able to seek personal gain at the 
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motivated by financial 
gain. 
.614 Motivation  
Insiders' knowledge of the 
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Factor two consisted of three variables. Although it represents 
8.180 percent of the total variance in initial eigenvalues, it 
represents 10.003 percent of the total variance after rotation.  
  
The three variables constituted the insufficient security policy 
factor. This is because the first and second variables focused 
mainly on security policies, in term of implementation and 
updating. In addition, the third variable focused on policy 
training and awareness. Therefore, inadequate security policy 
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Factor three included two variables with 6.902 percent of the total 
variance in initial eigenvalues and 8.571 percent of the total 
variance after rotation. 
 
In factor three, the first variable reflects the characteristics of the 
underachieving employee. While, the second highest loading 
variable focused on the high levels of trust. Low performance 
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as delays, absences and 









































Factor four represents 5.656 percent of the total variance in initial 
eigenvalues. On the other hand, it represents 8.134 of the total 
variance after rotation.  
 
First variable addressed the background of the employees. 
Sometimes the background and where the individual comes from 
could influence their behaviour. Hence, the background of the 
employees is considered as an outside factor that influences their 
behaviour towards the work or the organisation. 
 
Second variable in factor four also considered as an outside factor, 
since the coercion by outsiders on the employees could influence 
them to behave in an appropriate way. Outsider’s coercion could 
be through commercial pressure or blackmailing insider employee 
to perform the attack. Therefore, the influence of the outside 
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Even though factor five represents 4.801 percent of the total 
variance in initial eigenvalues, it represents 8.019 percent of the 
total variance after rotation.  
 
Both variables in factor five focused on unnecessary access or 
more access given to the employees than what they actually need 
to perform their job, either by allowing mobile device to access the 
organisation's network remotely or by giving employees a high 
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Factor six created from two variables, describes 4.236 percent of 
the total variance in initial eigenvalues and 7.521 percent of the 
total variance after rotation.  
 
Both variables within this factor focused on loyalty of employees 
towered an organisation. Outsourcing and remote access of 
organisation's information affect the loyalty of employees simply 
because "Home is where the heart is". Although it is true that the 
employees work for an outsourced company, their loyalty to their 
original company may still remain. Moreover, accessing the 
organisation's data remotely may reduce the loyalty of the 
employees since they are outside the workplace environment 
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Factor seven represents 3.879 percent of the total variance in 
initial eigenvalues, and represents 7.262 of the total variance after 
rotation.  
 
Variables in factor seven are considered as essential attributes to 
commit a perfect crime. The first variable describes the knowledge 
of the insiders, especially their awareness about the methods used 
to detect insider threat behaviour. While, the second variable 
relates to the insiders' level of technical skills which help them to 
carry out the attack. Both variables allow the insiders to avoid 
being detected when they launch an attack. 
 
Insiders' knowledge of the 
methods used to detect 














Factor eight included two variables with 3.781 percent of the total 
variance in initial eigenvalues and 6.710 percent of the total 
variance after rotation. 
 
In factor eight, the common theme among the variables is social 
isolation. For instance, employee may prefer to work from their 
homes or any isolated areas. Such constant behaviour may 
indicate signs of depression, leading to social frustration. In such 
cases, social isolation could lead to serious inappropriate 
behaviour. 
 








Psychological factors such 
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5.5.2  Reliability  
The Cronbach alpha was obtained for the eight improved factors after factor analysis. 
The Cronbach alpha of the data ranged from 0.70 to 0.90. The highest was 0.90 
indicating conflicts between the organisation and an individual who is willing and 
able to seek personal gain at the organisation's expense, while the lowest internal 
consistency was 0.70 for the perfect crime. The high internal consistency values for 
all the constructs confirm the reliability of the measurement model.  The results of 
the reliability test are presented in Table 5.20. 
 
Table 5.20: Cronbach’s alpha 
Factors  Alpha 
Reliability 
Conflict between the organisation and an individual who is willing and able to 
seek personal gain at the organisation's expense 
0.90 
Inadequate security policy 0.83 
Giving high trust to underachieving employee 0.80 
Outside influence on employees 0.89 
Liberal access 0.76 
Loyalty of employees 0.86 
The perfect crime  0.70 
Socially isolated employees 0.78 
The sample consisted of 100 security specialists. 
5.6 Enhanced HIT Model and the Improved Factors  
As discussed in section 5.4, due to the mixed results from the primary analysis of 
each factor, the researcher decided to conduct factor analysis. Factor analysis helped 
the researcher to organise the variables in order to extract an improved list of factors 
which reflected a more consistent interpretation of the data than the original 
grouping. Moreover, factor analysis showed the relationship between factors and 
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improved factors that contribute to insider threat behaviour. The variables were 
grouped into eight factors, all of which together form the enhanced HIT model (see 
table 5.19). Figure 5.14 presents the enhanced HIT model.  
 
The improved factors extracted using the factor analysis method are listed below: 
 Conflict between the organisation and an individual who is willing and able 
to seek personal gain at the organisation's expense 
Conflict can be defined as “the disagreement between at least two persons or 
groups on specific issues, or it is a process in which one party perceives that its 
interests are being opposed or negatively affected by another party” (Nouman, 
Khan, and Khan 2011, 618). A study found that a majority of employees (85%) 
experience conflict with their organisation and about 27%of these conflicts 
transform into personal attacks, and 25% of the avoidance of conflict resulted in 
sickness or absence from work (Hayes 2008).   
Conflict in organisations occurs for numerous reasons; usually, it is the outcome of a 
culture clash between employees, different personalities and the organisation’s 
culture. According to Nouman, Khan, and Khan (2011), the most common causes of 
the conflicts arising between organisations and individuals are a lack of 
communication, misperception, difference in opinions, and discrimination. 
Moreover, a workplace conflict could also be affected by personality clashes, stress, 
high workloads and culture clash (Weinhold and Weinhold 2004; Hayes 2008; 
Sarala 2010). This workplace conflict may lead to revenge, as stated by CERT 
(2006), since more than half of the insider attacks were launched as a result of 
dissatisfaction of employees, and most of them acted out of revenge related to some 
conflict or negative event with the organisation. This could include, for example, 
disputes with the employer, clashes with supervisors and co-workers, new 
supervisors, high workloads, transfers or demotions and dissatisfaction with salary 
increases or bonuses. A conflict with a supervisor may cause an employee to become 
an insider threat. For example, an employee attempted to pass his organisation’s 
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employee was concerned over company practices and decided to send an e-mail to 
180,000 employees detailing his frustration with his organisation’s health record 
system. This e-mail uncovered secret projections of the organisation’s future 
outcomes which resulted inthis employee being fired (Kirkpatrick 2008). 
Culture and personality clashes increase the likelihood of conflict as employees 
often see a clash of values as a significant cause of conflict (Weinhold and Weinhold 
2004; Hayes 2008). Acceptable traditions for doing business differ according to 
region and area. According to these various regional circumstances, the pressure of 
external sources on insiders could be easier to apply, either directly or indirectly, 
through sophisticated methods such as social engineering (Colwill 2009). Royds 
(2009) stated that most of the data losses reported by the government of the UK 
show that only 5% occur because of technology issues, while 95% occur as a result 
of cultural factors or people’s behaviour. 
Furthermore, organisational cultures can also contribute to the conflict; if the 
conflict is ignored or managed poorly by the organisation’s culture, this exposes the 
organisation to higher levels of accidents, lowered productivity, and depression and 
dissatisfaction of employees, which simply leads to inappropriate behaviour (Bond 
2004; Casali and Day 2010). Organisations should define appropriate and 
inappropriate behaviour in the workplace. If organisational culture tolerates 
unethical behaviour, there is a high probability that conflicts will occur (Bond 2004; 
Casali and Day 2010). Organisational culture is defined as “the shared values, 
norms and expectations that direct the way people approach their work and interact 
with each other” (Colwill 2009, 5). Another definition stated that “as the system that 
penetrate values, belief and norms in each organization. Organisational  culture 
able encourage and discourage the effectiveness depend on the value characteristic, 
belief, and norms”(Syauta et al. 2012, 70). Good organisational culture usually 
aligns the values of the organisation with those of its employees. On the other hand, 
poor organisational culture expresses values and behaviours different from the 
shared values of employees and the adopted organisational values (Casali and Day 
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by the government of the UK show that only 5% occur because of technology issues, 
while 95% occur as a result of cultural factors or people’s behaviour. The culture of 
an organisation can influence the behaviour of employees and eventually contributes 
to the effectiveness of an organisation. The conflict will worsen if the insiders are 
unduly motivated by financial gain and they may use their knowledge and technical 
skills to violate the security for personal gain.   
 Insufficient security policy  
An inadequate security policy can be described as an overall inadequate level of 
protection against insider threat. The implementation of inappropriate information 
security policy, out dated security policy and lack of training and awareness are 
considered  to be essential aspects that can affect the insider threats (Pramanik, 
Sankaranarayanan, and Upadhyaya 2004). Implementing a suitable information 
security policy, making it up-to-date and providing appropriate training and 
awareness are vital tasks which require more than just writing a security manual. 
Each organisation needs to know who has access to the data, what their own access 
policies are, and what actions they take to access data. Clear and updated security 
policies as well as training and awareness are considered very essential to all 
organisations to protect their assets from misuse (CERT 2006). 
The implementation of insufficient information security policies and procedures 
could significantly increase the insider threat. According to Randazzo et al. (2004), 
in 70% of the cases, insiders had broken through systemic vulnerabilities in 
processes, procedures and policies to carry out their attacks. Meanwhile,  Kowalski 
et al. (2008) claim that in half of the incidents they examined the insiders exploited 
the vulnerabilities in established business processes or controls, such as insufficiently 
enforced policies for separation of duties. Organisations need to implement suitable 
security policies and all employees should follow the security policy to minimise the 
risk and to respond to any security incidents effectively. Moreover, an out-dated 
security policy can expose organisations to serious risk (Canavan 2007; Karyda, 
Kiountouzis, and Kokolakis 2005). Security policies should be updated based on 
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other changes in the structure of the organisation. In both situations, security policies 
should be updated because of the change (Zafar 2013).  
Moreover, training and awareness is an important process that should be undertaken 
in order to minimise the insider threat.  According to Furnell (2006), the problems 
faced by organisations from internal threats are being reported along with matching 
evidence of insufficient security training and awareness. Security training and 
awareness is one of the areas on which an organisation must focus and apply so as to 
reduce the insider threats (Crossler et al. 2013). Awareness among all levels of 
employees is vital to the successful performance of any organisation’s information 
security policy (Albrechtsen and Hovden 2010). 
 Giving high trust to underachieving employees 
This factor generally focused on the high level of trust which is given by the 
organisation to their underachieving employees. An underachiever is an employee 
who is working much less than their potential and who exhibits inappropriate or 
concerning behaviour. Underachievers are the employees who do not regularly apply 
effort to their work and are working far below the organisation’s expectations. 
Employees’ performance and productivity are very important to an organisation’s 
success. Employees who are not using their abilities, skills, time and resources 
effectively are costing the company money (Joseph 2009). 
 
Performance is “work results that achieved by someone or group in organization, 
suitable with the authority and responsibility, in effort to reach the Organisational  
goals legally, not violate the law, and suitable with moral and ethics.”(Syauta et al. 
2012, 71). Employee performance is “work outcome in quality and quantity that 
achieved by someone in conducting his responsibility”(Syauta et al. 2012, 71). 
 
The performance of organisations’ employees can be influenced by several factors. 
For example, role ambiguity and role conflict can negatively affect an employee’s 
performance and impede his/her normal work (Zou 2011). According to Vosloban 
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level of employees’ performance. This includes employees’ level of commitment to 
completing tasks, their abilities, their communication skills, and their attitude. 
Additionally, the employees’ performance is influenced by other factors such as 
workplace environment, tasks clarity, rewards, opportunities and frequency the 
relationship with colleagues. The workplace environment plays a significant role in 
motivating employees to perform their assigned tasks efficiently. Financial reward 
alone is not a sufficient motivator in encouraging the high performance required 
within the organisations (Chandrasekar 2011). 
 
Moreover, Syauta et al. (2012) and Md Zabid Abdul, Sambasivan, and Johari (2003) 
confirmed that organisational commitment influences employee performance: the 
higher the organisational commitment, the higher the employee performance. 
Organisational commitment is the “degree to which an employee believes in and 
accepts Organisational goals and desire to remain with the organization”(Syauta et 
al. 2012, 70). 
Vosloban (2012) consider that employees’ performance management is an essential 
aspect of the organisation’s productivity. Organisations’ managers should be 
responsible for developing high performance in their employees. “The performance 
management is a systematic process of the workload planning and expectations 
setting, of the continuous performance monitorization, development of the 
performing capacity, periodically performance evaluation and high performance 
recompensation”(Vosloban 2012, 661). Organisations should ensure that they offer 
their employees the necessary knowledge required to carry out their jobs in order to 
achieve the desired performance (Vosloban 2012; Joseph 2009).  
Noticeable concerning behaviours were shown by the employees in the insider threat 
cases including decline in performance, delays, or unexplained absenteeism (CERT 
2009). Organisations should be aware of their employees’ performance, especially if 
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 Outside influence on employees 
All external surroundings that may affect employee behaviour are considered the 
outside factors. The influence of the external environment could include many 
factors such as employees' background, values, economic motivator and employee 
coercion by outsiders (Mathur and Gupta 2012). These factors sometimes can 
negatively direct the insiders’ behaviour against their organisation. While 
organisations’ internal environment can be controlled and managed, the individual 
external environment is outside the control of organisations (Mathur and Gupta 
2012). 
 
Sometimes, individuals’ backgrounds are considered to be an external factor 
affecting the employees’ behaviour toward their organisation. Mathur and Gupta 
(2012) stated that:  
“It is a common belief that people who are brought up with 
lot of parental care, concern, love and affection exhibit good 
demeanour with respect and high regard to everyone. Since 
they are brought up in a protected environment, in turn offer 
the same to their peers and subordinates. Conversely, people 
coming from broken families with chequered childhood are 
much unsecured, suspicious, and less jovial and lack sound 
decision making skills.” 
 
This clarifies why personal family background is a very important factor affecting 
employee behaviour.  The different backgrounds of employees may have different 
professional implications (Mathur and Gupta 2012).  Similarly, attitudes and 
propensities towards crime and acceptable practices for doing business differ 
significantly according to employees’ backgrounds and regions. As stated by  
Colwill (2009, 191) “Practices that are considered illegal in the Western world, for 
instance the giving of substantial gifts (namely bribes), may be a common and 
accepted practice in some regions where the wheels of business need to be oiled”. 
 
Moreover, employees’ concerns include issues of life that are often beyond their 
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These concerns include family, health and financial problems (Mathur and Gupta 
2012). Sometimes, an outside influence can be exerted on an employee through 
coercion by an external entity to force them to launch the attack; this coercion could 
take the form of commercial pressure or blackmail. Likewise, critically problematic 
financial situations such as struggling to make ends meet, and large credit card debts, 
make the insider greedy for money. In these cases, insiders are motivated mainly by 
the desire for financial gain. Employees could steal information to sell it, or be paid 
by outsiders to modify data or modify information to obtain financial benefits. Some 
employees were motivated to provide additional income for their relatives, partner or 
friends (Willison and Warkentin 2013).   
 Liberal access 
Liberal access can be defined as unnecessary access or more access given to the 
employees than what they actually need to perform their job. This may occur when 
an organisation offers increased access facilities in several ways by, for example, 
allowing mobile devices to access the organisation's network remotely or by giving 
employees a high level of access to IT systems.  
A high level of more than needed access can lead to insider threat (Willison and 
Warkentin 2013). Many organisations offer their employees more access than what 
they essentially need to perform their job (Cole and Ring 2005). Misuse of access is 
one of the most difficult types of attack to detect and prevent, since the insider uses 
his or her authorised access rights to perform illegal tasks (Bellovin 2008).  
 
Moreover, mobile devices with remote access to organisation networks increase the 
risk of insider threat as stated by Aldhizer and Bowles (2011, 59) “The proliferation 
of powerful conventional mobile devices … with remote access to internal networks 
has raised significant new security concerns.”. Although the use of mobile devices 
such as smartphone or PDA device and enabling employees to work remotely 
facilitate the mobility, it can lead to data loss or theft through the physical loss of the 
device or leakage of data outside the network. (Steele and Wargo 2007, 25). 
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thereby exposing the data to risk, since the data on mobile devices is usually not 
encrypted or backed up. According to Sarkar (2010, 120),“any device like a laptop, a 
PDA or a mobile that accesses a corporate network or store data is a potential risk 
to intellectual property or sensitive customer data. These portable devices are a 
great source of data leakage”. The increased number of powerful mobile devices 
with remote access to internal networks has raised significant new security concerns 
(Aldhizer and Bowles 2011). 
 Loyalty of employees 
The absence of employee loyalty can negatively affect the employees’ work 
efficiency and the organisation’s security (Bridges and Harrison 2003). Employee 
disloyalty could increase the possibility for an internal organisational clashes and 
problems. According to Schrag (2001), employee disloyalty weakens organisational 
productivity and security. Many organisations are concerned about their employees’ 
loyalty. Employee disloyalty can be manifested in different ways such as a deliberate 
failure to perform tasks, accepting benefits that belong to the organisation, 
dishonesty and theft. Former employees’ disloyalty also can affect the organisation 
as they can take with them confidential information and proprietary products.  
 
Furthermore, outsourcing and remote access may influence employee loyalty 
(Bridges and Harrison 2003). An outsourced employee may be less loyal to the 
organisation: “The growing culture of open and interconnected world combined with 
transfer of jobs overseas, downsizing, outsourcing, and increased hiring of part-time 
workers to avoid paying benefits are shaping the employees’ sense of job security 
and loyalty to employer”(Sarkar 2010, 115).  A single outsourcing contract can 
change the position of several ‘outsiders’ to ‘insiders’ and may blur the difference 
between an organisation’s employees and members of the third party. Outsourcing 
could increase the organisation’s vulnerability to loss of intellectual property and the 
possibility of transferring a high value or high impact knowledge to a competitor or 
other external sources (Colwill 2009; Whitworth 2005). Organisations are 
increasingly outsourcing critical business functions. Consequently, external 
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systems, while access had been previously granted only to organisation’s employees. 
Organisations should be aware that if they dealing with outsourced employees, then 
insiders are no longer just the employees within their four walls. Organisations 
should ensure that the outsourced employees are managed carefully, allowing them 
access only to information they need to fulfil their contractual obligations and 
terminating their access when it is no longer needed. 
 
 In addition, remote access provides a good opportunity for insiders to attack with 
less risk. It is easier to attack the organisation remotely, since the insider is outside 
the boundaries of the organisation and no-one can witness hem. Accessing the 
organisation's data remotely can lead to a decrease in the loyalty of the workers since 
they are not in the workplace environment (Sarkar 2010). This will give them the 
chance to abuse the organisation whether intentionally or not.  According to  CERT 
(2009), most insiders used remote access outside the work place to carry out their attack.  
 The perfect crime 
"Think I can avoid being detected" refers to the employees’ confidence that they will 
not be revealed by the organisation. Employees could use their knowledge ability and 
technical skills against their organisation. According to Padayachee (2012, 673), 
“The insider threat is even more dangerous than external threats, as an insider may 
easily misuse the skills and knowledge gained through legitimate work duties for 
illegitimate gain”. The insiders’ knowledge, especially their awareness about the 
methods used to detect insider threat behaviour, and insiders’ level of technical skills 
both can facilitate the insider attack. Some researchers refer to an insider as “anyone 
who has intimate knowledge of internal operations and processes”(Steele and Wargo 
2007, 20). In addition to their free access to documents and data, insiders have a 
broad knowledge of their organisation’s system and procedures (Wood 2000). 
Employees commonly have a great knowledge about their organisation; they are 
usually familiar with some or all internal process of their target systems (Dallaway 
2008). Furthermore, the most serious threat situation to the organisation’s system and 
networks is the technically skilled insider who violates security policies for personal 
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through activities such as downloading and using hacker tools, gaining access to the 
system after termination, and the setup and use of backdoor accounts. Insiders usually 
have the skills which are generally limited to the systems they are familiar with which 
may increase their opportunity to compromise these systems. The level of employee 
sophistication is considered as a potential factor which can influence their ability to 
perform insider misuse. According to Padayachee (2012, 673), “The insider threat is 
even more dangerous than external threats, as an insider may easily misuse the skills 
and knowledge gained through legitimate work duties for illegitimate gain”. Thus, 
insiders’ knowledge and skills are considered essential for committing a perfect 
crime. 
 Socially isolated employees 
This relates to the character or personality of the employee. Sometimes socially 
isolated employees prefer to work from home or in isolated work areas. Some 
employees prefer to be socially isolated when working, indicated by their preference 
for working from their homes or in isolated areas. If this behaviour is consistent, it 
may be an indication of depression, leading to social frustration. In such cases, this 
could lead to serious, inappropriate behaviour (Colwill 2009). According to Gely and 
Bierman (2006, 299) “Employees need to be able to communicate with each other 
for workplace social engagement to flourish”.  
 
Working from home or any isolated areas can lead to insider threat. According to 
CERT (2009), insiders have acknowledged that it is easier to conduct malicious 
actions from home because it reduces the concern that anyone in the office could be 
observing the malicious behaviour or actions. Furthermore, social frustrations may 
include childhood abuse and neglect. Such individuals tend to exhibit anger, isolation 
from the community, poorer social skills and a desire to “strike out at the system” 
(Steele and Wargo 2007). Lack of social skills and a tendency to social isolation 
increase the probability of inappropriate behaviour, since if these individuals face 
any difficulties, they will not address these in a positive manner (Shaw 2006). Often 
if the insiders are loners with low social skills, they feel a general antagonism 
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isolated employees are usually poor team players, whose primary interests are: 
exploring networks, breaking into secure systems, cracking code, and challenging 
and outfoxing security professionals (Sarkar 2010). 
 
The enhanced HIT model presented in Figure 5.14 will be utilized in the preparation 
of the interview method in Chapter Six. The qualitative phase of the study will 
validate the factors in the enhanced HIT model. The outcome from the interviews is 
the final HIT model with the factors that influence the insider threat behaviour. Thus, 
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5.7 Summary 
This chapter provided a general overview of the first evaluation of the candidate HIT 
model. The focus of the quantitative phase was on validating the factors identified in 
the academic sources, IT industry publications and published reported incidents. 
Furthermore, the intention was to discover an improved set of factors that could 
further enhance the candidate HIT model. In this chapter, the researcher discussed 
the survey design, targeted population, a Web-based survey and finally the data 
analysis. The researcher surveyed 100 security specialists with the following job 
titles: IT Security Manager, Principal Cyber Security Manager, Security Systems 
Administrator and Senior IT Security. The data was collected through a Web-based 
survey and analysed by SPSS.  
The preliminary analysis did not present a robust list of factors contributing to the 
insider threat. While there is strong support for some factors (such as information 
security policies), support for other factors (such as outsourcing and remote access) 
was mixed. Results of the preliminary analysis indicate that the presented factors 
required further analysis. The factor analysis technique was utilized to identify 
groups of inter-related factors to produce a new set of robust factors. At the end, 
Chapter Five covered the main points of the changes made to the candidate holistic 
insider threat behaviour model and how the survey results led to the enhanced 
holistic insider threat behaviour model.   
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 CHAPTER SIX:           6
QUALITATIVE PHASE AND FINAL 
RESEARCH MODEL  
 
6.1    Introduction  
Chapter Five provided a general overview of the quantitative method applied to the 
survey responses. It covered the main points of the changes that were made otp the 
candidate HIT model and how the survey results led to an improved list of factors. At 
the end of this chapter, an enhanced HIT model will be presented. Chapter Five 
Chapter provided the groundwork for this phase of the study. 
  
This chapter describes the evaluation of the enhanced HIT model. It gives a general 
overview of the qualitative approach in this research. As discussed in section 4.2, this 
study collected the data sequentially in two phases. The quantitative method 
conducted first provides a wide view of the research problem followed by the 
qualitative method to evaluate, refine and enhance the result. The interviews have 
been conducted to support two outcomes. The first is to evaluate the enhanced HIT 
model resulting from the survey to confirm the answers to the first research question. 
The second is to provide material for the second research question of the thesis. The 
data from these interviews will be analysed and a summary of the interviews will be 
presented to illustrate the main concepts that cover the feedback regarding the 
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6.2    Interview Design and Decisions 
This section discusses the interview design, the reasons for choosing in-depth semi-
structured interviews over other interviews methods and interview analysis and 
coding, as well as the number of participants together with their experiences and job 
titles. 
 
Qualitative researchers have established a number of qualitative data collection 
techniques. One of the most common qualitative data collection methods is the 
interview (Lincoln and Guba 1985; Maykut and Morehouse 1994). In the light of 
undertaking a qualitative method, this research aims to explore essential meanings 
through humans’ accurate description of their experiences as well as the 
quantitatively calculated relationships in the previous section.  The interview method 
was divided into two parts. The first part was to evaluate the enhanced insider threat 
behaviour factor from the survey method. While, the second part in the interviews 
was to obtain the participants’ comments and thoughts regarding how each factor can 
be managed. The research in this section will explain and present the interviews’ 
design which demonstrates each step taken to conduct this phase. 
 
Table 6.1: The interviews design  
Process Action taken 
Development of the 
objectives 
The objectives of the interviews method are: 
 To evaluate the new outcome model from the survey. 
 To obtain some guidelines which help to minimise the insider 
threat issue.  
Development of 
interview questions 
Developed the interview questions according to each factor in the 
enhanced model from the survey phase. 
Questions were developed and checked by supervisors for editing.  
Identification of the 
participants 
The researcher searched for Information Security Specialists who have 
ten years of experiences or greater in the information security field.  
Interviews   There were three rounds of data collection: the first round collected 
six interviews, the second round collected two interviews and the 
final round collected three interviews. 
 Five of the participants preferred to be interviewed through Email, 
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Process Action taken 
Transcription Interviews transcribed and checked. 
Coding  Thematic content analysis with the coding done in NVivo  
 Paper coding through mapping techniques and revisiting the 
interviews. 
 Returning to NVivo for a holistic approach to coding. 
6.2.1 Obtaining Interviewees 
To carry out the interviews, the researcher prepared an invitation letter that contained 
the following: 
 Introduction to the researcher  
 General information about the research  
 The purpose of the interviews  
 The benefits of the research 
 The researcher's willingness to conduct the interview in the manner most 
convenient for the interviewee, such as email, phone or Skype 
 A statement stating the researcher's willingness to provide the results of the 
study at the end of the research 
  A statement assuring that confidentiality and privacy will be maintained. 
 
The researcher distributed the invitation letter (attached in Appendix 3) in October 
2012 through LinkedIn to 60 Information Security Specialists who have ten years or 
more of experience in the information security field. LinkedIn is a business focused 
social network Website for people in professional occupations. The advanced search 
ability in LinkedIn helped the researcher to locate the target participants based on 
specific criteria such as locations, job title, the industries in which they worked, and 
where they were educated (Bradbury 2011). Participants were given one week to 
respond, and then a reminder letter was sent to the non-responding individuals to 
remind and encourage them to participate in this study. Table 6.2 shows the three 
rounds of the interview, the number of participants who agreed to be interviewed and 
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commenced the interview was less than those who originally expressed interest in the 
study.  
 
 Table 6.2: The interviews’ three stages 















One 35 1 Oct 2012 8 Oct 2012 10 6 
Two 15 29 Oct 2012 5 Oct 2012 5 2 
Three 10 26 Nov 2012 3 Dec 2012 5 3 
 
Twenty participants were interested in the study and agreed to contribute to the 
interview, and eleven completed the interview questions. The theory saturation was 
achieved after the last interview in round two as the data became redundant and most 
of the themes and criteria were mentioned and confirmed by more than one 
participant. Therefore, the researcher decided to stop after the eleventh interview. 
According to Thomson (2011, 47) saturation is achieved when “no new or relevant 
data seem to emerge regarding a category”.  
 
Table 6.3 provides a brief description of the interviewees. Some individuals did not 
proceed with the interview because they refused to release any information and 
others were busy. The time difference between the researcher's country and the 
participants’ country also proved to be an obstacle for the respondents. Therefore, 
five of the participants preferred to be interviewed through Email, four of the 
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Table 6.3: Interviewees and their description 
Participants Description  
Participant A  
 
Participant A is a key informant male. He is a Chief Information Security Officer with over 24 years of experience in in 
Information Security and IT. 
He has held several positions including:  
 Chief Information Security Officer  
 Head of Information Security  
  Director, Office of the CTO and Strategic Consulting  
  Director of Information Security at  
 Global Security Solutions Leader  
 Commander, Information Technology  




Participant B is a key informant male. He is a Chief Information Security Officer with 24 years’ experience in Information Security 
and IT.  
Participant B has held several positions including:  
 CEO  
 Chief Software Officer, Director Algorithmic and Secure Software design and code analysis  
 Chief Information Security Officer  





Participant C is a male. He is an Information Security Officer with over 10 years’ experience in Information Security and IT he is 
the founder and CEO. He holds a Bachelors' degree in Computer Science majoring in System and Network Engineering (SNE) 
with a minor in Information Security. Currently, he is undertaking an Executive MBA. Furthermore, he holds a host of professional 
certifications recognized by the industry including ISC2 CISSP, EC-Council Certified Ethical Hacker, MCITPro 2008, MCSE and 
many more. Participant C is a Specialist in: Cyber Security and Cyber Warfare SME, Strategic and Tactical management, Business 
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Participants Description  
Participant D 
 
Participant D is a key informant male. He is a Chief Information Security Officer with over 20 years’ experience in Information 
Security. His current and previous executive positions include Chief Security Officer, Chief Information Security Officer and 
advising Chief Information Officer, currently he working as Chief Information Security Officer. Participant D holds an Executive 
Juries Doctor in Cyberspace Law, a certified MBA in IT Management and undergraduate in IT Security. He is specialist in: Cyber-
Law, IT Governance, IT Risk • Cloud Security, Social Networking Security, IT Security, Security Architecture Management 
Project/Program Management Threat & Incident Management, IT Security Software Development, Identity & Access Control, 
Change Control Management Forensics and E-Discovery. 
Participant D has held several positions including:  
 Chief Information Security Officer  
 Chief Information Officer - Director of Security Services  
 Information Security, DR and Compliance Audit Consultant  
 Information Security Consultant, Project Management. 
 Senior Information Security Engineer, Project Manager  
Participant E 
 
Participant E is a male. He is a Senior IT Security Manager with over 12 years’ industry experience and 10 years’ experience in 
Security Consulting & Management. 
Participant E is currently working as Senior IT Security Manager, and he has held several positions including:  
 Project Manager and Senior Consultant  
 System Analyst/Lead Developer  
Participant F 
 
Participant F is a male. He is a Manager of information Security and Services with 10 years’ experience in information security 
and over 15 years’ experience in information technology.  He holds a Bachelor of Science in Information Technology and he is a 
specialist in: IT Governance, IT Risk, Cloud Security, IT Security, Security Architecture Management, Project/Program 
Management, Threat & Vulnerability Management and Technical Security Operations. 
Participant F is currently working as Security Administrator (Manager of Security Services), and has held several positions in the 
past including:  
 Director of Information Security  
 Director of Security Services  
 Systems Engineer 
 Senior Security Engineer  
 IT Security Consultant  
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Participants Description  
Participant G 
 
Participant G is a key informant male. He is a Global Chief Information Security Officer and has been working in the information 
security field for over 35 years. Participant G has a broad background in multiple facets of security including IA, physical, 
technical, personnel, and operations security and he is a specialist in Certification and Accreditation, Counterintelligence, Public 
Key Infrastructure (PKI), Physical Security Design and Implementation and Information Systems Security and Management. 
Participant G has held several positions including:  
 President & Principal Consultant  
 Adjunct Professor and Lecturer  
 Assistant Executive Director  
 Chief Information Security Officer and Senior Consultant  
 Security Analyst  
He holds a Master of Business Administration with a Concentration in Technology Management, Business.  
Participant H 
 
Participant H is a key informant male. He is an accomplished information security, risk management and technology leader with 
over 17 years’ experience in information security and approximately 22 in technology. He holds a Master of Science (M.S.) in 
Information Systems and Technology Management, Information Assurance and Security. He is currently working as a Chief 
Information Security Officer, and has held several positions in the past including:  
 Solutions Strategy & Development Manager  




Participant I is a key informant male. He is in IT and IT Security fields for more than 30 years. Currently, his job title is Sr. Vice 
President of Network and Technical Services and Chief Security Officer. He holds a Master of Science (M.S.) in Computer 
Science. He has held a number of positions including:  
 Sr. Vice President - Application Development and Ancillary Applications. 
 Senior Manager - Risk Consulting Group  
 Chief Information Officer 
Participant J 
 
Participant J is a key informant male. His job title is Chief Information Security Officer. He had been involved in the security 
industry for over 30 years, and obtained certifications in both the traditional/physical and IT security environments (CPP and 
CISSP designations). Participant J holds a degree in Computer Systems Technology. He has held several positions related to 
security  including: 
 Information Systems Audits Principal  
 Manager, Information Systems Operations – Security  
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Participants Description  
Participant K 
 
Participant K is a key informant male. He has been working in security for the past 22 years, with the past 12 years in commercial 
and corporate security. He has executive and management level experience in security audits, security reviews, security operations 
management, risk assessments, travel safety and security strategies, protective security operations, security guard services, physical 
security, security management, security provider reviews, security budgeting and commercial security sales and service. Currently 
he is working as a Security Manager and Consultant as well as Security Professional and Security Advisor. Participant K has held 
many positions related to security  in the past including: 
 Director Security Services Asia Pacific for Travel Health, Safety & Security, Security Consultant  
 General Manager National Security Operations and Security Technical Advisor  
 Team Leader Protective Security and Travel Security  
 Security Team Leader  
 Security Manager-Project  
 Team Leader and Security Manager  
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Table 6.4: Interview methods 
Round   No. of participants Interviewee name Interview method  























The main objective of the interview questions was to evaluate the insider threat 
factors in the enhanced model obtained from the survey and to obtain some 
guidelines and ways to minimise the insider threat problem.  The researcher wanted 
to ascertain whether or not these factors would contribute to insider threat behaviour.  
 
Before the beginning of each interview, a copy of the information sheet and the 
consent form was sent to each participant (attached in Appendices 4 and 5). Each 
interviewee was requested to read and sign the consent forms, thereby agreeing to 
participate in the interview and having it recorded if it was conducted through Skype 
or phone. The eleven interviewees were very positive in their responses to the 
interview. They shared with the researcher their knowledge and experiences 
regarding the insider threat cases, and they provided significant comments on the 
insider threat contributing factors and the proposed model. Positive feedback was 
received from the participants regarding the proposed model. For example, 
participant D stated: " I’d love to get a copy of your thesis when it’s available since I 
find the subject quite interesting and I also like learning new things. You have 
obviously done your research and the questions were thought provoking and 
holistically applicable in my opinion". Participant F stated “Your model describes the 
many factors which might lead to insider threats – most of the factors are robust”. 
Participant J stated: "As for your model - I really like it. I do not think I would add or 
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insider threats, and identifies the most common aspects of how an organisation is 
impacted by the insider". 
 
All the Skype and phone interviews were recorded using a digital voice recorder and 
then downloaded to the computer for transcription. The email interviews were 
already in written text, allowing the researcher to analyse them directly. Skype and 
phone interviews typically lasted between 35 minutes to one hour, while the email 
interviews took between one to two weeks with each participant. Some interviewees 
took more time than others since they provided extra information including 
examples. The transcriptions were stored in both hard and soft copies.  
6.2.2  Data Analysis and Coding 
Data analysis in the qualitative study requires some flexibility and creativity in 
analysing the data. According to Creswell (1994, 153): 
“Data analysis requires that the researcher be comfortable 
with developing categories and making comparisons and 
contrasts. It also requires that the researcher be open to 
possibilities and see contrary or alternative explanations for 
the findings.” 
 
According to (Zhang and Wildemuth 2009), content analysis is a commonly used 
method for analysing interview transcripts in order to disclose people’s thoughts. 
Qualitative content analysis “involves a process designed to condense raw data into 
categories or themes based on valid inference and interpretation”(Zhang and 
Wildemuth 2009, 2). Miles and Huberman (1994) recommend starting the qualitative 
content analysis process during the early phases of data collection. This early 
application of content analysis will assist the researcher to move back and forth 
between themes development and data collection, and can it direct the data collection 
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In light of the confirmatory nature of this phase, the deductive content analysis 
(Mayring 2000a) process guided the data analysis.  According to Mayring (2000b, 4), 
the main idea of the deductive content analysis is “Deductive category application 
works with prior formulated, theoretical derived aspects of analysis, bringing them 
in connection with the text. The qualitative step of analysis consists in a 
methodological controlled assignment of the category to a passage of text”. The 
interviews were analysed using deductive content analysis with the coding done 
through NVivo. Coding is a process whereby the researcher edits and reorganises the 
data into pieces to visually map it out into a holistic model that tells a story (Ryan 
2006; Monette, Sullivan, and DeJong 2007).  
 
The researcher followed the two steps recommended by Miles and Huberman (1994) 
in order to analyse the interview data. Step one is the analysis of individual scripts 
while stage two analyses all the scripts. The detailed sequential process of step one is 
illustrated in Figure 6.1;  the sequential process of step two is illustrated in Figure 
5.2.  
 
Step one is the analysis of each script individually; the process of content analysis 
detailed by Tesch (1990) was utilised in order to analyse each interview. Firstly, the 
researcher prepares the data by transcribed all recorded interviews using 
respondents’ words to represent their thoughts. The eleven transcribed interviews 
yielded 110 pages of transcripts. A sample of the transcript is included in Appendix 
7. While the email interviews were already written, the researcher reformatted these 
so that all the transcribed data was consistent in format.  
 
Secondly, the researcher used individual themes as the unit for analysis. According 
to Zhang and Wildemuth (2009), “when using theme as the coding unit, you are 
primarily looking for the expressions of an idea. Thus, you might assign a code to a 
text chunk of any size, as long as that chunk represents a single theme or issue of 
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Thirdly, since this phase of the study utilised deductive content analysis to analyse 
the interview data, themes for this phase were developed according to the pre-defined 
categories (factors) from the quantitative phase (survey). Miles and Huberman 
(1994) claim that researchers, when performing deductive content analysis, can use 
preliminary categories or themes generated from previous research phases, theory or 
model as a basis for their themes. They can produce an initial list of categories from 
a previous research model, and they may adjust the model if any new categories 
emerge from the analysis. The researcher closely read the eleven transcripts. During 
this stage, the researcher looked for the pre-defined themes, highlighted them, and 
matched the relevant data to each theme. Once the main themes had been identified, 
the fourth step was to eliminate any overlap if one segment of text was coded into 
more than one theme (Creswell 2008). Finally, the researcher constantly reviewed 
the data and the developed themes to allow any new themes to emerge. For 
validation, the interview transcripts were revisited many times in order to compare 
the results with the matching factors derived through the quantitative phase.  
 
The second step is the cross analysis of all the transcripts to combine the themes. The 
combined themes were checked in order to identify the similarities and differences 
between them. Similar themes were combined under the same name. After all the 
themes had been determined, they were organised into codes creating a holistic 
approach to the key findings. Further analysis of the combined themes resulted in 



















Cross analysis  
• Transcribed all recorded interviews using 
respondents’ words to represent their 
thoughts. 
• Reorganised the written email interviews. 
Check the similarities and differences  
• Identify the similarities and differences in the 
each themes. 
Reduce overlaping 
• Combine similar themes under same name. 
Holistic approached 
• After gathering all themes they were 
organised into codes creating a holistic 
approached of the key findings. 
Develop final research model  









Figure 6.2: Step two - cross analysis of all transcripts 
  
Prepare the data 
• Cross-examine the conceptual models in 
stage 1. 
Define the Unit of Analysis 
• Individual themes used as unit for analysis. 
Develop Categories and themes 
• Deductive content analysis to analyse the 
interviews data, themes for this phase were 
developed according to the pre-deified 
categories (factors) form the quantitative 
phase (survey).  
Reduce overlaps 
• Chek whether one segment of text is coded 
into more than one theme 
Continuing revision and refinement of 
category 
• Revisit the transcripts many times in order to 
compare the results with the matching factors 
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6.2.3 Rigour, Validity and Reliability 
According to Golafshani (2003, 601), “validity and reliability are two factors which 
any qualitative researcher should be concerned about while designing a study, 
analysing results and judging the quality of the study”. An open-ended perspective in 
a study gives validity and reliability to the study by allowing participants to explicitly 
express their opinion and experiences regarding a topic which assists the researcher 
in the data collection. Furthermore, recording the interviews will lead to more valid 
and reliable data (Golafshani 2003). 
 
Rigour keeps the study valid in terms of utility, truth, and reliability (Morse 2002). 
According to Lincoln and Guba (1985), trust and credibility are important criteria. 
This research followed a mixed methods approach which has a strong interpretive 
aspect. The researcher first reviewed the literature in order to produce the candidate 
HIT model. The second results from the factor analysis were interpreted by the 
researcher to produce the enhanced HIT model. Hence, to ensure this was done in a 
credible and trustworthy manner, interviews were conducted to establish credibility. 
Further, to ensure that the interviews themselves were trustworthy and credible, the 
following decisions were made for the purposes of validity and reliability: 
 The researcher used semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions. 
All interviews were carefully transcribed using respondents’ words to 
represent their thoughts. 
 Credibility was ensured mainly through member checking. Member checking 
was utilised in numerous ways during data collection and analysis: 
1. The researcher discussed the interview questions with the 
participants at the end of each interview during the pilot study.  
2. During formal interviews, the researcher shared the ideas and 
information extracted from other interviews to obtain further 
clarification of new points that emerged. 
 Constant comparisons were made by ongoing review of data with continuous 
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 Saturation was achieved as the data became redundant when most of the 
themes and criteria were mentioned and confirmed by more than one 
respondent.  
 Participants’ comments were written in italics and between bracketed quotes 
to clearly help the reader distinguish between the researcher’s words and the 
respondent’s words. According to Whiteley (2002), achieving rigour in 
studies means that the reader must be able to recognise the respondents’ 
words as distinct from the researcher’s words. 
 Ongoing checking regarding research decisions, findings and process.  
6.3    Results and Interpretations (Cross Analysis)  
The participants were asked the same questions within a flexible framework. They 
were encouraged to talk about their experiences, thoughts and opinions through 
open-ended questions and they were asked to provide examples from their 
experience. According to Dearnley (2005), the open-ended questions were intended 
to encourage strong and in-depth discussion and lead to the emergence of new 
concepts.. The validity of the study was increased by the collection of data that were 
rich in detail and analysis (Hussey and Hussey 1997).  
 
The respondents were asked 15 questions (see Appendix 6) which were divided into 
four categories. The questions are included in the interview presented below for 
clarity.  
The categories into which questions were divided included:  
 
 Demographics questions: questions 1 and 2. 
 General Insider threat questions: questions 3 and 4.  
 Insider threat contributing factors questions: questions 5 - 13.   
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As previously mentioned, the interview method was divided into two parts. This 
section presents the questions asked in the first part of the interviews; the second part 
of the interviews will be discussed in Chapter Seven.  
6.3.1  Demographics Questions 
The information collected from respondents which related to demographics included 
their gender, experience and their current job title. All the participants were males 
with 10 or more years’ experience in the information security field. The uneven 
gender distribution in these roles within the organisations and also the required 
experience years could explain why all the participants were male.  
6.3.2 General Insider Threat Questions  
The researcher asked the interviewees several general questions regarding their 
perspective and experience about insider threat behaviour that included: 
 how they define the insider threat 
 whether they had experienced insider threat cases  
 their opinion of the risk factors associated with inside threat  
 
Each participant defined the insider threat from different angles but all of them made 
almost the same points. For example, participant A stated that “Threats that occur 
within the parameter of the network. Threats are a combination of people, motives 
and opportunities.” Similarly, participant B stated “Any internal threat from within 
the organisation. This includes: staff/employees, contractors, external agencies 
(accountants/ lawyers etc.) and partners.” Participant K stated “Persons, employees, 
vendors and affiliates that have access to internal physical or electronic resources 
not usually available to the public or consumers.” All participants perceived the 
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It was noticeable that all of the participants had experienced insider threat cases 
throughout their working life. Respondents were very cooperative in sharing with the 
researcher the insider threat cases they had encountered; only one interviewee 
(participant B) chose not to answer this question.  Most of the perpetrators mentioned 
by the participants were mainly motivated by the desire for financial or personal 
gain.   
 
Responses to Question 4 highlighted the importance of some indicators as clues that 
someone might be an insider threat, such as financial problems and insider 
behaviour. Moreover, there were different views regarding the risk factors which 
contribute to the insider threat. Some of the participants argue that all staff pose a 
threat to the organisation. Participant B believed that “All staff are insider threats as 
an example. Whether a threat evolves into an incident is a separate issue. All staff, 
all contractors etc. are threats. Some are accidental. Some are intentional, but there 
always remains a risk and there is not an absolute means to remove this.”, similarly 
participant G assumed “All the in-house staff are insider threat”. On the other hand, 
other participants’ comments regarding risk factors focused on issues related to 
access, remote access, loyalty and lack of frequent monitoring. Some participants 
considered access as a very important risk factor. Whether accessing resources to 
which an employee should have no access, or using access to perform unauthorized 
tasks, both constitute a high risk to any organisation. 
6.3.3 Insider Threat Contributing Factors Questions 
This section presents the participants’ comments about the insider threat contributing 
factors to ascertain whether or not these factors influence the insider to behave 
inappropriately with regards to security. The researcher has divided this section into 
two sub-sections; the first one deals with the eight themes that are driven from the 
interviews, and each theme discusses one of the proposed factors which facilitate the 
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    6.6.2.1 Factors contributing to insider threat  
This section will discuss the eight factors presented in section 5.6 that contribute to 
inappropriate insider threat behaviour that emerged from the survey and were 
validated by the interviews. These factors include: conflict between the organisation 
and an individual who is willing and able to seek personal gain at the organisation's 
expense; giving high trust to underachieving employees; outside influences on 
employees; the perfect crime; inadequate security policy; socially isolated 
employees; liberal access and loyalty of employees. 
 
 Conflict between the organisation and an individual who is willing and able 
to seek personal gain at the organisation's expense 
As discussed in section 5.6, the most common causes of the conflicts between 
organisations and individuals are a lack of communication, differences of opinion, 
personality clashes, stress, high workloads and culture clash as employees sometimes 
see a clash of values as a significant cause of conflict.  
 
From the interviews, the researcher observed that all of the participants agreed that 
conflict between the organisation and an individual is an important factor in insider 
threat behaviour. This is illustrated by the following comments:   
 
“Any type of conflict between an individual and organisation 
always has the tendency to increase risk of insider threat. 
For example, if an individual is seeking for promotion who 
he/she thinks he/she rightfully deserves and this promotion is 
granted to somebody else, this individual will carry a risk of 
being an insider threat.” (Participant I)  
 
“My personal experience, from previous positions, is that an 
insider with a real or perceived conflict with an organisation 
is a greater threat than from an outside party. A motivated 
actor with inside access to assets, etc. has greater 
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“The motives of the individual in question will change as 
soon as a conflict starts, and this may in turn motivate this 
individual to seek personal enrichment.” (Participant C) 
 
Participants provided the researcher with examples of cases they have encountered in 
which the employees abuse the organisation as a result of the conflict. The following 
comments illustrate the participants’ experiences:    
 
“I have faced it [conflict between the organisation and an 
individual], and there are people that misuse computer 
resources”. (Participant A) 
 
“In previous organisation s, I dealt with an inside threat 
stemming from an employee who took advantage of the 
organisation  while on sick leave. The employee had justified 
the offense by stating they were upset at the organisation  not 
providing full benefits while on leave, and then took 
advantage of the corporation by working for a competitor. 
While we were unable to fully estimate the damage, we did 
identify that some information was missing and eventually 
attributed the loss to the employee.” (Participant J)  
 
“I have experienced individuals that feel the company 
“owes” them something due to a conflict, usually around 
position and remuneration. Therefore they will seek to 
extract compensation, justified by this mindset, as a means of 
self-regulation and justice especially in larger companies.” 
(Participant K)  
 
 
In addition, some participants provided general examples about conflict and how it 
could affect the organisations as noted below:  
 
“Organisations that host hostile, competitive or oppressive 
cultures will invite ethical and moral conundrums. For 
example, if compensation one employee receives is directly in 
competition to another employee, the drive to win may 
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to get ahead. Another example might be where an employee’s 
contributions are not properly and fairly acknowledged 
which leads to employee frustration which leads to retention 
issues and employee misconduct.” (Participant D)  
 
“Using justice studies (my undergrad minor), we see meat 
eaters and grass eaters in law enforcement.  That is, grass 
eaters take a discounted meal whereas meat eaters use their 
position for more direct gain.  The same holds true for the 
individual.  In all cases, except for someone lacking common 
sense, the organisation usually means conflict with 
individuals. The perpetrator becomes disillusioned and 
begins rationalization of treat behaviours.  Once 
rationalized, conflict drives action.” (Participant H) 
 
Although one of the participants had not encountered any cases of conflict, he was 
aware of some employees who had attempted to benefit personally from a conflict 
between themselves and their organisation, stating:  
 
 “To date, I have not experienced this personally. However, I 
am aware of certain employees who have attempted to make 
personal gain at the organisation’s expense because of the 
conflict. Unfortunately, there was no strong disincentive to 
not attempt the hurt the organisation.” (Participant G) 
 
In summary, the factor of conflict between the organisation and an employee was 
supported by 100 per cent of the participants. Therefore, this factor was incorporated 
in the final research model. All of the participants agreed that conflict between 
organisation and employee increases the risk of insider threat.  
 Insufficient security policy 
This factor mainly focuses on insufficient or inadequate policies that include: the 
implementation of an inappropriate information security policy, out-dated 
information security policy and lack of training and awareness (inadequate security 
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From the interviews, it appeared that three participants were less worried about 
policy as they believed that even if there is a strong policy, it will not prevent or 
minimise the risk of insider threat because individuals might not follow it as 
indicated by the following comments:  
 
“The policies nowadays, they don’t make a big difference.  I 
mean, they are there so you can punish people or deal with 
people, but they’re not really there as an education 
mechanism unless you teach people about it training and 
awareness as appropriate.” (Participant A) 
 
“In my experience, policy is like law.  It only keeps honest 
people honest.  It does very little to prevent people from 
breaching security.  Training and awareness are aids, but 
dishonest people don’t follow rules.” (Participant H) 
 
“Sure, it is important to let your employees know what 
behaviour is expected, but I do not believe that it actually 
prevents anything. People will do what they can get away 
with, eventually. Policy is then just a means of being able to 
respond to the full extent because you have given fair 
warning.” (Participant C) 
 
On the other hand, most (eight) of the participants agreed that an inadequate policy 
does contribute to insider threat behaviour. The following comments express their 
opinions:   
 
“Yes Insufficient policies increase the risk of insider threat. 
Without knowing what is acceptable people test what they 
can do.” (Participant B) 
 
“Yes, you increase the unintentional inside threat by not 
employing sufficient controls and you lack sufficient 
deterrents for the intentional inside threat.” (Participant D) 
 
“The most effective ways to avoid leakages are sufficient 
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insider threats. Without them, no measures could be practical 
& effective.” (Participant E) 
 
 
  “Definitely Yes Insufficient policy increases the risk of 
insider threat since it makes the organisation vulnerable. We 
need to ensure that security is taken seriously by management 
and staff and invest adequate time to develop security rules, 
standards, policy and procedures and to implement proper 
tools.” (Participant I) 
 
“Absolutely insufficient security policy has been one of the 
most telling indicators of potential insider threat – the lack of 
policy, training etc.” (Participant J) 
 
“Policy is documented evidence of what plans are in place or 
implemented. If you are not able to document it, it doesn’t 
exist ... Policy is not a panacea but the absence of such 
documentation certainly accelerates negative outcomes.” 
(Participant K) 
 
Further, interviewees believed that strong policies as well as sufficient training and 
awareness are vital to minimise the risk of insider threat. They suggest that if the 
employees are aware that policies and security are strong, and they are sufficiently 
trained and educated, they are less likely to become involved in any malicious 
activities, as shown by the following comments:  
 
 “If the individual knows that security is strong and they are 
being monitored, this individual is far less likely to engage in 
any malicious activities.  Through proper security awareness, 
training, policy, logon banners, etc., we are telling this 
potential insider threat that we are watching, and it’s going 
to be very difficult to get away with unauthorised  
behaviour… Policy layer – we must have strong policies in 
place (and educate users on them) which dictate 
classification levels of data along with the restrictions on 
what can be shared. Design and implement (and train users 
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“Yes [Insufficient security policy increase the risk of insider 
threat]. If employees do not know what the framework is in 
which they must work, I believe they are more likely to take 
inappropriate actions … All organisation should ensure that 
policies are integrated into the organisation. Ensure that 
routine training is in place that highlights the requirements 
… A lack of policy will ensure that the organisation is not 
signaling its desire as to what actions are acceptable. This 
will ensure that employees may even unwittingly take actions 
that are detrimental. Solid policies that are well-advertised 
are crucial.” (Participant G) 
 
“Yes [Insufficient security policy increase the risk of insider 
threat]. Insider threats are both intentional and unintentional 
actions.  Training and written policies keep honest people 
honest and reduce accidental treats or ones where the person 
lacked common sense” (Participant H) 
 
In the summary, most of the interviewees agreed that an inadequate security policy 
had an influence on insider threat. Seventy-two per cent of participants confirmed the 
importance of implementing an appropriate information security policy to decrease 
the risk of insider threat behaviour. Hence, this factor is included in the final research 
model. 
 Giving high trust to underachieving employee 
As discussed in section 5.6, underachievers are those employees who do not 
regularly apply effort to their work and working far below the expected performance. 
Most often the problem is not their ability, but attitude; they often engage in 
inappropriate or concerning behaviour prior to the incident such as delays, absences 
and poor job performance. Most of the participants agreed that giving high trust to 
underachievers increases the risk of insider threat, although none of the academic 
literature discusses this issue.  
 
The interviews indicated that the high level of trust and access, especially for 
underachievers, could increase the insider threat behaviour.  Below, excerpts from 
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“Yes it does [giving high level of trust to underachiever 
increases the risk of insider threat]. The probability of risks 
from employees with low performance and lack of core 
capabilities is very high. The problem becomes even greater 
if they had a high degree of trust and access.” (Participant 
E) 
 
“Giving high trust to an employee already underachieving 
should not be allowed.  That is to say, we do not elevate 
someone’s privileges if they are known to be underachieving. 
If someone has elevated privileges and then becomes an 
underachiever, we immediately reduce privileges because 
they demonstrate a risk.” (Participant H) 
 
“Yeah [giving high level of trust to underachiever increases 
the risk of insider threat], so for example if  you give all the 
employees like a default level of access, there is risk, you are 
raising your exposure to the risk.  It doesn’t have to be 
malicious behaviour on their part.  It can be incorrect 
behaviour that will be a risk.  For example, if they have 
access to deleting entire directories, they may delete it 
inadvertently.” (Participant A) 
 
The highlighted risk factor that underachieving employees may cause an increasing 
risk of the insider threat was confirmed by all interviewees. However, some 
participants further added that organisations should investigate the causes of this 
underachievement. 
 
“Agree giving high trust to underachiever increases the risk 
of insider threat behaviour. However, for this one, we need to 
investigate the root cause for underachievement and take 
necessary actions to remedy the situation if possible. Their 
underachievement may be the result of not investing on them, 
not providing them the adequate training, or setting them fail 
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“I agree giving high level of trust to underachiever increases 
the risk of insider threat. They are certainly markers to pay 
attention to. What is the underlying reason for that 
underachievement? Could it be that education or job support 
and empowerment doesn’t exist? There are many personality 
types and a company that identifies them and then is able to 
adapt to this is important.” (Participant D) 
 
Moreover, a group of participants suggested that underachieving employees 
constitute a risk to the organisation even if they have optimum trust. 
 
“Yes underachiever increases the risk of insider threat; it all 
comes to the person and the governance of that person. If 
they are not provided opportunity then it could make them 
perform more.” (Participant B) 
 
“Yes. If they are underachieving, the position or the 
organisation may not be a good fit.  They may not have the 
organisation’s best interest in mind – if the opportunity 
presents itself they may be inclined to take advantage for 
their own gain.” (Participant F) 
 
“Yes, I feel that underachieving employees are not as 
invested in the organisation, so they may feel that what they 
do that might hurt the organisation is not as critical.” 
(Participant G) 
 
“The concept of "least access privilege" is something all 
organisations should strive to achieve. I'm convinced that 
threat changes based on the performance of the employee as 
well as other attributes. Employee low performance is 
indicator to identify potential insider threats.” (Participant J) 
 
In brief, most of the participants agreed upon the influence of giving high trust to 
underachieving employee factor. Eighty-one per cent of the interviewees confirmed 
the significance of inappropriate behaviour such as delays, absences and poor job 
performance in increasing the risk of insider threat. Hence, this factor is incorporated 
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 Outside influence on employees 
As discussed in section 5.6, the influences of the external environment could include 
employees' background, values, economic motivators and employee coercion by 
outsiders. Hence, organisations have minimal control over the outside influences on 
their employees. 
   
During the interviews, all participants agreed that outside influences on employees 
can cause serious problems as highlighted by the following comments. 
 
 “Outside influence aids in rationalizing the issues, pressure 
and hence motive.” (Participant B) 
 
“Bribery or other methods of coercion may entice an 
individual to turn to malicious insider.” (Participant C) 
 
“Temptations are everywhere. It varies from person to 
person. Succumbing to temptation is inevitable and the 
thresholds vary again form person to person. I believe all 
employees can be influenced by outside factors, everyone has 
their price ultimately.” (Participant D) 
 
However, some of the participants’ opinions varied about who can be affected by 
outside influences. They suggested that employees with ethical lapses, less training 
and financial struggles are much likely to be influenced by external factors. 
 
“Outside influence increased risks in weak values and less 
moral personalities.” (Participant E) 
 
“People who are the candidates for insider threat behaviour 
but don’t have the proper training, knowledge or tools to act 
on it can easily be coerced by outside influence that are 
capable to do so.” (Participant I) 
 
It was revealed that desire for money, greed and financial situation are considered to 
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 “Money. Money. Money.  If the employee is stressed over 
money, feels they are not being compensated appropriately, 
or feels their income is threatened in any way they can be 
influenced by the external factors ” (Participant H)   
 
“In my experience, employees who are facing some type of 
coercion (i.e. a physical threat, the threat of losing your 
home, unable to provide for your family, etc.) will react 
differently and accept some personal risk to achieve a 
personal goal. If an employee justifies the need to steal 
because their family is wanting, an employee will 
unconsciously seek opportunities to steal.” (Participant J)   
 
One of the participants had limited experience with the highlighted risk factor, but 
nevertheless suggested the immediate termination of employees’ employment if they 
are influenced by outside sources.    
 
“I have very limited experience with outside influences 
having had an effect on employees. I would guess that 
influences such as gambling, debt, illicit substances, etc. 
could have a great risk on the personal behaviour... The 
employee should be removed from his trusted position as 
soon as it became apparent that the influence could affect his 
trustworthiness. This rendered the outside influence moot.” 
(Participant G) 
 
In the summary, all interviewees (100 per cent) confirmed the significance of outside 
influences on employees in the behavioural insider threat model. Thus, this factor is 
incorporated in the final research model. 
 Liberal access  
Liberal access relates to unnecessary access or more access given to the employees 
than what they actually need to perform their job. This arises in different ways such 
as allowing mobile devices to access the organisation's network remotely or by 
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organisations offer their employees more access than what they essentially need to 
perform their job (liberal access described in detail in section 5.6).  
 
Many participants provided their own definition of liberal access and most of these 
definitions matched that of the researcher. The following are some of their 
definitions:  
    
“Liberal access sounds like to me that access to company 
resources exceeds the business needs of the employee.” 
(Participant D) 
 
“Unnecessary open-minded access to facilities allowed to 
employees.  Sometimes given for convenience, and sometimes 
just for nothing.” (Participant E) 
 
“Liberal access would be opposed to minimal access – 
minimal access is the proper way to grant access to any 
resource.  Liberal access would be something in excess of 
what is required to do their job.” (Participant F) 
 
“Access above or beyond that which is necessary.” 
(Participant H) 
 
“In my opinion, "liberal" access is typically access to 
resources above what is required for your day-to-day 
activities.” (Participant J) 
 
One participant asserted that he does not believe that liberal access causes intentional 
malicious behaviour as demonstrated by the following comment: 
 
“I am not sure it is an influence for malicious behaviour.  
However, it could influence negligent, accidental, or errant 
behaviour.” (Participant H) 
 
Nevertheless, it is apparent from the interviews that the majority (ten) of the 
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employees than what they need increases the risk of insider threat as indicated by the 
following comments: 
 
“Of course liberal access increases the risk.  In fact it is 
encouraging people to access things that are beyond what 
they need to do in order to perform their job.  So once you do 
that, you increase the risks for the enterprise… The biggest 
abuse happens when people with appropriate access is used 
it inappropriately, because that is a violation of trust.  So you 
trust people to, for example, perform their job, but when they 
are not performing, or performing religiously, and then you 
have issues that you need to handle” (Participant A) 
 
“Liberal access simply enables people to do wrong and thus 
entices them to do so.” (Participant C) 
 
“Facilitating access by any device or facilitating access by 
providing excessive access is the direct result of instituting a 
liberal access environment. ALL people eventually will bend 
or break, intentionally or unintentionally the expected norms 
of the organisation.” (Participant D) 
 
“If they have this amount of access, the temptation may be 
there to use it outside the boundaries of their job.” 
(Participant F) 
 
“I think this type of access can provide a (potentially) false 
sense of entitlement in an employee, which may lead to 
inappropriate behaviour or unintentional behaviour. If I use 
the IT environment, providing an employee unfettered access 
to the Internet, or allowing an employee to gain access to an 
entire file structure system can be problematic for an 
employer. Employees with this level of access may "expect" 
to have access to other resources, and then see there is a 
potential benefit to having this access. That benefit may be 
anything from a financial reward from a competitor, to using 
information gained by this access to further their careers in 
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One of the participants assumed that liberal access can be considered as presenting a 
great opportunity for the insiders. 
“Liberal access can be opportunity. Self-rationalisation and 
economic motivators can influence even the most pious of 
individuals. Not to mention and expectation of success 
without consequence.” (Participant K) 
 
Other participants agreed that liberal access increases risk, and they suggest that a 
minimum level of access should be granted to all employees and this should be based 
on their job.  
“The minimum level of access should be the appropriate 
standard for all employees, even those trusted employees. 
Giving employees unnecessary access accomplishes nothing, 
and provides an opportunity for employees to take 
inappropriate actions.” (Participant G) 
 
“This is not a wise decision which will invite ill intentions for 
those who have the tendency and skills to cause harm or 
disclose/leak sensitive information to others. Access should 
be granted based on the job functions performed and 
continuously monitored by entitlement review process.” 
(Participant I) 
 
Furthermore, interviewees believed that remote access creates a great risk for any 
organisation, since the employees can access confidential information from outside 
the workplace. The following comments clarify this belief:   
 
“Accessing network remotely during vacation. The point here 
is doing things unnecessarily must raise red flags. Why some 
employee would, during his vacation back in his home 
country, connect to company’s network? Was it really needed 
or that urgent? Is he trying to copy some files/data/trade 
secrets?” (Participant E)  
 
“Insider threat increased by increased attempts to access 
confidential files/folders from outside the department … 
increased use of remote access software, during off business 
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hours, either on premise or via remote connection. ” 
(Participant J) 
 
Some interviewees believed that mobile devices could pose a threat to the 
organisation in general; however, if the organisation stops it, this will cause some 
inconvenience. The following comment illustrates this:   
 
“With pure information security point of view, liberal access 
especially mobile device is sometimes simply wrong and 
sometimes it’s very wrong. Mobile devices for malicious 
insiders are more convenience to share the confidential info 
to anyone they like. But the most immediate disadvantage of 
stopping it is killing the convenience. So we must control it, 
not stop it in full. For example I’m checking my mail 24/7 on 
my iPhone. If they stop my access, I’ll have to stay in my 
office to check my mail. This is impractical for people like me 
who have to play versatile roles in my company. (Participant 
E) 
 
“Mobile devices pose external threats too. For example, what 
if an authorised  smartphone is stolen?”(Participant E) 
 
However, another participant stated that mobile devices do not increase the risk of 
insider threat unless the organisations do not use the suitable security policy: 
 
“Mobile Devices will not pose a threat if there are proper 
security procedures built in around those and an effective 
Mobile Device Management (MDM) solution is activated.” 
(Participant I) 
 
In brief, the majority of participants agreed that liberal access increases the risk of 
insider threat. Ninety-one per cent of the respondents confirmed that unnecessary 
access or more access given to the employees than what they actually need to 
perform their job can increase the insider threat. Hence, this factor is included in the 
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 Loyalty of employees 
The absence of loyalty can negatively affect an employee’s work efficiency and 
could expose the company to serious security risk as discussed in section 5.6.  
 
From the interviews, the researcher observed that all of participants agreed that 
employee loyalty can influence the insider to behave in an inappropriate way as 
demonstrated by the following comments: 
 
“Yes, of course, loyalty can affect whether or not somebody 
will do something on purpose. The more disaffected and 
unhappy an employee is the less he or she will be protective 
of the organisation. And that will lead to increased risk and 
eventually increased vulnerability.” (Participant A) 
 
“Employee disloyalty limits rationalisation and creates an 
insider group mentality” (Participant B) 
 
“The reason behind insider threats sometimes distributed 
Loyalty – Working at two similar places for example.” 
Loyalty affects the insider threat behaviour hugely much 
more than any other factors. Loyalty is not something we can 
impose onto someone. It has to come from inside the 
personality of the recruited and appointed person.” 
(Participant E) 
 
Loyalty keeps the insider at bay, until his or her trigger 
event.  That is to say, the insider may have only exhibited 
loyalty, but it was not part of their personality.  Their true 
nature is revealed under the pressure of a trigger event. 
(Participant H) 
 
“If workers are forced to work in unjustified and unwanted 
situations, this may invite inside threat behaviour. But, it can 
definitely affect in a positive way if organisations can 
develop loyalty of their employees by doing the right things 
and treating them fairly in every aspect. Loyal employees will 
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“If an employee does feel some fealty to the organisation, 
they are less likely to do something inappropriate”. 
(Participant I) 
 
Concerns about the loyalty of outsourced employees were raised by some of the 
participants during the interviews. Loyalty of the outsourced employees was 
considered as a significant factor affecting the insider threat behaviour as indicated 
by the following comments:  
 
“Outsourcers may steal information. Also outsourced 
resources are less careful (why should they care?) so thy less 
loyal.” (Participant E) 
 
“It is the insider that appreciates the value of their 
compromise; therefore they specifically target an outsourced 
entity with an offer.”(Participant K) 
 
 
Some participants declared that accessing the organisations’ network remotely could 
decrease the employee loyalty: 
 
“It’s my gut feeling that somebody who remotely accessing 
the organisation network would be less loyal and more likely 
to share data on the internet, or to use the same equipment 
for internet access, which of course raises the risk.” 
(Participant A) 
 
 “Remote access essentially places a layer between their 
moral code and perceived consequences. Since they are “out 
of sight, out of mind” they may be more easily motivated to 
misconduct.” (Participant D) 
 
 “If an employee is disengaged from the workforce, or 
doesn’t find some way to bond with co-workers, the employee 
may act upon emotions or perceived threats.  This “acting 
out” may lead to insider threats, even if the actions are only 
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In summary, the loyalty of the employees was verified by all interviewees. One 
hundred per cent confirmed the significance of employee disloyalty in increasing the 
risk of insider threat. Hence, this factor is included in the final research model. 
 The perfect crime  
As explained in section 5.6, the perfect crime is when employees think they can 
avoid being detected. This factor relies on two important elements which facilitate 
and enable the insider to attempt the perfect crime: the knowledge possessed by the 
insiders and their level of technical skills. 
 
Participants’ opinions regarding this factor were divided: some of them completely 
agreed with the researcher while others did not. Two participants totally disagreed 
with regard to the importance of the knowledge in increasing the insider threat 
behaviour.  
 
“No, I believe that knowledge of how insiders may be 
identified should they take unethical actions should reduce 
the desire to do so.” (Participant G) 
 
“No. Having knowledge is unlikely to encourage or influence 
the insider to behave “inappropriately”. If anything, it will 
deter inappropriate behaviour, to a point. Only a small 
percentage of people are deterred by overt and suspected 
deterrents. Others require monitoring or physical barriers.” 
(Participant K) 
 
On the other hand, the majority (nine) of participants supported the importance of the 
knowledge and skills as a risk factor as shown in the following comments: 
 
“Certainly knowledge and skills increase the insider threat 
behaviour. If they know how to defeat the system, they may 
very well try.” (Participant C) 
 
“Yes knowledge and skills increase the insider threat 
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will do their best to circumvent existing controls. Conversely, 
a person who is considering misconduct may think twice 
about doing so if controls offer a sufficient deterrent… If 
there is a perfect crime, it would be because it went 
undetected and unpunished due to the combination of 
contributing factors like: Deliberate intent of the perpetrator 
and Inadequate control environment due to incompetent 
security practitioners, the absence of a genuine holistic risk 
assessment and or complacency.” (Participant D) 
 
“Obviously knowledge and skills increase the insider threat 
behaviour. If the insiders know how their posed threats or 
actions are detected, they’ll find out ways to compromise the 
measures taken.” (Participant E) 
 
“Absolutely – having insider knowledge and technical skill is 
a huge risk to the organisation  – it provides someone with 
intelligence they shouldn’t have – intelligence they can 
leverage in an attack.” (Participant F) 
 
“Definitely agree on this [knowledge and skills increase the 
insider threat behaviour]. They will try to react to inflict 
damage sooner.” (Participant I) 
 
Two participants mentioned that if the insiders have the knowledge and skills as well 
as the motivation and opportunity, they are more likely to engage in inappropriate 
behaviour.  
 
“Yes, I believe an insider’s knowledge about existing 
controls (or lack thereof) can influence behaviour.  If an 
insider has the requisite motivation and opportunity, and if 
they learn that there is a limited chance of being detected.” 
(Participant J) 
 
“Opportunity, so yes knowledge and skills increase the 
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The perfect crime factor that includes the insider’s knowledge and skills was 
acknowledged by the majority of the participants; however, two participants only 
partially agreed with the researcher as they believed the insider’s knowledge was not 
an important risk factor as they claimed below: 
 
“The short answer would be to some level, but not really the 
knowledge and skills increase the insider threat behaviour.  If 
somebody is determined to perform something, for example 
fraud, they will create a mechanism around the known 
safeguards to use.”(Participant A) 
 
“Theoretically, this is true.  That is, if a person knows the 
systems it makes it easier.  However, knowledge is not 
necessarily the motivator.  Negative insider behaviour 
generally not driven by the person’s knowledge.  Their 
knowledge facilitates the behaviour after the fact.” 
(Participant H) 
 
Hence, the majority of respondents confirmed the influence of the perfect crime 
factor. Eighty-one per cent of participants believed that insider knowledge and 
technical skills is a critical risk factor in the behavioural insider threat model. 
Meanwhile, both insider knowledge and technical skills were confirmed by the 
literature review. Consequently, this factor is included in the final research model. 
 Socially isolated employees 
As discussed in section 5.6, socially isolated employees most often prefer to work 
from home or in isolated work areas. Such employees are commonly socially 
frustrated, isolated from the community, have poorer social skills and are poor team 
players.  
  
Participants’ attitudes and feelings towards socially isolated employees attracted a 
number of comments. The comments varied, with some interviewees agreeing that 
the social isolated worker increases the risk of insider threat behaviour and they 
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Two participants appeared less concerned about this factor as they believed that 
working from an isolated area such home does not increase the insider threat. 
Moreover, they claimed that social isolation does not relate to security. The 
following comments express this assertion: 
 
“Working from home is relatively common.  It does not 
necessarily correlate to security.  Social isolation, in and of 
itself, also does not correlate to security.” (Participant H) 
 
“Isolation does not correlate to access and opportunity. It is 
often easier to misappropriate from within a crowd where 
your actions and intentions can be hidden, rather than have 
the confidence to go ahead alone. If this demographic were 
true, nearly every policeman, nurse and emergency services 
officer would be an insider threat.” (Participant K)  
 
On the other hand, the majority (nine) of the participants supported this factor as 
noted in the following comments:   
 
“Yes, they are more likely to rationalise… They are an out 
group and do not see the others as a part of their own 
“community.” (Participant B) 
 
“Yes. Socially isolated workers are greater threats. The 
reason behind in my view is the personal factors which is the 
major cause of leakages.” (Participant E) 
 
“I would suggest that socially isolated workers may feel they 
have no investment in the organisation  so they are more 
likely to take inappropriate actions.” (Participant G) 
 
“Yes I do believe it could lead to feelings of disconnect or 
even more negative emotions, in turn leading to a lower bar 
for threat behaviour.” (Participant C) 
 
“I would agree that the socially isolated insider does pose a 
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“There is a risk that socially isolated (or even physically 
isolated) workers increase the potential for insider threats to 
be realized. (Participant J) 
 
One participant recommended that the organisation needs to have policies that 
address working from home and ensure that policies do not create social frustrations.  
 
“Yes since they may feel like an outcast and blame 
management for not taking proper actions. Work from home 
policies and HR. Policies should be complete and properly 
tested to ensure not to allow social frustrations.” 
(Participant I) 
 
Briefly, the socially isolated employee factor was confirmed by the majority of 
participants. Eighty-one per cent of the respondents supported the significance of the 
social isolation factor in contributing to the insider threat. Therefore, this factor is 
included in the final research model. 
   6.6.2.2 Common risk factors  
The researcher asked the participants to determine which of the discussed factors 
appeared to be more common than others based on their experience. The following 
comments are indicative of their opinion: 
 
 “Without a doubt, liberal access.  Excessive access coupled 
with a lack of a governance framework based on a proper IT 
security risk assessment.)” (Participants D)   
 
“The most common failure in organisation s is the failure to 
restrict access.  Many companies don’t understand or wish to 
undertake the effort to institute a proper access control 
policy.  This fact leads to employees getting “liberal” access 
– much more access than is needed to do their jobs.” 
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“I believe different types of Conflict between organisation s 
and employees, Liberal Access, and Insufficient Security 
Policy Implementation would trigger more Insider Threat 
Behaviour than others.”(Participants I) 
  
“I would say that the user with higher privileges "snooping" 
around the network seems more common, in my experience. 
Granted, I've investigated employee breaches where someone 
was compromised by money or threat, and I've seen how 
unfulfilled employees can sabotage a company. It's just that 
I've seen more employees with higher levels of access cause 
havoc in systems - either with intent or inadvertently.” 
(Participants J) 
 
It was noticeable that most of the participants consider liberal access, insufficient 
policy and security, and conflict between organisation and employees as being the 
most common factors contributing to insider threat. 
6.3.4 Enhanced HIT Model Evaluation Questions and 
Changes in the Model  
This section provides further explanation and justification for the inclusion of each 
individual factor in the final HIT model. It provides an overview of the participants’ 
responses to the enhanced HIT model and their feedback. During the interviews, the 
researcher discussed with the participants the enhanced HIT model. Generally, 
positive responses were given by the interviewees, which encouraged the researcher 
to carry on with this research.  
 
Positive feedback is illustrated by the following comments: 
 
“You have obviously done your research and the questions 
were thought provoking and holistically applicable in my 
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“Your model describes the many factors which might lead to 
insider threats – most of the factors are robust”. (Participant 
F)  
 
"As for your model - I really like it. I do not think I would add 
or subtract from the model or its definitions. I think it 
encompasses the components of insider threats, and identifies 
the most common aspects of how an organisation is impacted 
by the insider". (Participant J) 
 
“I am interested in your work and the model development 
process” (Participant H) 
 
It was noticeable after analysing all eleven interviews that the majority (nine) of the 
participants agreed with all the proposed insider threat factors. Hence, the outcomes 
from this phase provided an answer to the first research question of this study: 
RQ1: What factors influence the insider to behave inappropriately with 
regard to security? 
 
The interviewees were asked two questions: 
 If you were to add any other factors to the proposed model, what would they 
be? Why?  
 If you were to delete any factors from the proposed model, what would they 
be? Why? 
 
Responses to these questions revealed that most (nine) of the participants agreed with 
all factors introduced by the model and they did not wish to add or remove any 
factors. However, ten of the participants suggested changing the name of one factor 
to make it more general. After the researcher considered all participants’ comments 
and feedback, a decision was made to change the name of one factor. This was the 
only adjustment resulting from the interviews. The other factors remain the same as 
described in section 5.6. Table 6.5 summarises participants’ suggestions and the 
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Table 6.5: Participants’ suggestions and the actions taken  
Participant Suggestions Action 
Participant A He suggested adding another factor to 
the model. This factor is lack of 
awareness. 
Suggested factor was not added. 
 
Lack of awareness is already discussed 
in the information security policy 
factor, which has a logical sequence 




They suggested that socially isolated 
employees need to be removed from the 
model. 
The factor was not removed. 
 
The researcher decided to keep this 
factor since all the other nine 
participants agreed that this factor is 
important and does contribute to the 
model. 
Participants A, 
C, D, E, F, G, 
H, J and K 
They suggested changing the name of 
the ‘conflict between the organisation 
and an individual who is willing and 
able to seek personal gain at the 
organisation's expense’ factor. 
Participants believed that any conflict 
between organisations and the employee 
may lead to insider threat. Hence, they 
thought that a conflict that occurs may be 
enough for some individuals to launch 
their attack. Even if the insider has 
nothing to gain, he will still be 
committed to the threat out of a desire 
for revenge. In such cases of conflict, 
even if the insider does not have the 
required skills or abilities, he will 
possibly find other ways to revenge 
himself.  
The factor’s name was changed. 
 
The participants’ suggestion was taken 
into consideration, so the ‘conflict 
between the organisation and an 
individual who is willing and able to 
seek personal gain at the 
organisation's expense’ factor was 
changed to ‘conflict between the 
organisation and an employee’. 
 
 
6.4   Final HIT Model  
The final HIT model is the outcome of successive steps starting with the combination 
of all the factors derived from the three sources (academic literature, IT industry 
publications and reported incidents reports) in the candidate HIT model. The 
candidate HIT model was evaluated by 100 security specialists using the survey 
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evaluated by eleven Chief Information Security Officers through in-depth interviews 
resulting in the final HIT model. As a result of the interviews, all the suggested 
factors from the previous phase were confirmed by the participants. The factors that 
were chosen after careful validation were consolidated into the final HIT insider 
threat behaviour model. 
 
The HIT Model consists of factors that are validated by the qualitative data analysis 
and confirmed by the previous research steps. The integration of a realistic 
worldview of participants added valuable insights regarding the model and the 
factors. This integrative approach is intended to establish a holistic and integrated 
coherent insider threat model with greater explanatory power, to help organisations 
minimise insider threat behaviours. Figure 6.3 illustrates the final HIT model 
representing the factors that influence the insider threat behaviour. This HIT model 
will be utilized in the next chapter for the development of best practices to manage 
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6.5    Summary 
This chapter dealt with the qualitative method and described the evaluation of the 
enhanced HIT model resulting from the survey responses. In this chapter, the 
researcher described how the data from the interviews were analysed, and provided a 
summary of the interviews illustrating the main concepts that reflect the feedback 
regarding the enhanced HIT model. The purpose of the qualitative method was to 
evaluate the enhanced HIT model presented in section 5.6 and to confirm the factors 
identified by the factor analysis. Furthermore, it was used to determine the changes 
that could further improve the enhanced HIT model. As a result of the interviews, all 
the suggested factors from the previous phase were confirmed by the participants. 
The factors that were chosen after careful validation were consolidated into the final 
HIT model. 
 
The outcome from this phase was the final HIT model which represents a 
comprehensive set of factors that influence the behaviour of insider threat. The 
conceptual model provided the groundwork for the following phase of the study. 
Therefore, the next chapter will outline the development of the best practices to 
manage the insider threat behaviour based on the factors in the holistic insider threat 
behaviour model. 
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 CHAPTER SEVEN:       7
DESIGNING BEST PRACTICES 
 
7.1    Introduction 
The previous chapter (Chapter Six) presented the final HIT model which provides 
the foundation for this phase of the study. This comprehensive model was developed 
through several stages including the extensive review of the literature (academic 
sources, IT industry publications and published reports incidents), and quantitative 
and qualitative data analyses. 
 
This chapter addresses the second research question by describing the management 
and controls for the factors produced in the final HIT model via the best practices. 
This chapter presents a list of extra guidelines that complement CERT best practices, 
which can be used to minimise insider threats. The proposed best practices will be 
useful in different organisations and for audiences who are aware of organisational 
security issues such as Chief Information Security Officers (CISOs).These best 
practices will help CISOs to better manage insider threat behaviour. 
 
7.2 Method Used to Develop the Best Practices  
This section discusses the process of developing the best practices to manage insider 
threat behaviour. Best practices are a set of security measures to manage insider 
threat behaviour based upon the factors in the HIT model. These measures were 
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sources. The researcher followed three steps in order to develop the best practices to 
manage the eight factors in the final HIT model (figure 6.3). The steps are: 
1. Use CERT best practices as an initial baseline  
2. Identify any gaps in CERT best practices  
3. Supplement these gaps with other sources  
  Interview data  
 Academic sources 
 
CERT generated a list of practices for minimising the insider threat. These guidelines 
suggest protection measures to help an organisation to mitigate insider risk and 
enable early detection of the insider attacks. These best practices are used by the 
researcher as a starting point to develop the best practices to manage the eight factors 
described in section 5.6. A summary of the CERT best practices are presented in the 
following section (section 7.2.1).  The researcher discusses each of these practices 
and how they address most of the factors presented in the final HIT model. Although 
CERT best practices cover most of the factors in the final HIT model, they fail to 
address several other factors in the model. Thus, CERT best practices will be 
supplemented with other sources to address these gaps. These sources include the 
interview data and academic sources.  
7.2.1 CERT Best Practices to Minimise the Insider Threat  
Carnegie Mellon University's Computer Emergency Response Team CERT outlined 
significant steps for organisations that could improve their security against insider 
threats. They generated three reports (Common Sense Guide to Prevention and 
Detection of Insider Threats) explaining the practices that would help to prevent or 
detect malicious insider threats. The first version of the Common Sense Guide to 
Prevention and Detection of Insider Threats was published in 2005. This report was 
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Study1 conducted jointly with the U.S. Secret Service. The second version of the 
report was published in 2006; it contained new and updated practices based on new 
CERT insider threat research funded by Carnegie Mellon CyLab2 and the U.S. This 
report includes a new type of analysis of the insider threat problem focused on 
policies, practices, technology, insider psychological issues, and organisational 
culture. The third version of the Common Sense Guide was published in 2009 and 
includes new and updated practices based on an analysis of new cases CERT (2006; 
2009). The fourth edition of the Common Sense Guide to Mitigating Insider Threats 
that includes the latest CERT best practices was published in 2012 and is a result of 
continued case collection and analysis. In the title of the fourth edition, the words 
“Prevention and Detection” have been replaced by “Mitigating” since mitigation 
covers prevention, detection, and response (CERT 2012). 
 
7.2.1.1   PRACTICE 1: Consider threats from insiders and business 
partners in enterprise-wide risk assessments. 
All organisations need to identify and prioritise their critical business assets, the risks 
to those assets and the associate impact if the assets are compromised; and finally, 
they use the assessment results to develop or improve the overall approach to 
securing the organisation’s assets. The purpose of risk assessment is to help 
organisations to assess the insider threat environment, organisational vulnerabilities 
that enable the threat and possible impacts (including financial, operational and 
reputational) that could produce insider incidents. In order to develop a good risk 
assessment procedure, organisations need to include as insiders all employees who 
have access to the organisation include current or former employees, outsourcing or 
business partners. Organisations should spot the possible risk posed by their 
employees’ knowledge and access and specifically include that threat as part of their 
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Insider threats often influence the integrity, availability or confidentiality of 
organisations’ critical data. Employees can affect the integrity of their organisations’ 
data in several ways by, for example, using customer financial information or 
damaging their employers’ websites. They can also violate the confidentiality of the 
data by stealing trade secrets or private customer information. Moreover, employees 
can influence the availability of the data by deleting data, sabotaging entire systems 
and networks, destroying backups and launching other types of denial-of-service 
attacks. 
 
Risk assessment is essential for all organisations; firstly, they need to determine the 
critical assets which include financial data, confidential information, intellectual 
property and critical systems. Secondly, they need to develop a risk management 
procedure to protect their critical assets from insiders. 
 
Solutions recommended by CERT (2012, 9) are as follows: 
 Conduct a risk assessment of all organisations’ systems to identify critical 
data. Organisations need to ensure that insiders and trusted business 
partners are part of the assessment.  
 Have all employees, contractors, and trusted business partners sign 
nondisclosure agreements upon hiring and termination of employment or 
contracts. 
 Background investigations on all employees include trusted business partner 
and on all acquired employees during a merger or acquisition required, at a 
level appropriate with the organisations own policy as a contractual 
obligation. 
 Prevent sensitive data from being printed if they are not essentially required 
for business purposes since electronic documents can be easier to track. 
 Avoid direct access for trusted business partners to organisation’s internal 
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 Limit access to the system backup process to only administrators. 
  Implement a clear separation of duties between regular administrators and 
those responsible for backup and restoration, and prohibit regular 
administrators’ access to system backup media or the electronic backup 
processes. 
 Prohibit personal devices in secure areas because they may be used to hide 
or copy organisation property and data. 
 Implement data encryption solutions to encrypt data and limit encryption and 
decryption tools to authorised users. 
 
7.2.1.2   PRACTICE 2: Clearly document and consistently enforce 
policies and controls.  
Organisations should develop clear, efficient and adequate policies and controls since 
the development of ambiguous, misleading or inadequate policies can potentially 
increase the risk of insider threat. All organisations should ensure that their policies 
and controls are clearly documented and consistently enforced. Moreover, 
organisations should have fairness policies in place for all employees and provide 
regular employee training regarding the policies and their justification, 
implementation, and enforcement. Clearly documented policies and controls can help 
organisations to avoid employee misunderstandings of the policy that can lead to 
unmet expectations. Moreover, consistently enforced policies can help organisations 
to prevent employees feeling that they are being treated differently from other 
employees. Policies should be clear on several points including the acceptable use of 
the organisation’s assets, ownership of information, performance evaluation 
including the needs for promotion and bonuses, and processes for handling employee 
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organisational policies that clearly state what is expected of them and what the 
consequences are of violations. 
 
Solutions recommended by CERT (2012, 16) are as follows:  
 Ensure that senior management advocates, enforces, and complies with all 
Organisational policies. Policies that do not have management buy-in will 
fail and not be enforced equally. Management must also comply with policies. 
If management does not do so, subordinates will see this as a sign that the 
policies do not matter or they are being held to a different standard than 
management. Your organization should consider exceptions to policies in this 
light as well. 
 Ensure that management briefs all employees on all policies and procedures. 
Employees, contractors, and trusted business partners should sign 
acceptable-use policies upon their hiring and once every year thereafter or 
when a significant change occurs. This is also an opportunity for your 
organization and employees, contractors, or trusted business partners to 
reaffirm any nondisclosure agreements. 
 Ensure that management makes policies for all departments within your 
organization easily accessible to all employees. Posting policies on your 
organisation’s internal website can facilitate widespread dissemination of 
documents and ensure that everyone has the latest copy. 
 Ensure that management makes annual refresher training for all employees 
mandatory. Refresher training needs to cover all facets of your organization, 
not just information security. Training should encompass the following 
topics: human resources, legal, physical security, and any others of interest. 
Training can include, but is not limited to, changes to policies, issues that 
have emerged over the past year, and information security trends. 
 Ensure that management enforces policies consistently to prevent the 
appearance of favouritism and injustice. The Human Resources department 
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particular policy violations. This will facilitate clear and concise enforcement 
of policies. 
 
7.2.1.3   PRACTICE 3: Incorporate insider threat awareness into 
regular security training for all employees.  
Security awareness and training is essential for all organisations, since all employees 
should understand the need for policies, procedures, and technical controls. 
Employees need to be aware of security policies and procedures and the 
consequences of any violations. In addition, they need to be aware that some 
individuals may try to force or persuade them to abuse their organisation. All 
organisations’ employees need to fully understand the security policies and the 
process for recording policy violations. Likewise, employees should be informed that 
system activity is monitored, particularly system administration and privileged 
activity. All employees should be informed about their personal responsibilities such 
as protection of their own passwords and work products.  
 
All employees need to be aware that insider attacks do occur and can cause serious 
damage. It is essential for employees to understand that malicious insiders do not fit 
a specific profile. Their technical skills are varied and could range from minimal to 
advanced, and they can be from different age groups. Although there is no way to 
identify the malicious insider through a demographic profile, nevertheless there are 
ways to identify higher risk employees by their behaviour. Training programs should 
generate a culture of security suitable for the organisation and include all employees 
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Solutions recommended by CERT (2012, 21) are as follows:  
 Develop and implement an enterprise-wide training program that discusses 
various topics related to insider threat. The training program must have the 
support of senior management to be effective. Management must be seen 
participating in the course and must not be exempt from it, which other 
employees could see as a lack of support and an unequal enforcement of 
policies. 
 Train all new employees and contractors in security awareness, including 
insider threat, before giving them access to any computer system. Make sure 
to include training for employees who may not need to access computer 
systems daily, such as janitorial and maintenance staff. These users may 
require a special training program that covers security scenarios they may 
encounter, such as social engineering and sensitive documents left out in the 
open. 
 Train employees continuously. However, training does not always need to be 
classroom instruction. Posters, newsletters, alert emails, and brown-bag 
lunch programs are all effective training methods. Your organization should 
consider implementing one or more of these programs to increase security 
awareness. 
 Establish an anonymous, confidential mechanism for reporting security 
incidents. Encourage employees to report security issues and consider 
incentives to reporting by rewarding those who do. 
 
7.2.1.4   PRACTICE 4: Beginning with the hiring process, monitor 
and respond to suspicious or disruptive behaviour. 
Prospective employees’ concerning or suspicious behaviour should be investigated 
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frequent policy violations, serious criminal activity or personal and professional 
stressors. Organisations should do a better job of screening potential employees. All 
organisations should perform background checks for all employees, including 
contractors, to check and evaluate employees according to the information received. 
Background checks should include examining previous criminal convictions, any 
credit issue and clarification from previous employers regarding the individual’s 
ability to deal with workplace issues. In addition, this information should be used as 
part of a risk-based decision process in determining whether or not it is appropriate 
to give the new employee access to critical, confidential, or proprietary information 
or systems.  
 
Organisations should train managers to identify and respond to conflict and 
suspicious behaviour by the employees. It is essential to thoroughly investigate and 
respond to all violations that are committed. Organisations should consistently 
monitor their employees, especially those employees with financial struggles or an 
unexplained increase in finances, since financial gain is the main motivation for 
many insider thefts or modifications of information.  
 
Policies should consider the reported concerning or suspicious behaviour by co-
workers. After suspicious or concerning behaviour is reported, numerous steps could 
help an organisation to managing the risks of malicious activity. Firstly, the 
organisation should assess the employee’s access to critical information assets and 
network. Secondly, the organisation should carefully review the logs to examine 
recent online activity by the employee. When this is done, the organisation should 
help and provide options to the employee for handling this behaviour, possibly 
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Solutions recommended by CERT (2012, 21) are as follows:  
 Thoroughly background investigation includes a criminal record and credit 
check. 
 Encourage employees to report suspicious behaviour to appropriate 
personnel for further investigation. 
 Investigate and document all issues of suspicious or disruptive behaviour. 
 Enforce policies and procedures consistently for all employees. 
 
7.2.1.5   PRACTICE 5: Anticipate and manage negative issues in the 
work environment.  
The existence of policies alone is not enough. Prospective employees need to be 
made aware of organisational practices and policies that encompass appropriate 
workplace behaviour, dress code, working hours, career development and conflict 
resolution, before the actual day of commencement. Hence, all employees should be 
aware of the existence of such policies and the consequences and the penalties for 
violations.  
 
Promotions can have a large influence on the workplace environment, particularly 
when employees expect promotions but are not given them. If an organisation is not 
able to offer promotions as expected, managers should notify employees as soon as 
they know and provide them with an explanation if possible. 
 
Organisations should have an open door policy enabling employees to discuss work-
related problems and outside problems including financial and personal stressors 
with a member of management or human resources, or it could be useful to provide a 
service such as an employee assistance program (EAP) for employees. Such 






~ 223 ~ 
performance or general wellbeing. These programs exist to minimise employee 
criminal actions which they may consider as alternative solutions to deal with the 
financial and personal stressors.  
 
Solutions recommended by CERT (2012, 30) are as follows:  
 Enhance monitoring of employees with an ongoing personnel issue, 
according to the organisational policy and laws.  
 Enable additional auditing and monitoring controls outlined in policies and 
procedures.  
 Regularly review audit logs to detect activities outside of the employee’s 
normal scope of work. 
  Limit access to these log files to those with a need to know.  
 All levels of management must regularly communicate organisational 
changes to all employees. This allows for a more transparent organisation, 
and employees can better plan for their future. 
7.2.1.6   PRACTICE 6: Know your assets. 
Organisations should be aware of their physical assets as well as their information 
assets and consider how to secure their most valuable and sensitive information and 
equipment. Physical assets, such as servers and workstations, are easier to track and 
protect than information assets. To protect sensitive data assets, organisations must 
be thoroughly conversant with the types of data they process, where they process it, 
and where they store it.   
 
 Risk assessment is the best way for organisations to understand their assets and 
protect them from insider attack. Conducting a risk assessment will help an 
organisation to know about its data types, its system’s processes, who uses the data, 
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Organisations should know the types of data they process (medical information, 
personally identifiable information or credit card number), the types of devices that 
process this data (servers, workstations or mobile devices) and the location where the 
data is stored, processed, and transmitted (single location, geographically dispersed 
or foreign countries). 
 
In order to identify critical assets, physical inventories of equipment and the data 
they house can help organisations either by a service-based technique or hardware-
based technique. Some organisations may have a service catalogue that covers the 
information services an organisation needs to achieve its tasks. A service based 
inventory “establishes a hierarchy of assets, starting with a top-level service, 
branching into the information assets that support it, branching again into the assets 
that support them, and so on. The organization then inventories the bottom level 
assets”(CERT 2012, 32).  However, the hardware-based technique does not create a 
complete inventory. For a hardware-based inventory “Organisations need to work 
closely with system administrators to become fully aware of the logical assets 
contained within each piece of hardware. The organisation should produce a 
hardware asset hierarchy similar to the software asset inventory, starting with the 
top-level hardware asset and branching successively” (CERT 2012, 32). 
 
Once the organisation has identified the critical information assets, and added any 
unidentified assets, all the inventory information should be summarised and recorded 
on a spread sheet. In order to determine the priority of assets, the organisation should 
assign each asset a set of attributes. The attributes should include: environment, 
security categorisation and criticality. 
 
Solutions recommended by CERT (2012, 34) are as follows:  
 Conduct a physical asset inventory. Identify asset owners’ assets and 
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 Understand what data your organization processes by speaking with data 
owners and users from across the organisation. 
 Identify and document the software configurations of all assets. 
 Prioritize assets and data to determine the high-value targets. 
 
7.2.1.7   PRACTICE 7: Implement strict password and account 
management policies and practices.  
Insiders have an opportunity to compromise computer accounts, even though 
organisations try to prevent insider attacks. Password and account management 
policies and practices should apply to employees, contractors, and business partners. 
Organisations should ensure that all activity from any account is attributable to the 
person who performed it. Appropriate computer account management with access 
control will ensure that access to the organisation’s critical electronic assets is 
controlled, and unauthorised access is difficult. In addition to that, the access is 
recorded and monitored and thus suspicious access can be easily detected and the 
computer account and the employee associated with that account can be identified. 
Password policies should enforce strong passwords and ensure that employees 
change their passwords frequently and do not share their passwords with any person 
inside or outside the organisation. Moreover, password policies should ensure that all 
computers automatically perform password-protected screen savers after a fixed 
period of inactivity. In addition, a reporting mechanism should be available to report 
attempts of unauthorised account access including social engineering. Daily audits 
should be carried outto identify and disable unauthorised or expired accounts.  
 
Solutions recommended by CERT (2012, 38) are as follows:  
 Establish account management policies and procedures for all accounts 
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accounts are created, reviewed, and terminated. In addition, the policy 
should address who authorises the account and what data they can access. 
 Perform audits of account creation and password changes by system 
administrators.  
 Define password requirements and train users on creating strong passwords.  
 Ensure all shared accounts are absolutely necessary and are addressed in a 
risk management decision.  
7.2.1.8   PRACTICE 8: Enforce separation of duties and least 
privilege.   
Separation of duties and least privilege must be implemented for all organisational 
tasks to mitigate the insider threat risk. Separation of duties requires dividing tasks 
between employees to limit the capability that one employee could steal information 
without the assistance of another. The two-person rule is one type of separation of 
duties principles that is often used. It requires two employees to perform a task so 
that it is done effectively. For instance, two bank officers are required to sign large 
banker’s checks, or proof of source code is required before the code is executed. 
Generally, if an employee collaborates with another to perform a task, this makes 
them less likely to launch a malicious task.  
 
Sufficient separation of tasks requires implementation of least privilege, allowing 
employees to access only the resources needed to perform their job. Least privilege is 
a mechanism that minimises an organisation’s risk of confidential or proprietary 
information theft. Employees are subject to promotions, transfers, relocations, and 
demotions; thus, organisations need review their employees’ required access to 
information and information systems. An ongoing process is essential to manage the 
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organisation. This helps to monitor the employees’ access to information according 
to their job tasks.  
 
Access control based on separation of duties and least privilege is essential to 
minimise the insider threat. These principles need to be implemented in both a 
physical and the virtual manner. Role-based access control generally prevents 
employees from gaining physical or technical access to resources not required by 
their work roles. Examples include scientists requiring access to their laboratory 
space but not requiring access to human resources file cabinets. Similarly, human 
resources employees require access to staff records but do not require access to 
laboratory facilities. 
 
Solutions recommended by CERT (2012, 42) are as follows:  
 Carefully audit user access permissions when an employee changes roles 
within the organisation to avoid privilege creep. In addition, routinely audit 
user access permissions at least annually. Remove permissions that are no 
longer needed. 
 Establish account management policies and procedures. 
 Require privileged users to have both an administrative account with the 
minimum necessary privileges to perform their duties and a standard account 
that is used for every day, non-privileged activities. 
 Review positions in the organization that handle sensitive information or 
perform critical functions. Ensure these employees cannot perform these 
critical functions without oversight and approval. One person should not be 
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7.2.1.9   PRACTICE 9: Define explicit security agreements for any 
cloud services, especially access restrictions and monitoring 
capabilities. 
It is essential that all organisations provide data access control and monitoring in any 
agreements with cloud service providers. Cloud services help organisations to start 
up numerous infrastructure devices and services quickly and at low cost by providing 
data and infrastructure services to the organisation. By using a cloud service, 
organisations can extend their network perimeter and significantly increase the 
opportunities for new attacks to be launched including malicious insider attacks. It is 
important that the same defences the organisations use to secure their data and 
infrastructure should cover the service provider.  
 
It is essential that all organisations understand how the cloud service provider 
protects data and assets before entering into any agreement. Before using a cloud 
service, organisations should assess and understand the service’s physical and logical 
access and security controls. They need to know what measures are in place to 
mitigate any risks as well as who has access to their data and infrastructure. 
Moreover, they need to conduct a risk assessment of the data and services that they 
plan to outsource to a cloud service provider before entering into any agreement. 
Organisations must check that the cloud service provider poses an acceptable level of 
risk and has applied mitigating controls to manage the remaining risks. Moreover, it 
is important that organisations carefully examine all aspects of the cloud service 
provider to guarantee that the service provider meets the organisation’s security 
practices. 
 
Organisations should regularly audit and monitor a distributed infrastructure’s 
behaviour to ensure that it meets security configuration requirements. Furthermore, 
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sure it performs thorough background checks on all prospective employees 
(operations staff, technical staff, janitorial staff, etc.). Additionally, organisations 
should ensure that the cloud service provider conduct a periodic credit investigation 
in order to identify any problem or changes in an employee’s life situation which can 
lead to unacceptable risks.  
 
Solutions recommended by CERT (2012, 47) are as follows:  
 Conduct a risk assessment of the data and services that organization plans to 
outsource to a cloud service provider before entering into any agreement.  
 Verify the cloud service provider’s hiring practices. 
 Control or eliminate remote administrative access to hosts providing cloud or 
virtual services. 
 Understand how the cloud service provider protects data and other 
organisational assets before entering into any agreement. Verify the party 
responsible for restricting logical and physical access to your organisation’s 
cloud assets. 
 
7.2.1.10   PRACTICE 10: Institute stringent access controls and 
monitoring policies on privileged users. 
System administrators and privileged users such as database administrators have the 
technical ability and access to perform malicious activity. System administrators and 
privileged users have a higher access level than other users to systems, networks, or 
applications. This higher access level is usually associated with higher risk. For 
example, they can hide their actions since they can log in as other users and modify 
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Furthermore, technically skilled employees constitute a significant risk to any 
organisation. They can use sophisticated methods to carry out their malicious attacks. 
Examples of such methods include writing or downloading scripts or programs 
(including logic bombs or password crackers), creating a backdoor account, using 
remote system administration tools and adjusting system logs. 
 
The following techniques can be implemented by organisations to reduce the damage 
and promote the detection of malicious system administrator and privileged user 
actions: 
 Separation of duties: Require multiple privileged employees in order to 
modify critical functions. In other words, network, system and application 
should be designed, created, executed and enforced by multiple 
employees. 
 Two-man rule for critical system administrator functions: No single 
employee should be allowable or be technically able to produce changes 
to any critical functions without action by a second employee. These 
practices could significantly help to prevent an insider from introducing a 
logic bomb without this being recognised by another employee. 
 Non-repudiation of technical actions: This ensures that online activities 
taken by any employees including system administrators and privileged 
users can be attributed to its owner. 
 Encryption: Technologies such as encryption can be applied to prevent 
system administrators and privileged users from reading or modifying 
sensitive data that is available within their domains but they should not 
have access to it.  
 Disabling accounts upon termination: Organisations should immediately 
deactivate access for former employees, especially system administrators 
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Solutions recommended by CERT (2012, 51) are as follows:  
 Conduct periodic account reviews to avoid privilege creep. Employees should 
have sufficient access rights to perform their everyday duties. When an 
employee changes roles, the organization should review the employee’s 
account and rescind permissions that the employee no longer needs.  
 Implement separation of duties for all roles that affect the production system. 
Require at least two people to perform any action that may alter the system. 
 
7.2.1.11   PRACTICE 11: Institutionalize system change controls.  
Control processes help minimise risks associated with technology use, thereby 
providing assurance for information and services. Change controls are processes that 
check the accuracy, integrity, authorisation and documentation of all modifications 
made to computer and network systems. Many insider cases rely on unauthorised 
modifications to the organisation’s systems; hence, stronger change controls are 
needed as a mitigation strategy. System administrators or privileged users can install 
backdoor accounts, keystroke loggers, logic bombs, or other malicious programs on 
the system or network. Such attacks are sneaky and therefore difficult to detect ahead 
of time, although the implementation of technical controls can help with early 
detection. To support this, a baseline for software and hardware configurations 
should be identified by the organisations. As soon as configurations are identified, 
hardware and software that makes up those configurations should be characterised. 
Assessment of current configuration can detect differences by comparing them 
against the baseline copy and alert managers to take action.  
 
The organisation should describe different roles within the change management 
process for configuration and validation and allocate them to different employees, 
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others. For instance, different employees from the one who made the configuration 
changes should validate the configuration. Moreover, protecting change logs and 
backups is very important so that organisations can identify unauthorised changes 
and restore the system to its previous valid state if required. 
 
Solutions recommended by CERT (2012, 51) are as follows:  
 Periodically review configuration baselines against actual production 
systems and determine if any discrepancies were approved. If the changes 
were not approved, verify a business need for the change. 
 Implement a change management program within the organization. Ensure 
that a change control board vets all changes to systems, networks, or 
hardware configurations. All changes must be documented and include a 
business reason. Proposed changes must be reviewed by information security 
teams, system owners, data owners, users, and other stakeholders. 
 The configuration manager must review and submit to the change control 
board any software developed in-house as well as any planned changes. 
 
7.2.1.12   PRACTICE 12: Use a log correlation engine or security 
information and event management (SIEM) system to log, monitor, 
and audit employee actions.  
Logging, monitoring, and auditing can help an organisation to early investigate any 
suspicious actions by their employees. Auditing refers to the review and verification 
of logs and data in various networks, systems and applications. However, the logging 
and auditing of all online activities are not sufficient to protect an organisation’s 
infrastructure from insider threat because of the volume and complexity. Relating 
events will create more applicable alerts and better informed decisions. To overcome 
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of their data are critical. Organisations should consider collecting and correlating 
some events such as firewall logs, unsuccessful login attempts, intrusion detection 
systems/intrusion prevention system logs, Web proxies, antivirus alerts and change 
management. The correlation of events from these devices in many CERTS’ cases of 
insider threat offers valuable information enabling organisations to identify the 
attacker. 
 
A security information and event management system allows any organisation to 
monitor their employees’ actions continuously, and it allows the organisation to 
create a baseline level of normal action as well as detect abnormal action. 
Organisations can use a SIEM system to perform more desirable monitoring of 
privileged accounts. SIEM system is able to highlight any abnormal actions, such as 
installing of software or disabling security software. By increasing the monitoring 
and auditing level for certain actions, records that must be reviewed will be increased 
as well. However, the SIEM system will facilitate sorting through these events by 
highlighting those that need further review and discarding background noise.     
 
Organisations should develop monitoring policies before starting any monitoring 
program, and all organisations’ employees should be informed that they are 
monitored. This is normally achieved through security awareness training provided 
to employees before using a system. 
 
Solutions recommended by CERT (2012, 59) are as follows:  
 Implement rules within the SIEM system, to automate alerts. 
 Determine the volume of logs (number of reported events per second) and the 
needs of the organization before selecting a SIEM tool. 
 Create a log management policy and procedures. Ensure they address log 
retention (consult legal counsel for specific requirements), what event logs to 






~ 234 ~ 
 Ensure that someone regularly monitors the SIEM system. Depending on the 
environment, this may involve one or more dedicated personnel who monitor 
employee activity full-time. 
7.2.1.13   PRACTICE 13: Monitor and control remote access from 
all end points, including mobile devices.  
Remote access can help insiders to attack their organisation with less risk. If 
employees are trained and monitored, and accounts are protected from compromise, 
the insiders will think twice before compromising the organisation’s systems or 
networks from work. Insiders regularly use legitimate access to attack their 
organisations remotely. Vigilance is important and recommended when remote 
access is granted to sensitive data, processes or information systems. Many 
employees have admitted that it is easier to perform malicious actions remotely or 
from home, since it reduces the concern that someone could be physically observing 
the malicious activities. Therefore, organisations need to carefully design and 
implement remote access policies and procedures. Multiple layers of defence should 
be in place if an organisation allows remote access. Moreover, organisations should 
be careful when granting remote access to their employees as they may offer remote 
access to email and non-critical data; however, they should strongly consider limiting 
remote access to the most critical data and tasks. Thus, accessing sensitive data that 
could cause major threat to the organisation should be limited to employees 
physically located inside the workplace. Remote system administrator access should 
be limited to the smallest group practicable, if not prohibited overall. 
 
Mobile devices such as PDAs and smartphones have the same ability and capability 
as a desktop computer. Organisations should be aware of the mobile devices’ 
capabilities and how they are used in the enterprise. The organisation risk assessment 
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microphones, remote access, applications, wireless capabilities and huge storage 
capabilities. Mobile devices can be used to transfer data. Most of the phones have 
built-in cameras and microphones that could be used to capture sensitive data. These 
data can be stored on the phone or via email or Multimedia Messaging Service to any 
other device; moreover, the data can also be synchronised to cloud storage or social 
media services. Organisations should be aware of smartphone applications that allow 
remote management of servers, workstations, and network infrastructure devices and 
who has installed and has access to these applications. It is essential to disable the 
employee’s access to these applications once the employee leaves the organisation. 
 
If remote access to critical and sensitive data and information is considered 
necessary, the organisation needs to offset the added risk by requiring that 
connections be made only through organisation devices and closer logging and 
frequent auditing of remote transactions. If the organisation limits remote access only 
via their devices, this can improve the organisation’s ability to control and monitor 
access to their information and networks. Organisations should audit and log all 
remote login information such as login account, date/time connected and 
disconnected and IP address. Monitoring remote access could be more manageable 
and effective if authorisation for remote access to critical data is kept to a minimum. 
Remote access logs, IP addresses and phone records often help to identify employees 
who launch remote attacks. Disabling remote access is essential for terminated 
employees. Employee termination processes should include important actions such 
as retrieving all organisation devices, terminating remote access accounts, disabling 
all remote management capabilities, changing the passwords of all shared accounts, 
and closing all open connections. 
 
Solutions recommended by CERT (2012, 64) are as follows:  
 Disable remote access to the organisation’s systems when an employee or 
contractor separates from the organisation. Be sure to disable access to VPN 






~ 236 ~ 
remote management software. Be sure to close all open sessions as well. In 
addition, collect all company-owned equipment, including multifactor 
authentication tokens, such as RSA SecurID tokens or smart cards. 
 Include mobile devices, with a listing of their features, as part of the 
enterprise risk assessment. 
 Prohibit or limit the use of personally owned devices. 
 Prohibit devices with cameras in sensitive areas. 
 Implement a central management system for mobile devices. 
 Monitor and control remote access to the corporate infrastructure. 
 
7.2.1.14   PRACTICE 14: Develop a comprehensive employee 
termination procedure.  
All organisations need to have a termination policy and procedure that disables all of 
the departing employee’s access points to the organisation’s physical locations, 
networks, systems, applications and data. Disabling access for a terminated employee 
requires fast action including disabling all employee paths of access including 
physical and technical access such as computer system accounts, shared passwords, 
and card control systems. Organisations should retrieve their physical property from 
the employee as part of the termination process. This property includes badges, 
access cards, keys, two-factor authentication tokens, mobile devices and laptops. 
Such items, if not retrieved by the organisation, could enable the former employee to 
attack the organisation. Collecting these items cannot completely prevent such 
attacks, but it does mitigate the risk. Moreover, organisations should review the 
terminated employee’s online actions during the 30 days prior to termination. This 
review should include email activity to guarantee that the employee has not emailed 
any sensitive data to any parties outside the organisation. The organisation should 
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software has been installed that can allow the employee back into the organisation’s 
systems. As soon as any employee leaves the organisation, the HR department 
should inform all other employees about this so as to minimise the possibility of 
insider threat. If employees do not know about their colleague’s departure, they may 
accidentally release sensitive information to him/her.  
 
Solutions recommended by CERT (2012, 67) are as follows:  
 Develop an enterprise-wide checklist to use when someone separates from 
the organization. 
 Establish a process for tracking all accounts assigned to each employee. 
 Reaffirm all nondisclosure and IP agreements as part of the termination 
process. 
 Notify all employees about any employee’s departure, where permissible and 
appropriate. 
 Archive and block access to all accounts associated with a departed 
employee. 
 Collect all of a departing employee’s company-owned equipment before the 
employee leaves the organisation. 
 Establish a physical-inventory system that tracks all assets issued to an 
employee. 
 Conduct an inventory of all information systems and audit the accounts on 
those systems. 
7.2.1.15   PRACTICE 15: Implement secure backup and recovery 
processes 
Regardless of the all defences implemented by an organisation, employees 
sometimes can and do launch insider attacks successfully. Thus, implementing and 
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Backup and recovery policies should consider control access to the facility where the 
backups are stored and limit access to the physical media. For example, no one 
employee should have access to both online data and the physical backup media. 
Moreover, backup policies should include separation of duties and the two-person 
rule when modifying the backup process.  
 
Multiple copies of backups should exist when possible and stored offsite in a secure 
facility. Different employees should be responsible for the protection of each copy  
as it would be difficult for multiple employees to collaborate and compromise the 
backup copies. Encryption could be an additional level of protection for the backups, 
especially if the backup copies are managed by a third party vendor at the offsite 
secure facility. To manage the encryption keys, a two-person rule should be utilised 
in order to control the decryption process in case one of the employees responsible 
for backing up the information leaves the organisation. 
 
Solutions recommended by CERT (2012, 71) are as follows:  
 Store backup media off-site. Ensure media is protected from unauthorised 
access and can only be retrieved by a small number of individuals. 
 Ensure that configuration of network infrastructure devices (e.g., routers, 
switches, and firewalls) are part of the organisation’s backup and recovery 
plan as well as the configuration management plan. 
 Implement a backup and recovery process that involves at least two people: a 
backup administrator and a restore administrator. Both people should able to 
perform either role. 
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7.2.1.16   PRACTICE 16: Develop a formalized insider threat 
program 
All organisations should consider the possibility of threat from their employees; thus, 
they need to pay special attention to insider threats. The trust that organisations give 
to their employees can expose them to malicious insiders who use specific methods 
to hide their illegal actions. Any organisation should apply commensurately 
specialised action in order to effectively detect, prevent, and respond to the threat 
from insiders. It is essential to develop a process for dealing with insider threats 
before they occur.  
 
An insider threat program is an established forward-looking program that defines the 
roles and responsibilities of employees. It is important that all employees 
participating in the program obtain specific awareness training. The program must 
have criteria and inceptions for conducting inquiries, referring to investigators, and 
requesting prosecution. It is essential to control the inquiries by a process that 
guarantees privacy and confidentiality since the employees involved will be a trusted 
group involved in monitoring and resolution. Management’s support is important if 
the program is to be successful. 
 
A well-founded insider threat program should include policies and procedures for 
Human Resources, Legal, Security, Data Owners, Information Technology, Software 
Engineering, and Contracting. It is important that organisations develop an insider 
incident response plan to control the harm caused by malicious insiders. 
Organisations need to differentiate between an incident response plan for insider 
incidents and a response plan for incidents caused by an external attacker. 
 
Such programs help organisations to detect, prevent, and respond to an insider threat 
incident. An insider threat program team includes members of different teams from 
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essential to identify the team member and their roles before an insider incident 
happens. This team is similar to a standard incident response team in handling the 
incidents; however the insider threat team responds to the incidents that involve 
insiders. The organisation needs to reduce the probability that the insider offender 
will be assigned to the response team or be aware of its progress. This process could 
be challenging since the same employees allocated to a response team may be among 
the most likely employees to think about using their technical skills and knowledge 
against the organisation. The main insider threat team should include at least one 
member from each of these areas: Physical Security, Personnel Security, Information 
Assurance, Human Resources and Legal teams as well as someone who is a C-level 
executive (or equivalent) to lead the insider threat main team. 
 
Solutions recommended by CERT (2012, 81) are as follows:  
 Ensure that legal counsel determines the legal framework the team will work 
in. 
 Establish policies and procedures for addressing insider threats that include 
HR, Legal, Security, management, and IA. 
 Consider establishing a contract with an outside consulting firm that is 
capable of providing incident response capabilities for all types of incidents, 
if the organisation has not yet developed the expertise to conduct a legal, 
objective, and thorough inquiry. 
 Formalize an insider threat program that can monitor for and respond to 
insider threats. 
 Implement insider threat detection rules into SIEM systems. Review logs on a 
continuous basis and ensure watch lists are updated. 
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7.2.1.17   PRACTICE 17: Establish a baseline of normal network 
device behaviour 
Organisations should create a baseline of normal network activity in order to detect 
irregularities in network activity. The organisation need to choose the data points of 
interest, how long it will monitor these points to develop a baseline and what tools it 
will use to collect and store the data. The longer the organisation monitors the chosen 
data points, the more reliable the baseline will be. The organisation must justify the 
normal activity points as part of the baseline so that it precisely reflects the 
organisation’s operations. Baseline data points to be monitored include: 
communications between devices, virtual private network (VPN) users, ports and 
protocols and normal firewall and IDS alerts. 
 
A network’s computers usually need to communicate to only some devices; for 
example, a computer may need access only to a domain controller, file server, email 
server and print server. If this computer accesses any other device, it could be either 
misconfigured or someone could use it for illegal activity. In order to allow only 
authorised devices to communicate, organisations need to configure host-based 
firewalls which can prevent malicious insiders from accessing an unauthorised 
network device.  
 
Organisations should carefully monitor the VPN usage because it permits employees 
to access organisational networks from outside the organisations. It is important that 
organisations have policies defining permitted times for network access since 
monitoring access times or enforcing access policies will support the organisation 
spot insider action. Organisations should permit VPN connections only from 
countries where a business need exists. Access controls for VPN are essential; 
organisations should limit access to file shares on a server to control how data can 
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owned devices. In addition, organisations should carefully monitor VPN access for 
any abnormal activity such as a download of data that exceeds normal usage.   
 
Organisations need to review firewall and IDS logs to identify normal behaviour. A 
SIEM tool can help security staff to examine the logs and establish a baseline of 
normal firewall and IDS behaviour. Any changes in the number of alerts might 
indicate abnormal behaviour and need further investigation. 
 
Solutions recommended by CERT (2012, 85) are as follows:  
 Use network monitoring tools to monitor the network for a period of time to 
establish a baseline of normal behaviours and trends. 
 Deny VPN access to foreign countries where a genuine business need does 
not exist. White list only countries where a genuine business need exists.37 
 Establish which ports and protocols are needed for normal network activity, 
and configure devices to use only these services. 
 Determine which firewall and IDS alerts are normal. Either correct what 
causes these alerts or document normal ranges and include them in the 
network baseline documentation. 
 Establish network activity baselines for individual subunits of the 
organisation. 
 Determine which devices on a network need to communicate with others and 
implement access control lists, host-based firewall rules, and other 
technologies to limit communications. 
 Understand VPN user requirements. Limit access to certain hours and 
monitor bandwidth consumption. Establish which resources will be 
accessible via VPN and from what remote IP addresses. Alert on anything 
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7.2.1.18   PRACTICE 18: Be especially vigilant regarding social 
media 
Insiders who use social media sites can deliberately or accidentally pose a threat to 
their organisation data and information systems. Training, policies and procedures 
should be provided by all organisations regarding how all employees, including 
business partners and contractors, should use social media.  
 
People can share information about themselves with others through social media 
websites. Such information includes everything about them from birthdays and 
family members to business affiliations and hobbies. Social media websites such as 
Facebook and LinkedIn can be used to determine who is employed by a specific 
organisation. Such websites can also be used to identify who inside an organisation 
may be more vulnerable or willing to contribute to an insider attack. For instance, if 
any employee uses a social media website to post any negative comments about his 
or her work or organisation, attackers may take this as a sign that the employee is 
dissatisfied and could possibly contribute to any malicious insider activity against the 
organisation. Attackers can identify people in high-value roles (C-level executives, 
financial personnel, etc.) by using these Websites to map an organisation’s employee 
structure.   
 
All organisations should have policies and procedures to address what is and is not 
acceptable employee participation in social media websites. Organisations need to 
consider what their employees could post even if this information is not deemed 
harmful. For instance, a social media policy might prohibit the organisation 
employees from posting any of the organisation’s projects or even organisation 
affiliations since social engineers or competitors could use this information against 
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Every organisation needs to include social media training as part of the 
organisation’s security awareness training program and they need to carefully 
monitor social media websites.   
 
Solutions recommended by CERT (2012, 89) are as follows:  
 Establish a social media policy that defines acceptable uses of social media 
and information that should not be discussed online. 
 Include social media awareness training as part of the organisation’s 
security awareness training program. 
 Encourage users to report suspicious emails or phone calls to the information 
security team, who can track these emails to identify any patterns and issue 
alerts to users. 
 Consider monitoring the use of social media across the organisation. 
7.2.1.19   PRACTICE 19: Close the doors to unauthorised data 
exfiltration.  
All organisations should know where their information systems are exposed to data 
exfiltration and implement mitigation strategies. Information systems provide many 
means of sharing information such as USB flash drives, printers and email. Each sort 
of device presents unique challenges for preventing data exfiltration. In order to 
minimise the threat of sensitive information being attacked by any insider, 
organisations should know where and how data can leave their systems. Since many 
kinds of technologies could become exit points for data, organisations must be aware 
of all devices connected to their system as well as all physical and wireless 
connections to their systems such as Bluetooth, removable media enclave exit points, 







~ 245 ~ 
All organisations should be aware of how their employees use cloud computing 
services or software as a service. Such services offer another opportunity for data 
exfiltration. Carefully monitoring and restricting access to these services is important 
in order to minimise the threat. Monitoring the use of printers, photocopiers, faxes 
and scanner devices is also important. Organisations could examine audit logs from 
these devices to discover and respond to any irregularities. All organisations should 
develop a removable media and data transfer policy and implement technologies to 
enforce it. Such policy can allow sensitive organisation data to be removed from 
systems only in a controlled way. Organisations need to restrict and limit data 
transfer protocols to employees with a reasonable task need, and carefully monitor 
their use. 
 
Solutions recommended by CERT (2012, 94) are as follows:  
 Establish a cloud computing policy.  
 Monitor the use of printers, copiers, scanners, and fax machines. 
 Create a data transfer policy. 
 Establish a removable media policy. 
 Restrict data transfer protocols, such as FTP, SFTP, or SCP.  
 Isolate development networks and disable interconnections to other systems 
or the internet. 
7.2.2 Relating the CERT Best Practices to the Holistic 
Insider Threat (HIT) Model  
This section explains how the eight factors (described in section 5.6) in the final HIT 
model are linked to some of the existing CERT best practices. The researcher 
followed a systematic approach in order to relate the CERT best practices to the 
factors in the final HIT model presented in figure 6.3. Firstly, keywords were used 
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each keyword were then used to identify CERT best practices that address each of 
the factors in the HIT model, at least in part.  Secondly, the researcher read the 
document from cover to cover using the eight factors as a lens to focus the attention.   
 
CERT’s best practices addressed most of the factors in the final HIT model. The 
ways in which the HIT model factors are addressed are described below. However, 
some aspects of several of the factors have not been covered by the CERT best 
practices. To propose best practices that fill these gaps, the CERT best practices were 
supplemented with suggestions collected from interviews and also from other 
academic sources.        
7.2.2.1   Factor 1: Conflict between the organisation and employees  
In order to find the CERT best practices relating to the highlighted factor, several 
search terms were used: ‘conflict’, ‘difference in opinions’, ‘clash’, ‘culture clash’, 
‘misperception’ and ‘lack of communication’. Moreover, the reading using this 
factor as the lens concludes that CERT best practices provided several 
recommendations in order to detect and respond to the conflict between organisations 
and their employees.  
 
CERT recommended monitoring and responding to any suspicious or disruptive 
behaviour. As discussed in section 7.2.1.4, organisations should frequently monitor 
their employees’ behaviour and train managers to identify and respond to any sort of 
conflict or suspicious employee behaviour. CERT encourages employees to report 
suspicious behaviour to appropriate staff and document all issues of conflict or 
abnormal behaviour, which in turn can help provide a quick response to the conflict 
and reduce its harm. Furthermore, organisations need to manage negative issues in 
the work environment immediately. All employees must be aware of workplace 
behaviour, career development and reason for conflict. In section 7.2.1.5, CERT 
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include the conflict. They recommend improved monitoring of employees exhibiting 
continuing conflict or behaviour problems; improved auditing and monitoring 
controls; frequent checking of audit logs to discover any actions outside the 
employee’s task scope and restricting access to these log files.  
 
Although, CERT provides some practices to detect and respond to the conflict, they 
do not offer solutions to prevent the causes. CERT practices overlooked some of the 
causes of conflict such as culture clashes between the employees, lack of 
communication, and discrimination. According to Nouman, Khan, and Khan (2011), 
the most common causes of the conflicts between organisations and their employees 
are: lack of communication, misperception, difference in opinions and 
discrimination. Cultural clashes and cultural differences can significantly increase 
the conflict as employees often see a clash of values as a major cause of conflict 
(Weinhold and Weinhold 2004; Hayes 2008). In order to address this gap, the 
researcher used the data from the interviews as well as several academic sources.  
 
Interviewees offered several suggestions to address some of the causes of conflict 
between organisations and their employees. The researcher observed that most of the 
participants emphasised that fairness, equality and communication as well as better 
managers with conflict resolution skills are essential to minimise the causes of 
conflict within organisations. The following comments are pertinent to this issue:  
 
“Organisation should treat their employees equally. They 
also need to be more open and fair in handling their 
employee affairs and management. Managers should not be 
making bias and unfair decisions which in turn can adversely 
affect the business for the long term. Therefore, managers 
should receive adequate training on how to handle employee 
affairs in a correct manner and they should be trained about 
the consequences of their failures which may include insider 
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“Organisation should also be training managers of 
employees or other partners more effectively communicate 
with employees to handle any sort of conflict.” (Participant 
D) 
 
Two participants suggest that organisations should listen to their problems and try to 
help them to solve these problems.  
 
“Keep the employees happy. Build with them an air of trust 
& rapport; keep listening from them through weekly casual 
social meetings if they are having any rough times or 
complaints against the organisation.” (Participant E) 
 
“One must address conflict and sources of conflict directly.  I 
find that dismissing an employee’s concerns even if, leads to 
further conflict. Listening and attempting to walk the 
employee through a solution tends to reduce the conflict. 
That is to say, I ask them to help design a solution to their 
problem. (How do you think we should fix it?) (Do you feel 
the only way to solve the problem is doing X?).” (Participant 
H) 
 
While interviewees’ responses addressed some of the causes of conflict, several 
academic sources have been used to address the remaining conflict causes. Most of 
the academic studies emphasised the influence of cultural differences on an 
organisation and how these may increase the insider threat. Cultural differences 
usually exist between different communities, nations and geographic regions. 
According to Ofori-Dankwa and Ricks (2000), organisations need international 
managers to pay attention to cultural differences between employees. All 
organisations should acknowledge the differences in culture and pay attention to the 
significant impact of cultural differences. By thoroughly considering these 
differences, international managers will possibly acquire a greater understanding of 
other cultures, act appropriately and reduce the risk of clashes (Ofori-Dankwa and 
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Luo and Shenkar (2011) recommend four principals for managing cultural 
differences between employees within an organisation, namely communication, 
acculturation, socialization and staffing; they call this the preparation and regulation 
of system members. 
 
 Communication is “a process that increases familiarity between 
organisational systems and acts as “social glue””(Luo and Shenkar 2011, 
8). It provides a powerful connection among all parts of an organisation. 
Communication can help to mitigate any culture clash and conflict between 
employees. For effective communication, language and culture training for 
both local and foreign employees as well as managers can help improve 
communication. In order to reduce the possibility of cultural clash, the 
cultural training must be conducted on a specific region or country basis. 
Such training will increase knowledge of the other culture more than general 
culture training. Moreover, cultural mentors can improve this knowledge by 
correcting the wrongful stereotypes. Efficient cross-cultural communication 
requires great openness and transparency on the part of all organisations 
members. Thus, as cross-cultural communications improve, cultural clash 
will decrease. 
 
 Acculturation is the process of learning about another culture that is both 
introductory and experiential, thus providing both preparatory and ongoing 
management.  Acculturation involves “changes induced in systems as a 
result of the diffusion of cultural elements in both directions. It requires 
effective adjustment and adaptation to a specific culture”. (Luo and Shenkar 
2011, 8). Acculturation training includes three related components: 
understanding of different culture such as its important values and how 
cultural values are expressed in behaviour; how to adjust to the different 
culture; and job performance aspects within the different culture, such as 
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Organisations should take a serious step in order to develop and improve 
their cultural learning ability including a well-designed process for 
understanding different cultures. Hence, as cross-country acculturation 
improves, cultural clash will diminish. 
 
 Socialisation “at the personal level improves mutual familiarity, social 
cognition, and understanding of each other's cultural norms and behaviours, 
thus reducing cultural friction”(Luo and Shenkar 2011, 9). Socialisation can 
manage cultural clashes by increasing tolerance, respect and personal trust 
which help to balance cultural differences. Socialisation at the organisational 
level increases inter-firm trust, connection and mutual support which remove 
organisational level cultural clashes. By maintaining socially-embedded 
relationships, organisations become more culturally familiar with each other. 
Thus, as cross-cultural socialisation confirms, cultural clash will decrease.  
 
 Staffing is the “process by which Organisational  inputs are selected and 
regulated to avert head-on cultural collision or to curb the cultural profile of 
a system where potentially colliding with another” (Luo and Shenkar 2011, 
8). Staffing focuses on employing the right foreign employees, rotation or 
repatriation, evaluation and rewarding as well as local hiring for 
management positions, softens the cultural clashes with local employees. 
Hiring foreign employees who are familiar with the host country culture, 
norms and language can significantly reduce cultural clashes.  In the hiring 
process, organisations should include international experience, cultural 
knowledge and relational ability among the important criteria for choosing 
foreign employees to reduce cultural conflicts with local employees. 
Meanwhile, recruiting indigenous managers with knowledge of international 
business practices and the related foreign culture will also be useful in 
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who are familiar with the host country culture could minimise culture clash, 
recruiting local employees will eliminate this issue.  
 
According to Fitzsimmons, Miska, and Stahl (2011), multicultural employees 
sometimes add value to the organisation, only if the organisations execute the 
necessary processes to use their skills such as recruiting and selection processes as 
well as career development practices to employ them in the suitable positions where 
they can be most useful. They suggested three key tips for managing multicultural 
employees including staffing, training and development, and organisational culture 
development. 
 Staffing: it is essential that each organisation develop a process to identify 
multiculturals’ potential for both recruiting and placement. Multiculturals 
should be employed in suitable positions which match their abilities and their 
skills. Organisations should hire people with a great multicultural 
background, and place them well in appropriate positions. This process will 
help to move the organisational culture in the right direction. 
 
 Training and development: Organisations need to apply their training and 
development programs in order to support multicultural employees to become 
more aware of their skills and abilities, and to improve monocultural 
employees’ skills. Normally, training multiculturals with monoculturals is 
more likely to help narrow the gap between them. Mentorship and coaching 
as well as global experiential programs are best suited to achieving such 
goals.  
 
 Organisational Culture Development: it is essential that each organisation 
generate observable signs that the company values employees with a 
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Organisations are at risk if they only attempt to manage the conflict without 
ascertaining its causes. In order to fill this gap in CERT best practices, the following 
action is recommended: 
 Managing conflict causes: Organisations should manage the reasons for 
the conflict as soon as it appears. Organisations have to treat their 
employees fairly, equally and take advantage of their multicultural 
employees through staffing, communication, socialisation and training in 
order to reduce any cultural problems. If each organisation follows the 
previous steps, the conflict will definitely be minimised. Consequently, in 
cases where conflict is not managed properly and there is lack of 
communication, discrimination and cultural clash, CERT does not 
provide best practices to minimise this factor contributing to insider threat 
behaviour.    
7.2.2.2   Factor 2: Insufficient information security policy 
According to Pramanik, Sankaranarayanan, and Upadhyaya (2004), the 
implementation of inappropriate information security policy, out-dated security 
policy and lack of training and awareness were considered essential aspects that can 
affect the security policies and can lead to insider threat behaviour. To find the best 
practices fromm the CERT’s document related to the highlighted factor, several 
search terms were utilised: ‘policy’, ‘lack of training and awareness’ and 
‘inappropriate information security policy’. Moreover, the reading using this factor 
as the lens concludes that CERT best practices provided worthwhile solutions to 
manage inadequate information security police that covers the essential element of 
security policy.  
 
CERT recommend enterprise-wide risk assessments to prevent threats from insiders 
and business partners. It is essential to identify and prioritise the critical business 
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compromised. Organisations can use the assessment results to develop and improve 
their security policy and the overall organisations’ security. All organisations need to 
clearly document and consistently enforce policies and controls. As mentioned in 
section 7.2.1.2, they need to develop clear, efficient and adequate policies and 
consistently enforced them. In addition, CERT recommended incorporating insider 
threat awareness into periodic security training for all employees. Section 7.2.1.3 
discussed CERT solutions regarding training and awareness; they suggest developing 
and implementing an enterprise-wide training program which includes numerous 
topics related to insider threat; before giving new employees access to an 
organisation’s system they need to be trained in security awareness, including insider 
threat; ongoing training should be offered to all employees and contractors.  
 
Interviewees’ responses regarding information security policy support the practices 
recommended by CERT to manage this factor. Responses were mainly focused on 
the same aspects that are covered by CERT. Participants suggested the 
implementation of an adequate information security policy and procedure and 
updating it as well as providing sufficient training and awareness for all 
organisations’ employees. These solutions can help the organisation a great deal to 
mitigate the risk of insider threat. The following comments encapsulate these 
guidelines: 
 
“Development of efficient and sufficient security policies and 
procedures. -Concentration of propriety information on the 
upper nodes of organisation staff. -Periodic management 
audit of procedures and policies for effectiveness and 
practice. -Update of policies after regular intervals. Many 
things happen in passing year.  -Policy & Procedure 
development by people very much experienced in this area 
(technical and human sciences).” (Participant J) 
 
“Publish solid policies, and advertise them in ongoing 
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organisation. Ensure that routine training is in place that 
highlights the requirements” (Participant G) 
 
“We need to ensure that security is taken seriously by 
management and staff and invest adequate time to develop 
security rules, standards, policy and procedures and to 
implement proper tools” (Participant I) 
 
Additionally, participants suggested that to minimise this issue, the organisations 
need to assess their security policies to identify the gaps as highlighted by CERT in 
Practice 1. The following comments confirm this:  
 
“Conduct a proper IT security risk assessment regularly and 
implement changes based on the prioritized gaps identified to 
improve the security policy” (Participant D) 
 
“Industry or service templates: measure what you have, what 
you don’t and seek to fill the gaps. Most don’t know what 
they don’t have until it is too late. Far too many are 
overconfident that what they have will last forever and fail to 
adapt, update and plan ahead.” (Participant K) 
 
Hence, CERT best practices provide good solutions to manage inadequate 
information security which are also supported by the interviewees. CERT suggest 
that each organisation should conduct a risk assessment as the first step to developing 
a strong policy and then clearly document and enforce the policy. There should be 
regular updates of the organisation policy and periodic security awareness training 
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7.2.2.3   Factor 3: Giving high trust to underachieving employees 
Several search terms were used to identify the best practices from the CERT’s 
document relating to the highlighted factor. Keywords included: ‘underachieving 
employees’, ‘underachiever’, ‘low performance’, ‘poor performance’ and 
‘underperforming employee’. Moreover, the reading using this factor as the lens 
concludes that although CERT best practices provided guidelines to address some of 
the suspicious or disruptive behaviour, they did not address the issue of 
underachieving employees.  
 
They suggested several actions to respond to and manage any suspicious or 
disruptive behaviour beginning with the hiring process, and monitoring and 
responding to suspicious or disruptive behaviour. As discussed in section 7.2.1.4, all 
organisations should perform background checks on all employees. Background 
checks should include clarification from previous employers regarding the 
individual’s ability to deal with workplace matters. Organisations should regularly 
monitor their employees’ behaviour and train managers to identify and respond to 
any suspicious behaviour by the employees. In section 7.2.1.5, CERT provides 
guidelines on managing any negative and suspicious behaviour by regularly 
monitoring the employees with continuing behaviour problems and regularly 
auditing their logs.  
 
However, useful recommendations have been obtained from the interviews regarding 
the low performance of the employees. Participants’ responses regarding this factor 
were mainly focused around how the organisation can increase the employees’ 
performance if they are underachieving. The participants believed that organisations 
need to check the background of the employee before hiring. This process could 
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“When we hire, we perform background checks to determine 
if the individual has any previous employment issues.” 
(Participant F) 
 
Then they suggested that each organisation should work with their employees to 
improve their performance by investigating the reasons for their low performance 
and providing the support required to improve.  
 
“I think we need to research the factors causing their 
underachievement and need to ensure that this employee was 
given the proper time, tools, and knowledge to do their job. If 
not, they will easily be underachiever.” (Participant I) 
 
“Deal with the employee. Work directly with the employee to 
improve their work, behaviour or quality of work.  This is 
done, in part, by creating an environment that he/she can 
thrive.  This is dependent on the individual personality and 
motivations” (Participant H) 
 
“The employee who is underperforming should be warned – 
at some point the performance is documented and discussed 
with the employee.  The goals of this exercise are two-fold – 
first we are trying to get the employee to do a better job.  
Secondly, we are gauging the employee to see if something 
has changed – has the fit changed – would the organisation 
be better without this individual. If this process happens 
consistently and effectively, we can weed-out lower 
performers and also gauge the risk to our data and services.” 
(Participant F) 
 
“Employing employee individual feedback about themselves 
coupled with face-to-face assessments will help gauge 
employee motivators up front before the point of no return is 
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Ultimately, if they did not improve their performance, their employment should be 
terminated.  
 
“Underachieving employees should be given an opportunity 
to increase their performance. Failing that, they should be 
fired” (Participant G) 
 
“If organisation believes that everything was provided for 
this person to excel and get ahead and this person didn’t 
have the capacity or motive to do so, he/she should not be 
employed with the company any longer.” (Participant I) 
 
Furthermore, academic sources have suggested several guidelines to manage 
employees’ low performance. According to Vosloban (2012), organisations need to 
frequently evaluate the performance for their employees. There are several reasons 
for organisations to carry out regular individual performance evaluations: rewarding 
the high performing employees, encouraging the low performing ones, justify 
decisions to terminate the employees with low or poor performance, offer continuous 
promotion and development opportunities. In order to encourage employees’ 
performance, organisations need to empower and involve them in different activities. 
Organisations need to offer benefits and financial incentives to their employees and 
to reward them according to their productivity (Vosloban 2012; Chandrasekar 2011).   
 
Once low or poor performance has been identified, organisations should immediately 
investigate the reasons for this low performance (Syauta et al. 2012). Organisations 
need to explain to the underachieving employees how their performance can 
influence the organisation’s productivity. Finally, organisations need to work with 
their employees to improve their performance by providing a goal-setting guide. 
Underperforming employees should be involved in setting meaningful goals and 
performance measures for their work. These goals should be realistic, achievable and 
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To sum up, CERT best practices do not address the management of underachieving 
employees in order to minimise the insider threat behaviour. In order to fill this gap 
in CERT best practices, the following practices are recommended: 
 Addressing underachieving employees: Organisations need to manage 
their underachieving employees in order to reduce the risk of insider 
attack. All organisations need to frequently evaluate their employees’ 
performance. Once they notice that any of their employees are performing 
under the required level, they should immediately respond and take some 
action. Firstly, management should investigate and attempt to find the 
causes of their low performance and help them to improve by providing a 
goal setting guide or involving them in different activities such as 
conferences. If performance does not improve, the employee should be 
dismissed. 
7.2.2.4   Factor 4: Outside influence on employees 
A number of keywords were utilised in order to relating CERT best practices to the 
highlighted factor. These included: ‘outside influence’, ‘external environment’, 
‘employees' background’, ‘economic motivator’, ‘outside problems’, ‘financial 
stressors’ and ‘personal stressors’. Moreover, the reading using this factor as the lens 
concludes that CERT suggested several useful practices to manage this factor.  
 
According to Mathur and Gupta (2012), the influence of the external environment 
includes factors such as employees' background, values and economic motivators. As 
discussed in section 7.2.1.4, organisations need to perform thorough background 
checks for previous criminal convictions or a credit issues. Furthermore, 
organisations should consistently monitor their employees, especially those 
struggling financially or a sudden, unexplained financial improvement. Organisations 
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and personal stressors with a member of management or human resources, or provide 
a service such as an employee assistance program (EAP) (details in section 7.2.1.5). 
Moreover, logging, monitoring, and auditing can help an organisation to eliminate 
outside influence on employees and early investigate any abnormal actions. A 
security information and event management system allows any organisation to 
monitor their employee actions regularly in order to reduce any abnormal actions 
(details in section 7.2.1.12). 
 
Interviewees’ responses regarding this factor support the practices recommended by 
CERT. Participants’ comments focused on issues related to background checks and 
awareness as well as checking and monitoring employees’ behaviour and actions.  
 
Comments relating to monitoring and checking employees’ activities were among 
the most discussed solutions for this factor. Participants’ comments in regards to 
monitoring are shown below: 
 
“Ideally we eliminate outside influence on employees and 
human error as much as we can by establish compensating 
controls to log-audit-report-monitor-etc.” (Participant D) 
 
“As security professionals, I need to be much more vigilant 
and aware of our surroundings, and implement proper 
processes for frequent monitoring of suspect behaviour and 
people’s activities at work.” (Participant I) 
 
Some participants suggested that background checks for employees can reveal any 
financial issues that may affect the outside influences exerted on employees. This is 
illustrated by the following comments:    
 
“A thorough background check may help, if there is risk of 
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“We perform background checks to determine if the 
individual has any past criminal behaviour, credit issues, or 
previous employment issues.  Through proper interview and 
screening, we attempt to weed out those who seem to be more 
concerned with their interests than the organisations” 
(Participant F) 
 
Training was also one of the solutions suggested by the participants: 
 
“Audit, review, training and making people aware of the 
security policy help to mitigate the outside influence on 
employees” (Participant B) 
 
Other participants offered several suggestions to minimise the effect of outside 
factors on the employees; these included: paying reasonable wages, providing some 
flexibility and always supporting them. The following quotations summarised these 
points well:  
 
“• Pay reasonably well.  You do not have to be the highest 
paying employer, but you must pay at least average for the 
resource and area. Review human resource policy in 
organisation for bonuses, appreciations and rewards.  
• Provide a great deal of flexibility.  Allow each person to 
solve problems with their own skills and creativity.  Stifled 
creativity makes creative people miserable.  
• Do not worry about the little things.  If the employee 
needs to be at his/her child’s school function, do not worry 
about getting that time back.  Let it go.  It causes stress 
unnecessary stress.   
• Back your staff!  When pressured from outside the 
department or from your own management, always support 
your staff.  This is just right and it develops mutual loyalty.  
Of course, this means support them when they are in the right 
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To summarise, the main guidelines do manage the outside influence on the 
employees; both CERT and interview participants suggested that background checks 
and the monitoring of employee behaviour are essential to minimise the risk of this 
factor. Background checks can help organisations to discover an individual’s 
previous criminal behaviour or financial problems. In addition, monitoring the 
employee behaviour and activities in addition to frequent security awareness training 
for all employees could greatly help an organisation to minimise the incidence of 
malicious actions. Furthermore, some participants suggested paying reasonable 
wages; as well as bonuses, appreciations and rewards can minimise the influence on 
the employee of the prospect of financial gain. 
7.2.2.5   Factor 5: Liberal access 
To identify the CERT best practices that address the highlighted factor, several 
keywords were utilised: ‘access’, ‘access control’, ‘privileges’, ‘remote access’ and 
‘mobile devices’. Moreover, the reading using this factor as the lens concludes that 
CERT best practices provided some recommendations in order to manage the 
employees’ access but these practices still did not provide sufficient solutions to 
address the mobile devices issue.  
 
They suggested that all organisations should identify their physical and information 
assets and how to secure the most valuable and sensitive information and equipment. 
A risk assessment will help the organisations to recognise the types of data, who 
access the data, what their access level and where the data stored (details in section 
7.2.1.6). As discussed in section 7.2.1.7, in order to manage insider access, 
organisations should implement strict password and account management policies. 
They need to ensure that all activity from any account belongs to the person who 
performed it. All organisations should establish an appropriate computer account 
management with access control in order to confirm that access to an organisation’s 
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also need to define password requirements and train employees on generating robust 
and strong passwords, in addition to regularly auditing the account and password. 
Organisations have to enforce separation of duties and least privilege. Separation of 
duties involves distributing tasks between employees to limit the ability of abusing 
the system without the assistance of another. Least privilege allows employees to 
access only the resources needed to perform their job (details in section 7.2.1.8). In 
addition, organisation should conduct regular account reviews to avoid privilege 
creep and they need to provide their employees with only necessary access rights to 
perform their job (details in section 7.2.1.10). The monitoring and control of remote 
access from all end points, including mobile devices, is also a useful suggestion 
made by CERT as a means of managing liberal access. As discussed in section 
7.2.1.13, organisations must pay more attention when remote access is granted to 
sensitive data, processes or information systems. All organisations have to design 
their remote access policies and procedures wisely. CERT recommends that multiple 
layers of defence be implemented if organisations allow remote access, and limiting 
remote access to the critical data and tasks. In addition, organisations need to be 
aware of all sorts of mobile devices, their abilities and how they are used. 
Organisations should include mobile devices in their risk assessment and consider its 
specific features such as cameras, remote access, and storage capabilities.  
  
Interviewees’ responses regarding this factor support the recommended practices by 
CERT. Most of the participants suggested that all organisations need to conduct a 
risk assessment to identify core business assets and the risks to those assets, and 
establish a risk management strategy for protecting those assets. 
 
“Conduct a thorough IT security risk assessment to identify 
and prioritise core business assets, the risks to those assets, 
the control gaps associated with those assets and granting 
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In addition, implementing least access principle is the ideal solution for this problem 
as well separation of duties and responsibilities must also be in place to reduce this 
type of risk. Finally, employees should be educated on how to keep the 
organisation’s assets secured. The following quotations summarise these points: 
 
“Once anyone employed, grant him the absolute minimum 
required trust and access but verify. Ensure that you have 
independent verification and audit of employee access.  Most 
insiders that pilfer information or access systems 
inappropriately never do anything that would reveal their 
actions.” (Participant H) 
 
“There are a number of controls an organisation can put into 
place to minimise liberal access risk.  
- A solid control framework, focused on the "least access" 
privilege principle, is an excellent first step to securing 
access to resources. These resources may be your people, 
property or information. 
- User education and training is another key component for 
reducing the potential for employees to unintentionally 
misuse their level of access. Employees should be aware 
of their roles in keeping information secure, and know 
how to report potentially suspicious activity like someone 
gaining inappropriate access to resources. 
- Separation of duties and responsibilities must also be in 
place to reduce this type of risk. Accurately defining a job 
role and responsibility and then ensuring any 
corresponding positions have different access will 
immediately reduce this level of risk” (Participant J) 
 
Some participants add that access controls and monitoring are also significant in 
solving the access problem, as shown by the following comments: 
 
“Proper access control, regular and random monitoring and 
verification of access levels and actions taken—trust but 
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“Proper access authorization should be implemented based 
on the job functions and should be monitored by proper 
entitlement review process” (Participant I) 
 
 
Although CERT in its fourth best practices edition discussed the mobile devices in 
practice 13, this practice still did not provide adequate solutions to address the 
mobile devices issue. This practice only recommends including mobile devices in the 
organisation’s risk assessment. On the other hand, some of the academic sources 
have suggested more useful ways to manage mobile devices. These sources have 
been used in order to address this neglected aspect.  
 
Mobile devices with remote access to organisation networks increase the risk of 
insider threat as stated by Aldhizer and Bowles (2011, 59) “The proliferation of 
powerful conventional mobile devices … with remote access to internal networks has 
raised significant new security concerns”. Mobile devices including laptops, PDAs 
and smartphones are a crucial element in insider threat behaviour since such devices 
enable remote access to the organisation network with great storage capabilities. 
Although mobile devices may increase productivity, new security risks arise by 
extending the “mobile edge” of the organisation. Mobile devices (PDAs and 
smartphones) are more vulnerable to penetration and viruses. Even though mobile 
devices in some situations are important for business needs, there are many tasks that 
do not require any mobile devices.  
 
Steele and Wargo (2007) suggest managing mobile devices with endpoint security. 
Endpoint security includes anti-virus, encryptions and data privacy thatrequires a 
centrally administered solution with sufficient details to determine precisely who is 
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devices are used. The sensitive data should be encrypted before it leaves the security 
perimeter. 
 
Aldhizer and Bowles (2011) recommended two techniques that can help minimise 
the risk that sensitive stored data on mobile devices may be lost or stolen. Such data 
can include personally identifiable client information, audit working papers, tax 
returns and knowledge management data. These techniques include automated 
wireless security management systems (WSMS) for larger organisations and cost-
effective thin computing for smaller organisations.  
 
Automated wireless security management systems (WSMS): large organisations 
should consider the implementation of an automated WSMS, because the majority of 
their employees are most likely to use mobile devices to access the internal network 
applications remotely. To implement such technology, organisations should firstly 
conduct a feasibility study that includes strategic competitive advantages, business 
risks, and implementation costs. It is generally conducted as a first step in order to 
determine whether to allow mobile devices to access the network applications 
remotely and to implement an automated wireless security solution. Secondly, key 
stakeholders need to meet in order to reach agreement about the most critical data 
that need to be protected.  
 
Once critical data within different internal network applications and mobile devices 
has been identified through a sequence of agreed keyword searches and advanced 
scanning tools, it will be uniquely tagged. These data should be transferred to 
dedicated servers where encryption and advanced physical security controls can be 
applied. In the future, critical data can be automatically tagged once they are created 
or entered into the organisation’s network or mobile devices, and can be 
automatically moved to suitable dedicated servers. Digital rights management can be 
used to manage the critical data, whereby the critical tagged data cannot be located in 
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instant messaging, the Internet (e.g., the organisational Website, Facebook, LinkedIn, 
and personal blogs), or printers.  
 
If any employee tries to breach this security procedure by transmitting critical data 
from the organisation’s internal network to a mobile device, the WSMS can 
automatically terminate the attempt and send an alert to management for direct 
investigation. Therefore, malicious employees with authorised access to critical data 
that are available within the internal network will not be able to transfer this data to 
their mobile devices and selling it. 
 
To further mitigate critical data leakage, large organisations should consider 
implementing the following WSMS processes: 
 Mobile device perimeter security: All mobile devices must have perimeter 
security controls such as anti-spyware, antivirus software and personal 
firewalls. 
 Device authentication: A record of all appropriately registered and authorised 
mobile devices is kept to make sure that unauthorised mobile devices will be 
immediately identified and denied access to the internal network. 
 Data encryption: WSMS can automatically force a mobile device to encrypt 
the data at the point of use. 
 Lost or stolen authenticated device protections: In addition to the strong 
network perimeter security, three automated WSMS controls should be 
applied to minimise the risk of a lost or stolen mobile: 1) limits on incorrect 
password guesses; 2) embedded global positioning systems; and 3) limited 
authorised user access to sensitive data. 
 Links to network perimeter security: Before accessing the internal network 
remotely, the automated WSMS policy server located within the 
demilitarized zone (DMZ) must be accessed first. At that time, the policy 
server guides all remote traffic through the network firewall, the intrusion 
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detection software to ensure that it is in compliance with organisational 
security policies. 
 Termination of former employee mobile device and network access: WSMS 
can automatically deactivate the internal network access through authorised 
mobile device at the date of termination. 
 Third-party access controls: WSMS can also identify any third parties such as 
outsourced employees. If a recognised third party’s mobile device does not 
meet organisational perimeter security, it can be rejected and not allowed to 
access the internal network by WSMS. In addition, WSMS sends the third 
party instructions through e-mail on how to update their security software. 
 
Cost-effective thin computing: small organisations should consider the 
implementation of cost-effective thin computing to minimise critical data leakage 
through centralised network control. Small organisations should consider 
implementing the following automated processes: 
 Thin mobile device perimeter security: Thin mobile devices cannot be 
affected by spyware and viruses since they have little or no operating system 
and cannot store critical data. On the other hand, such devices can sufficiently 
access the internal network remotely. Therefore, regular updates to firewalls, 
anti-spyware and antivirus software can be centralised and monitored at the 
network level as an alternative to the mobile device level. 
 User authentication: Thin computing depends on keeping a record of all 
authorised employees’ user IDs and their complex passwords to make sure 
that unauthorised employees will be recognized in real time and denied 
remote access to the internal network.  
 Data encryption and lost or stolen device protections: Thin computing can 
apply central server and data encryption through thin mobile devices. Lost or 
stolen thin mobile devices are not a major issue since these devices cannot 
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 Termination of former employee’s thin mobile device and network access: 
Thin computing can deactivate the internal network access through a thin 
mobile device on the date of termination by eliminating the user ID and 
password from the authorised network listing. 
 Third-party access controls: Small organisations that using thin computing 
could record known third parties’ user IDs and complex passwords to make 
sure that unauthorised third parties can be recognised in real time and denied 
remote access to the internal network.  
 
Even though CERT best practices provide useful guidelines to manage the access, 
they do not provide adequate controls to address one of the most important aspects of 
access which is mobile devices. Therefore, in the absence of security solutions for 
mobile devices, CERT best practices seem to have missed a significant practice in 
reducing and preventing insider threat behaviour. In order to fill this gap in CERT 
best practices, the following practice is recommended: 
 Securing mobile devices: Organisations must protect all mobile devices. 
A WSMS solution for larger organisations and a thin computing solution 
for smaller organisations can help minimise critical data violations 
through mobile devices.  
7.2.2.6   Factor 6: Loyalty of employees 
In order to find the best practices from the CERT document relevant to the 
highlighted factor, several search terms were used: ‘loyalty’, ‘disloyalty’, ‘loyal 
employee’, ‘disloyal employee’, ‘fair’, ‘equally’, and ‘similar’. Moreover, the 
reading using this factor as the lens concludes that although CERT best practices 
provide guidelines to address most of the insider threat contributing factors, they did 
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On the other hand, the interviewees added valuable information regarding security 
management for the highlighted factor. According to Schrag (2001), employee 
disloyalty weakens organisational productivity and security. Many organisations are 
concerned about employees’ loyalty, especially the loyalty of the outsourced 
employees and the loyalty of the employees when they are accessing the 
organisations’ network remotely (Bridges and Harrison 2003). Interviewees confirm 
this and emphasised that employees who access the organisation’s network remotely 
and outsourced employees are more likely to become less loyal to their organisations. 
Although, CERT best practices address remote access and outsourced employees, 
they do not consider employee loyalty to be an important factor.  
Participants’ concerns regarding outsourced employees are shown below: 
 
“Outsourcers may steal information. Also outsourced 
resources are less careful (why should they care?) so thy lees 
loyal.” (Participant E) 
 
“It is the insider that appreciates the value of their 
compromise; therefore they specifically target an outsourced 
entity with an offer.”(Participant K) 
 
Some participants declared that accessing the organisations’ network remotely could 
decrease the employee loyalty as noted by the following comments. 
 
“It’s my gut feeling that somebody who remotely accessing 
the organisation network would be less loyal and more likely 
to share data on the internet, or to use the same equipment 
for internet access, which of course raises the risk.” 
(Participant A) 
 
 “Remote access essentially places a layer between their 
moral code and perceived consequences. Since they are “out 
of sight, out of mind” they may be more easily motivated to 







~ 270 ~ 
In order to manage this factor, all participants emphasized that treating employees 
fairly, equally and with respect will help to increase employee loyalty toward the 
organisation both if they working remotely or if they are an outsourced employee. 
The following comments reflect this:  
 
“Organisations have to be ensured that an ideal workplace 
environment is provided to the employees.  Employees should 
be treated fairly and with respect this makes them more 
comfortable and loyal to the organisation” (Participant A) 
 
“Treating people fairly and similarly (though not necessarily 
equally) works quite well” (Participant C) 
 
“An organisation that treats employees with respect and 
dignity will find success in culturing employee loyalty.” 
(Participant D) 
 
One participant believed that if the top echelon in the organisation is loyal to the 
employees, this loyalty will be reciprocated:  
  
“Loyalty is usually started as a top down issue. If seniors are 
loyal to the employees, and show that loyalty, then 
subordinates are more likely to show loyalty back up. If 
employees are treated poorly, then loyalty up will be very 
weak” (Participant G) 
 
Another participant added: 
 
“Not only treat each person like they count/matter, but also 
believe it.  Your loyalty to them is required first.  You cannot 
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To sum up, CERT best practices failed to address the issue of disloyalty of the 
employee. On the other hand, the interviewees in this study added valuable 
information to help increase and manage the loyalty of the employees. In order to fill 
this gap in CERT best practices, the following practice is recommended: 
 Encourage employees’ loyalty toward the organisation: Each 
organisation has to treat its workers fairly, equitably and respectfully so 
as to in increase their loyalty to the organisation both if they working 
remotely or if they are an outsourced employee. 
7.2.2.7   Factor 7: The perfect crime 
This factor relies on two important elements: the knowledge of the insiders and the 
level of technical skills. Employees could use their knowledge, ability and technical 
skills against their organisation. According to Padayachee (2012, 673), “The insider 
threat is even more dangerous than external threats, as an insider may easily misuse 
the skills and knowledge gained through legitimate work duties for illegitimate 
gain”. In order to discover the relating best practices from the CERT’s document to 
the highlighted factor, several search terms were utilised: ‘knowledge of the insider’, 
‘knowledgeable employees’, ‘technically skilled employees’, ‘level of technical 
skills’, ‘technical skill’, ‘deterrents’, ‘sophisticated employee’ and ‘level of 
sophistication’. Moreover, the reading using this factor as the lens concludes that 
CERT best practices provide useful guidelines for managing the perfect crime factor.  
 
CERT best practices suggest that insider threat awareness should be incorporated 
into periodic security training for all employees. As discussed in section 7.2.1.3, it is 
essential that employees understand that malicious insiders do not fit a specific 
profile. Their technical skills are varied and could range from minimal to highly 
sophisticated, and they are from different age groups. Employees should be informed 
that system activity is monitored, particularly system administration and privileged 
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section 7.2.1.10, technically skilled employees create a major risk to any 
organisations. They can use sophisticated methods to carry out their malicious attack. 
A number of techniques can be implemented by organisations to reduce the risk of 
knowledgeable and technically skilled employees. These techniques include: 
separation of duties, two-man rule for critical system administrator functions, non-
repudiation of technical actions, encryption and disabling accounts upon termination. 
Moreover, CERT recommend using a log correlation engine or security information 
and event management (SIEM) system to log, monitor, and audit employee actions.  
Logging, monitoring, and auditing can help an organisation to early investigate any 
suspicious actions by their employees. Organisations should consider collecting and 
correlating some events such as firewall logs, unsuccessful login attempts, intrusion 
detection systems /intrusion prevention system logs, Web proxies, antivirus alerts 
and change management and use the SIEM system to assist in examining these 
events (details in section 7.2.1.12). 
 
Interviewees’ responses regarding this factor support the practices suggested by 
CERT. Two participants supported the proposed solutions by CERT in practice 3. 
They believed that educating and increasing the awareness of organisation’s 
employees is essential to mitigate the perfect crime factor. Employees should be 
informed that controls are in place and penalties exist for any abusive behaviour:  
 
“In many cases, simply educating your staff that controls are 
in place, and consequences exist, will deter some of the more 
“opportunistic” behaviour.” (Participant J) 
 
“Increase awareness campaigns to help educate users which 
will positively influence the unintentional inside threat and 
curtail the intentional inside threat.” (Participant G) 
 
Another participant supports the techniques recommended by CERT in practice 10 in 
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“Ensure employees are restricted to what they can do in the 
systems. You may even want to physically separate the 
Accounts Payable from the Accounts Receivable teams, to 
reduce the likelihood of collusion. And create a “two-man” 
rule for major research projects or product launches.  Don’t 
simply rely on just one individual – ensure there are others 
involved in key projects, particularly sensitive projects with a 
direct impact to the organisation s’ wellbeing.” (Participant 
J) 
 
Organisations need to carefully monitor the employees’ actions and behaviour in a 
random manner as suggested by CERT in practice 12.   
 
“The perfect crime could be managed through audit and 
review without allowing staff to know when and what and 
randomised checks of controls.” (Participant B) 
 
“The perfect crime could be managed by publicised 
monitoring of employees, followed by actions should 
employees take inappropriate actions, should reduce the 
desire to take those actions. Advertise that there is a strong 
monitoring process. Do not hesitate to take actions against 
misbehaving employees.” (Participant G) 
 
“Inform your staff that monitoring and compliance programs 
are in place. Layer auditing and control mechanisms into 
every automated system (i.e. file sharing systems, financial 
applications).  If auditing and logging capabilities are 
present, enable them and regularly review them for 
suspicious behaviour will minimise the perfect crime.” 
(Participant J) 
 
Moreover, interviewees’ responses regarding this factor have also added valuable 
information. The participants emphasised the importance of not sharing all deterrent 
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“Security professionals should be careful on utilizing their 
detection strategies. Detection strategies should only be 
known and activated by few and should be properly disguised 
not to draw attention.” (Participant I) 
 
“Only the top order employees must have the big picture of 
the infrastructure. All the rest must have bits and pieces 
only.” (Participant E) 
 
“Not all people need to know all systems.  This minimizes the 
number of people.  Major actions that require 2 or more 
people reduce an individual’s ability to act alone.” 
(Participant H) 
 
In summary, CERT and interviewees’ responses provided useful practices for 
managing the main components of the perfect crime factor (insiders’ knowledge and 
technical skills). The suggestions include: security awareness and training, 
monitoring the employees’ actions, auditing employee actions, responding to 
suspicious activities, enforcing separation of duties and least privilege, paying extra 
attention to system administrators and technical or privileged users and not to share 
all deterrents and systems with all employees. 
7.2.2.8   Factor 8: Socially isolated employees 
To pinpoint the appropriate CERT best practices that address the highlighted factor 
the following key terms were used: ‘isolated employees’, ‘social frustration’ 
‘working from home’, ‘isolated areas’, ‘communication’ and ‘personal 
predispositions’. Moreover, the reading using this factor as a lens concludes that 
while CERT best practices delivered strategies to address suspicious and disruptive 
behaviour, they failed to address socially isolated employees. Although CERT best 
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as a sign of isolation. On the other hand, useful recommendations have been utilised 
from the interviews regarding this factor.  
 
The participants suggested several solutions to minimise the highlighted factor. Such 
solutions include connecting socially isolated employees with peers, arranging 
weekly social gatherings and monitoring the behaviour of those employees, as 
indicated by the following comments:  
 
“Connecting these socially isolated employees with peers is a 
necessity in my opinion. You may work from home, however, 
video conferences and voice conferences on a daily basis 
would help reconnect the isolated worker. Regularly making 
the isolated worked aware of the expected conduct is also a 
facilitator to better employee conduct” (Participant D) 
 
“Weekly social gathering (e.g. Breakfast) to add some social 
spice to the team. And Improve Managers: Train managers 
(bi-yearly for example) for Team-building, Socialism & 
Leadership skills (Leading is the best way to Manage)” 
(Participant E) 
 
“Engaging the workforce on multiple levels is one method of 
reducing the potential for this type of threat to be realized.  
Not every employee will engage in every activity, but if 
employees are valued and they perceive their value to the 
organisation, the risk of an insider threat being realized will 
diminish” (Participant J) 
 
Management should be aware of personal factors such as social frustration and the 
personal predispositions of their employees and recognise the influence they can 
have on the organisation. According to some participants, this can be addressed 
through communication between managers and employees and taking action to 
prevent employee dissatisfaction when possible. The following quotation expresses 
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“This comes down to a proper management layer – have we 
thoroughly screened and managed the individual?  Are we 
monitoring their work?  Are we meeting with them to see if 
we can detect any problems, including issues outside of 
work? Technology isn’t the answer for everything – the 
properly designed and trained Management layer is a critical 
layer in any comprehensive Information Security program.” 
(Participant F) 
 
CERT’s best practices have missed a significant security solution for socially 
isolated employees in order to reduce and prevent insider threat. In order to fill this 
gap in CERT best practices, the following practices are recommended: 
 Handling socially isolated employees: One of the management solutions to 
minimise socially isolated employees is to focus on connecting those employees 
with others in the organisation. This connection could be achieved through 
periodic meetings or via video or voice conferences for employees who work 
from home. Additionally, socially isolated employees should be recognised and 
handled by the manager. This can be achieved through monitoring, 
communicating and taking action to address employee behaviour.  
7.3 Additional Best Practices  
In combining the CERT best practices with the best practices presented in the 
previous section (7.2.1), all the factors that are included in the holistic insider threat 
behaviour model were covered. The following behavioural and technical best 
practices and recommendations are provided in response to the eight factors 
described in section 5.6.  This section has addressed the gaps found in CERT best 
practices and thus illustrates how combining the CERT best practices with those 
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insider threat behaviour than CERT alone. This is an original contribution, and 
provides an answer to the second research question of this study:  
RQ2:  How can organisations manage the security-abusive behaviour 
of insiders? 
 
Additional best practices are: 
 Managing conflict causes 
 As discussed in section 7.2.2.1, organisations should ascertain the reasons for the 
conflict. Recommended solutions include: fairness, equality, communication and 
taking advantage of multicultural employees as well as improving management skills 
with appropriate training so that conflicts can be addressed successfully.  
 Addressing underachieving employees 
Organisations should manage their low performance employees to mitigate the 
insider threat as mentioned in section 7.2.2.3. All organisations should regularly 
evaluate their employees’ performance and immediately respond to employees 
performing under the required level. If any employee becomes an underachiever, the 
organisation needs to investigate the causes of the low performance and help the 
employee to improve.  Organisations can increase the performance of their 
employees by using a goal setting guide or involving them in different activities such 
as conferences.  
 Securing mobile devices 
Organisations need to secure all mobile devices and should consider it as a crucial 
element in insider threat behaviour since such devices have great storage capabilities 
and enable remote access to the organisation’s data. Two techniques can help any 
organisation to minimise the risk that sensitive stored information on mobile devices 
may be lost or stolen. These include automated wireless security management 
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smaller organisations. These two techniques can minimise the critical data violations 
perpetrated through mobile devices (details in section 7.2.2.5). 
 Encourage employees’ loyalty toward the organisation 
As discussed in section 7.2.2.6, all organisations should treat their employees fairly 
and equitably and with respect in order to increase employee loyalty. 
 Handling socially isolated employees 
Organisations need to manage their socially isolated employees in order to minimise 
the insider threat as mentioned in section 7.2.2.8. Socially isolated employees should 
be recognised and handled by the managers. This can be done by monitoring, 
communicating and taking action to address socially isolated employees. 
Organisations should connect those employees with the others in the organisation. 
Such connection could be through periodic meetings or via video or voice 
conferences for employees who are working from home. 
 
Additional best practices have been presented based on the best advice of 
experienced industry professionals. However, these additional practices should be 
evaluated in order to truly recommend them. Such a validation might be done by 
implementing these additional practices as well as CERT best practices in a large 
multinational organisation and monitoring the usefulness of these additional practices 
as a means of minimising the insider threat. This evaluation is not within the scope of 
the current study. However, further research should be done as indicated in section 
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7.4    Summary 
This chapter described the management and controls for the factors produced in the 
final HIT model presented in section 6.5. The best practices were developed through 
a two-step process: understanding CERT best practices and underling the gaps in it 
and secondly, using interviewees’ suggestions as well as several academic sources to 
address the gaps found in CERT best practices. Finally, the last section of this 
chapter presented a list of guidelines that can be used together with CERT best 
practices to minimise insider threats and to manage the factors in the final HIT 
model. It will be useful in the future to implement CERT best practices as well as the 
additional practices provided in this chapter by a large organisation in order to 
evaluate it. 
    
The next chapter (Chapter Eight) will summarise the research. It will also reveal the 
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 CHAPTER EIGHT:   8
CONCLUSION, LIMITATIONS 
AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
8.1 Introduction   
This chapter presents a summary of this study and provides answers for the research 
questions posed in Chapter Three. In addition, the theoretical and practical 
contributions are presented. At the end, the limitations of the study and the future 
research opportunities are detailed.  
8.2 Summary of Research    
This researcher studied the factors that influence the insider threat behaviour as 
identified from three different sources including: academic research, IT industry 
publications and published reported incidents.  In order to develop an integrative 
model to present the holistic view of the insider threat, all factors that emerged from 
the three sources were combined. The approach of combining factors from academic 
research with IT industry publications and published reported incidents factors gave 
a comprehensive view of insider threat. 
 
A multi-phased mixed method approach comprising both qualitative and quantitative 
methods was applied to enrich the findings of this study. In the first phase, the 
literature (which includes academic research, IT industry publications and published 
reported incidents) was extensively reviewed and analysed and the crucial needed for 
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previous models had done so. Once the problem had been diagnosed, the candidate 
HIT model was developed to combine all factors identified through the literature 
review.  
 
Then, using the survey method, the candidate insider threat model was evaluated by 
100 security specialists with the following job titles: IT Security Manager, Principal 
Cyber Security Manager, Security Systems Administrator and Senior IT Security . 
The data collected through Web-based survey and analysed by SPSS. The literature 
reviewed for this study highlighted the lack of agreement between the three sources 
on the factors contributing to insider threat. Some sources have strongly supported 
some factors while other sources have highlighted others. Therefore, the focus of the 
quantitative phase was to validate the factors identified in the literature. The 
researcher tested the candidate HIT model through the preliminary analysis of the 
survey. The preliminary analysis revealed that there is a further debate regarding the 
factors. Although there is a strong support for some factors, support for other factors 
was mixed. Therefore, the factor analysis technique was utilized to identify groups of 
inter-related factors in order to produce a new set of robust factors. The factor 
analysis offered a new, different list of factors, which is a more consistent 
interpretation of the data than the original grouping. As a result of this phase, the 
enhanced HIT model was developed. 
 
The enhanced HIT model resulted from the factor analysis and was evaluated by 
qualitative method. The researcher interviewed eleven Chief Information Security 
Officers with at least ten years’ experience each. The data for this phase was 
collected using semi-structured interviews. The recorded data was transcribed and 
then analysed using the content analysis technique recommended by Miles and 
Huberman (1994). The data analysis confirmed that the enhanced HIT model 
contained all the important insider threat contributing factors. The outcome of this 
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influence the behaviour of an employee who could pose an insider threat. This HIT 
model provided the foundation for the last phase of the study. 
 
The second phase in this study described the management and controls for the factors 
produced in the final HIT model. The best practices were developed to manage the 
HIT model’s factors through two steps: first, by understanding CERT best practices 
and underling the gaps in it; and second, by using interviewees’ suggestions as well 
as some academic sources to supplement the gaps found in CERT best practices. At 
the end of this phase, additional best practices were presented which can be used 
together with CERT best practices to manage the factors in the final HIT model and 
minimise the insider threats.  
8.3 Answering the Research Questions 
This section draws on the results presented in Chapters Six and Seven to answer the 
research questions presented in Chapter Three. The relationship between objectives, 
research phases, two research questions and sources of the collected data are 
presented in Table 8.1. 
 
The first research question is intended to find the factors that contribute to the insider 
threat.    
RQ1: What are the factors that influence the insider to behave 
inappropriately regard to security? 
 
The survey and interview revealed that there are eight factors contributing to insider 
threat behaviour include: conflict between organisation and employee, insufficient 
security policy, giving high trust to underachieving employees, liberal access, loyalty 
of employees, the perfect crime and socially isolated employees (details in section 
5.6). These factors are rigorous and robust since they were determined by a series of 
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study in the literature to date has offered a comprehensive set of factors contributing 
to insider threat.       
 
The answer to the first question provides a baseline answer to the second research 
question.  
RQ2: How can organisations manage the security abusive behaviour of 
insiders? 
To answer this question, it is useful to consider the answer to RQ1. Once the factors have 
been identified, it is easy to control and manage the abusive behaviour of insiders 
through the best practices presented in chapter seven. Chapter Seven (section 7.3) 
offered five additional best practices to CERT in order to manage and control all the 
factors in the HIT model. It is recommended that organisations implement the 
additional best practices with CERT best practices in order to provide greater 
protection from the insider threat. CERT best practices with the additional practices 
will incorporate all the essential requirements which are needed by security 
specialists to mitigate the insider threat. 
 
Table 8.: Relationship between objectives, phases and research questions 
Objective  Research 
questions 
Phase of the 
study 




model that can 
frame a holistic 
view of insider 
threat 
behaviour. 
RQ1: What are the 
factors that influence 
the insider to behave 
inappropriately in 





threat model.  
- Academic sources, industry 
publications and published reported 
incidents.  
- Web-based survey with 100 security 
experts with the following job titles: 
IT Security Manager, Principal Cyber 
Security Manager, Security Systems 
Administrator and Senior IT Security. 
- Semi-structured interviews with 11 
















- CERT best practices.  
- Academic sources. 
- Semi-structured interviews with 11 
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8.4 Research Significance 
This research makes two important contributions: theoretical and practical 
contributions. In terms of its theoretical significance, this research proposes a new 
conceptual insider threat model for a holistic view of insider threat behaviour. 
Moreover, the model is unique in the sense that it has been developed based on data 
collected from three different literature sources: academic research, IT industry 
publications and published reported incidents. The significance of this model lies in 
its understanding of the insider threat factors from a wider perspective instead of 
single view to ensure that all insider threat factors from different viewpoints were 
addressed. Thus, the study contributes to the body of knowledge as no previous study 
from any of the three sources of the literature has proposed a holistic model of the 
insider threat contributing factors. Another major theoretical contribution is that this 
holistic model is the first to be thoroughly evaluated by two different methods 
(quantitative and qualitative) in order to develop a rigorous holistic insider threat 
model. In addition, the practical contributions of this study are useful for different 
organisations and for personnel such as the Chief Information Security Officer 
(CISO) who are aware of organisational security issues. The proposed best practices 
will manage and minimise the risk of insider threats and increase the awareness of 
users. 
8.5 Research Limitations and Future Direction 
Like all studies, this research also has its limitations. However, each limitation and 
weakness provides an opportunity for future research.   
 
One of the limitations of this study is that the cultural context is restricted to the 
American culture; this possibly will limit the generalization of the results (Teo, Wei, 
and Benbasat 2003). However, this absence of generality might not be too much of a 
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and Fleiner 2009). Cross-country studies may provide a future direction to the 
cultural context. A similar study using the same model can be applied to other 
countries to determine how well the HIT model can be applied in other contexts. 
 
As discussed in section 4.2, one of the limitations of this study is that the HIT model 
has been evaluated by experienced industry professionals, which is a good means of 
assessing the model. However, there is a need for further evaluation using real life 
cases and interviewing the insiders themselves. However, it will require considerable 
effort to find those insiders. A proposal for future study requires a thorough analysis 
of a substantial sample of insider threat cases, and data collection could be 
undertaken by means of in-depth interviews with proven insiders to further verify the 
existence of these factors and to understand how they work.  
 
Furthermore, the best practices suggested in Chapter Seven have not been evaluated 
as discussed in section 7.3. However, it will be very useful to validate such practices 
in order to implement them. In future research, the additional best practices 
recommended in this study should be tested and evaluated. This evaluation would 
involve action research case study, implementing the additional best practices and 
monitoring them to verify their effectiveness in reducing insider threat. 
 
Finally, the comparison with evidence from empirical reported incidents has shown 
that theoretical academic research has overlooked gender as an important factor, as 
discussed in section 2.6. Evidence clearly suggests that male gender is a factor in 
most CERT cases; therefore, further academic investigation in male-gender related 
issues is needed.  However, it must be stressed that such research would need to be 
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8.6 Summary 
This thesis makes a novel contribution to the body of knowledge. It introduces a 
new, rigorous holistic insider threat model which provides insights into insider 
threats from a wider perspective. The HIT model enhances our understanding of the 
insider threat issue and provides an overview of the main factors contributing to 
insider threat. The transferability of this research was established by rich description 
and reporting of the research phases and process. The researcher has taken several 
steps to ensure the research validity and reliability of this study. Following the 
qualitative method approach, the researcher used several tips to avoid common 
method bias (details in section 5.2.5). Moreover, Cronbach’s alpha coefficient was 
calculated to determine whether the items in a scale were assessing the same 
construct. Moreover, the researcher used semi-structured interviews with open-ended 
questions. All interviews were carefully transcribed so that respondents’ words 
accurately expressed their thoughts, with continuous checking of the data to compare 
meanings. Furthermore, theory saturation was achieved as the data became redundant 
(details in section 6.2.4). 
 
Most importantly, this thesis has provided recommendations on ways to manage and 
control these contributing factors in the HIT model by introducing an additional set 
of best practices which can be used in addition to CERT best practices to provide a 
better defence against insider threat. It is expected that the implementation of these 
additional best practices will support the management and control of internal risk, 
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Pearson Correlation .246 .427
**
 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .014 .000 
 
N 100 100 100 
the implementation of 







Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .116 .015 
N 100 100 100 
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procedures or policies. Sig. (2-tailed) .006 .000 .000 














policy training and 
awareness. 
 psychological factors such as 
social frustrations or computer 
dependency. 





Sig. (2-tailed) .043 .014 .596 
N 100 100 100 
 personal factors such as alcohol 







Sig. (2-tailed) .043 .003 .079 
N 100 100 100 
 inappropriate or concerning 
behavior  prior to the incident 
such as delays, absences and 






Sig. (2-tailed) .712 .152 .070 
N 100 100 100 
outsourced employees being 
given the same logical and/or 
physical access as the 








Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .006 .003 
N 100 100 100 
 the organization engaging a 
relatively high number of 
outsourcing agreements. 
Pearson Correlation .158 .401 .370 
Sig. (2-tailed) .116 .000 .000 
N 100 100 100 
granting access to third- parties 
contracted to conduct work within 
the organization. 
Pearson Correlation .243 .384
**
 .321 
Sig. (2-tailed) .015 .000 .001 
N 100 100 100 
the implementation of 










N 100 100 100 
 outdated  information security 






Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
 
.000 
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Correlations 










employees and the 
organization. 
 psychological factors such as 
social frustrations or computer 
dependency. 





Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .092 .004 
N 100 100 100 
 personal factors such as alcohol 







Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .150 .001 
N 100 100 100 
 inappropriate or concerning 
behavior  prior to the incident 
such as delays, absences and 






Sig. (2-tailed) .010 .000 .002 
N 100 100 100 
outsourced employees being 
given the same logical and/or 
physical access as the 








Sig. (2-tailed) .030 .180 .096 
N 100 100 100 
 the organization engaging a 
relatively high number of 
outsourcing agreements. 
Pearson Correlation .167 .433 .390 
Sig. (2-tailed) .096 .000 .000 
N 100 100 100 
granting access to third- parties 
contracted to conduct work within 
the organization. 
Pearson Correlation .053 .296
**
 .411 
Sig. (2-tailed) .601 .003 .000 
N 100 100 100 
the implementation of 







Sig. (2-tailed) .070 .649 .158 
N 100 100 100 
 outdated  information security 






Sig. (2-tailed) .008 .031 .000 









~ 314 ~ 
Correlations 
  insiders being  
motivated to harm 
their organization. 






by financial gain. 
 psychological factors such as 
social frustrations or computer 
dependency. 





Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .006 .023 
N 100 100 100 
 personal factors such as alcohol 







Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 
N 100 100 100 
 inappropriate or concerning 
behavior  prior to the incident 
such as delays, absences and 






Sig. (2-tailed) .092 .005 .008 
N 100 100 100 
outsourced employees being 
given the same logical and/or 
physical access as the 








Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .000 .001 
N 100 100 100 
 the organization engaging a 
relatively high number of 
outsourcing agreements. 
Pearson Correlation .146 .474 .361 
Sig. (2-tailed) .146 .000 .000 
N 100 100 100 
granting access to third- parties 
contracted to conduct work within 
the organization. 
Pearson Correlation .123 .360
**
 .392 
Sig. (2-tailed) .222 .000 .000 
N 100 100 100 
the implementation of 







Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .008 .000 
N 100 100 100 
 outdated  information security 






Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 
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Correlations 















 psychological factors such as 
social frustrations or computer 
dependency. 





Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .066 .756 
N 100 100 100 
 personal factors such as alcohol 







Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .220 .105 
N 100 100 100 
 inappropriate or concerning 
behavior  prior to the incident 
such as delays, absences and 






Sig. (2-tailed) .053 .063 .306 
N 100 100 100 
outsourced employees being 
given the same logical and/or 
physical access as the 








Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .031 .537 
N 100 100 100 
 the organization engaging a 
relatively high number of 
outsourcing agreements. 
Pearson Correlation .147 .280 .379 
Sig. (2-tailed) .145 .005 .000 
N 100 100 100 
granting access to third- parties 
contracted to conduct work within 
the organization. 
Pearson Correlation .320 .499
**
 .382 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .000 .000 
N 100 100 100 
the implementation of 







Sig. (2-tailed) .032 .882 .177 
N 100 100 100 
 outdated  information security 






Sig. (2-tailed) .052 .230 .054 
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Correlations 
  insiders' 
knowledge of the 
methods used to 
detect insider 
threat behavior. 
 insiders'  
knowledge of 
methods to grant 




of the potential 




 psychological factors such as 
social frustrations or computer 
dependency. 





Sig. (2-tailed) .019 .001 .023 
N 100 100 100 
 personal factors such as alcohol 







Sig. (2-tailed) .353 .001 .005 
N 100 100 100 
 inappropriate or concerning 
behavior  prior to the incident 
such as delays, absences and 






Sig. (2-tailed) .040 .017 .169 
N 100 100 100 
outsourced employees being 
given the same logical and/or 
physical access as the 








Sig. (2-tailed) .210 .014 .003 
N 100 100 100 
 the organization engaging a 
relatively high number of 
outsourcing agreements. 
Pearson Correlation .286 .337 .429 
Sig. (2-tailed) .004 .001 .000 
N 100 100 100 
granting access to third- parties 
contracted to conduct work within 
the organization. 
Pearson Correlation .369 .461
**
 .401 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 
N 100 100 100 
the implementation of 







Sig. (2-tailed) .027 .000 .002 
N 100 100 100 
 outdated  information security 






Sig. (2-tailed) .008 .000 .004 
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Correlations 





 employees' level of 
technical 
sophistication. 
 employees having 
formal training in 
computer science, 
IT or similar. 
 psychological factors such as 
social frustrations or computer 
dependency. 





Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .001 .007 
N 100 100 100 
 personal factors such as alcohol 







Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .379 .165 
N 100 100 100 
 inappropriate or concerning 
behavior  prior to the incident 
such as delays, absences and 






Sig. (2-tailed) .336 .081 .002 
N 100 100 100 
outsourced employees being 
given the same logical and/or 
physical access as the 








Sig. (2-tailed) .002 .047 .000 
N 100 100 100 
 the organization engaging a 
relatively high number of 
outsourcing agreements. 
Pearson Correlation .311 .262 .109 
Sig. (2-tailed) .002 .009 .281 
N 100 100 100 
granting access to third- parties 
contracted to conduct work within 
the organization. 
Pearson Correlation .389 .320
**
 .268 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .001 .007 
N 100 100 100 
the implementation of 







Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .025 .011 
N 100 100 100 
 outdated  information security 






Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .216 
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Correlations 
  high levels of 
access to IT 
systems given to 
employees. 
 not promptly 
canceling access of 
ex-employees. 
 high levels of trust 
given to 
employees. 
 psychological factors such as 
social frustrations or computer 
dependency. 





Sig. (2-tailed) .046 .015 .001 
N 100 100 100 
 personal factors such as alcohol 







Sig. (2-tailed) .020 .009 .039 
N 100 100 100 
 inappropriate or concerning 
behavior  prior to the incident 
such as delays, absences and 






Sig. (2-tailed) .029 .027 .036 
N 100 100 100 
outsourced employees being 
given the same logical and/or 
physical access as the 








Sig. (2-tailed) .094 .077 .000 
N 100 100 100 
 the organization engaging a 
relatively high number of 
outsourcing agreements. 
Pearson Correlation .380 .131 .283 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .193 .004 
N 100 100 100 
granting access to third- parties 
contracted to conduct work within 
the organization. 
Pearson Correlation .370 .294
**
 .255 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .003 .010 
N 100 100 100 
the implementation of 







Sig. (2-tailed) .017 .003 .003 
N 100 100 100 
 outdated  information security 






Sig. (2-tailed) .003 .000 .007 













limited by shares. 





 a poor level of 
health and fitness 
among employees. 
 psychological factors such as 
social frustrations or computer 
dependency. 





Sig. (2-tailed) .241 .592 .579 
N 100 100 100 
 personal factors such as alcohol 







Sig. (2-tailed) .876 .942 .854 
N 100 100 100 
 inappropriate or concerning 
behavior  prior to the incident 
such as delays, absences and 






Sig. (2-tailed) .354 .706 .111 
N 100 100 100 
outsourced employees being 
given the same logical and/or 
physical access as the 








Sig. (2-tailed) .235 .214 .527 
N 100 100 100 
 the organization engaging a 
relatively high number of 
outsourcing agreements. 
Pearson Correlation -.177 -.172 .099 
Sig. (2-tailed) .079 .087 .327 
N 100 100 100 
granting access to third- parties 
contracted to conduct work within 
the organization. 
Pearson Correlation -.033 .028
**
 .018 
Sig. (2-tailed) .745 .784 .857 
N 100 100 100 
the implementation of 







Sig. (2-tailed) .006 .251 .449 
N 100 100 100 
 outdated  information security 






Sig. (2-tailed) .052 .427 .290 
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Correlations 
  psychological 




 personal factors 
such as alcohol 
and drug addiction 
or violent behavior. 
 inappropriate or 
concerning 
behavior  prior to 
the incident such 
as delays, 
absences and poor 
job performance. 
insufficient information security 
policy training and awareness. 





Sig. (2-tailed) .596 .079 .070 
N 100 100 100 
 organizational culture that 






Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .010 
N 100 100 100 
 employees from backgrounds 






Sig. (2-tailed) .092 .150 .000 
N 100 100 100 
cultural clash between employees 








Sig. (2-tailed) .004 .001 .002 
N 100 100 100 
 insiders being  motivated to harm 
their organization. 
Pearson Correlation .349 .393 .169 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .092 
N 100 100 100 
insiders being  vulnerable to 
coercion by outsider. 
Pearson Correlation .274 .345
**
 .279 
Sig. (2-tailed) .006 .000 .005 
N 100 100 100 
insiders being unduly motivated 






Sig. (2-tailed) .023 .000 .008 
N 100 100 100 






Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .053 
N 100 100 100 
giving employees remote access 
to organizational information. 
Pearson Correlation .184 .124 .187 
Sig. (2-tailed) .066 .220 .063 













given the same 
logical and/or 
physical access as 
the organization’s 
regular employees. 












insufficient information security 
policy training and awareness. 





Sig. (2-tailed) .003 .000 .001 
N 100 100 100 
 organizational culture that 






Sig. (2-tailed) .030 .096 .601 
N 100 100 100 
 employees from backgrounds 






Sig. (2-tailed) .180 .000 .003 
N 100 100 100 
cultural clash between employees 








Sig. (2-tailed) .096 .000 .000 
N 100 100 100 
 insiders being  motivated to harm 
their organization. 
Pearson Correlation .333 .146 .123 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .146 .222 
N 100 100 100 
insiders being  vulnerable to 
coercion by outsider. 
Pearson Correlation .355 .474
**
 .360 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 
N 100 100 100 
insiders being unduly motivated 






Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .000 .000 
N 100 100 100 






Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .145 .001 
N 100 100 100 
giving employees remote access 
to organizational information. 
Pearson Correlation .216 .280 .499 
Sig. (2-tailed) .031 .005 .000 
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Correlations 










policy training and 
awareness. 
insufficient information security 
policy training and awareness. 





Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .000 
 
N 100 100 100 
 organizational culture that 






Sig. (2-tailed) .070 .008 .129 
N 100 100 100 
 employees from backgrounds 






Sig. (2-tailed) .649 .031 .002 
N 100 100 100 
cultural clash between employees 








Sig. (2-tailed) .158 .000 .000 
N 100 100 100 
 insiders being  motivated to harm 
their organization. 
Pearson Correlation .381 .469 .222 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .027 
N 100 100 100 
insiders being  vulnerable to 
coercion by outsider. 
Pearson Correlation .265 .487
**
 .302 
Sig. (2-tailed) .008 .000 .002 
N 100 100 100 
insiders being unduly motivated 






Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .001 
N 100 100 100 






Sig. (2-tailed) .032 .052 .512 
N 100 100 100 
giving employees remote access 
to organizational information. 
Pearson Correlation .015 .121 .316 
Sig. (2-tailed) .882 .230 .001 
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Correlations 










employees and the 
organization. 
insufficient information security 
policy training and awareness. 





Sig. (2-tailed) .129 .002 .000 
N 100 100 100 
 organizational culture that 









N 100 100 100 
 employees from backgrounds 






Sig. (2-tailed) .093 
 
.000 
N 100 100 100 
cultural clash between employees 








Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 
 
N 100 100 100 
 insiders being  motivated to harm 
their organization. 
Pearson Correlation .489 .136 .290 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .177 .003 
N 100 100 100 
insiders being  vulnerable to 
coercion by outsider. 
Pearson Correlation .358 .451
**
 .434 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 
N 100 100 100 
insiders being unduly motivated 






Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .136 .000 
N 100 100 100 






Sig. (2-tailed) .066 .097 .040 
N 100 100 100 
giving employees remote access 
to organizational information. 
Pearson Correlation -.002 .196 .222 
Sig. (2-tailed) .985 .050 .026 









~ 324 ~ 
Correlations 
  insiders being  
motivated to harm 
their organization. 






by financial gain. 
insufficient information security 
policy training and awareness. 





Sig. (2-tailed) .027 .002 .001 
N 100 100 100 
 organizational culture that 






Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 
N 100 100 100 
 employees from backgrounds 






Sig. (2-tailed) .177 .000 .136 
N 100 100 100 
cultural clash between employees 








Sig. (2-tailed) .003 .000 .000 
N 100 100 100 
 insiders being  motivated to harm 
their organization. 




N 100 100 100 
insiders being  vulnerable to 
coercion by outsider. 
Pearson Correlation .511 1
**
 .409 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
 
.000 
N 100 100 100 
insiders being unduly motivated 






Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .000 
 
N 100 100 100 






Sig. (2-tailed) .024 .002 .191 
N 100 100 100 
giving employees remote access 
to organizational information. 
Pearson Correlation -.013 .204 .225 
Sig. (2-tailed) .900 .042 .024 
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Correlations 















insufficient information security 
policy training and awareness. 





Sig. (2-tailed) .512 .001 .005 
N 100 100 100 
 organizational culture that 






Sig. (2-tailed) .066 .985 .069 
N 100 100 100 
 employees from backgrounds 






Sig. (2-tailed) .097 .050 .122 
N 100 100 100 
cultural clash between employees 








Sig. (2-tailed) .040 .026 .010 
N 100 100 100 
 insiders being  motivated to harm 
their organization. 
Pearson Correlation .226 -.013 .033 
Sig. (2-tailed) .024 .900 .747 
N 100 100 100 
insiders being  vulnerable to 
coercion by outsider. 
Pearson Correlation .306 .204
**
 .193 
Sig. (2-tailed) .002 .042 .054 
N 100 100 100 
insiders being unduly motivated 






Sig. (2-tailed) .191 .024 .087 
N 100 100 100 









N 100 100 100 
giving employees remote access 
to organizational information. 
Pearson Correlation .432 1 .372 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 
 
.000 
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Correlations 
  insiders' 
knowledge of the 
methods used to 
detect insider 
threat behavior. 
 insiders'  
knowledge of 
methods to grant 




of the potential 




insufficient information security 
policy training and awareness. 





Sig. (2-tailed) .004 .000 .003 
N 100 100 100 
 organizational culture that 






Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .006 .000 
N 100 100 100 
 employees from backgrounds 






Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .221 .035 
N 100 100 100 
cultural clash between employees 








Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 
N 100 100 100 
 insiders being  motivated to harm 
their organization. 
Pearson Correlation .322 .296 .151 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .003 .133 
N 100 100 100 
insiders being  vulnerable to 
coercion by outsider. 
Pearson Correlation .324 .374
**
 .441 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .000 .000 
N 100 100 100 
insiders being unduly motivated 






Sig. (2-tailed) .024 .000 .000 
N 100 100 100 






Sig. (2-tailed) .222 .000 .333 
N 100 100 100 
giving employees remote access 
to organizational information. 
Pearson Correlation .164 .349 .232 
Sig. (2-tailed) .103 .000 .020 
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Correlations 





 employees' level of 
technical 
sophistication. 
 employees having 
formal training in 
computer science, 
IT or similar. 
insufficient information security 
policy training and awareness. 





Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .000 .016 
N 100 100 100 
 organizational culture that 






Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .039 .305 
N 100 100 100 
 employees from backgrounds 






Sig. (2-tailed) .317 .007 .078 
N 100 100 100 
cultural clash between employees 








Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .095 
N 100 100 100 
 insiders being  motivated to harm 
their organization. 
Pearson Correlation .471 .355 .080 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .426 
N 100 100 100 
insiders being  vulnerable to 
coercion by outsider. 
Pearson Correlation .393 .276
**
 .110 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .005 .276 
N 100 100 100 
insiders being unduly motivated 






Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .004 .193 
N 100 100 100 






Sig. (2-tailed) .016 .024 .003 
N 100 100 100 
giving employees remote access 
to organizational information. 
Pearson Correlation .169 .420 .372 
Sig. (2-tailed) .094 .000 .000 
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Correlations 
  high levels of 
access to IT 
systems given to 
employees. 
 not promptly 
canceling access of 
ex-employees. 
 high levels of trust 
given to 
employees. 
insufficient information security 
policy training and awareness. 





Sig. (2-tailed) .073 .015 .059 
N 100 100 100 
 organizational culture that 






Sig. (2-tailed) .018 .000 .015 
N 100 100 100 
 employees from backgrounds 






Sig. (2-tailed) .185 .878 .140 
N 100 100 100 
cultural clash between employees 








Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .004 .337 
N 100 100 100 
 insiders being  motivated to harm 
their organization. 
Pearson Correlation .148 .257 .164 
Sig. (2-tailed) .141 .010 .102 
N 100 100 100 
insiders being  vulnerable to 
coercion by outsider. 
Pearson Correlation .211 .371
**
 .279 
Sig. (2-tailed) .036 .000 .005 
N 100 100 100 
insiders being unduly motivated 






Sig. (2-tailed) .013 .000 .001 
N 100 100 100 






Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .081 .000 
N 100 100 100 
giving employees remote access 
to organizational information. 
Pearson Correlation .280 .164 .327 
Sig. (2-tailed) .005 .104 .001 













limited by shares. 





 a poor level of 
health and fitness 
among employees. 
insufficient information security 
policy training and awareness. 





Sig. (2-tailed) .158 .759 .967 
N 100 100 100 
 organizational culture that 






Sig. (2-tailed) .687 .128 .212 
N 100 100 100 
 employees from backgrounds 






Sig. (2-tailed) .213 .760 .510 
N 100 100 100 
cultural clash between employees 








Sig. (2-tailed) .592 .958 .296 
N 100 100 100 
 insiders being  motivated to harm 
their organization. 
Pearson Correlation -.139 -.198 -.131 
Sig. (2-tailed) .167 .049 .193 
N 100 100 100 
insiders being  vulnerable to 
coercion by outsider. 
Pearson Correlation -.072 -.130
**
 -.015 
Sig. (2-tailed) .476 .197 .884 
N 100 100 100 
insiders being unduly motivated 






Sig. (2-tailed) .075 .000 .296 
N 100 100 100 






Sig. (2-tailed) .508 .303 .013 
N 100 100 100 
giving employees remote access 
to organizational information. 
Pearson Correlation .003 .085 .125 
Sig. (2-tailed) .977 .399 .215 
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Correlations 
  psychological 




 personal factors 
such as alcohol 
and drug addiction 
or violent behavior. 
 inappropriate or 
concerning 
behavior  prior to 
the incident such 
as delays, 
absences and poor 
job performance. 
 allowing authorized mobile device 
to access organizational 
information from outside the 
organization physical boundary. 





Sig. (2-tailed) .756 .105 .306 
N 100 100 100 
 insiders' knowledge of the 







Sig. (2-tailed) .019 .353 .040 
N 100 100 100 
 insiders'  knowledge of methods 







Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .001 .017 
N 100 100 100 
insiders' knowledge of the 
potential value of the 









Sig. (2-tailed) .023 .005 .169 
N 100 100 100 
technically skilled insiders who 
violates the security for personal 
gain. 
Pearson Correlation .338 .421 .097 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .000 .336 
N 100 100 100 
 employees' level of technical 
sophistication. 
Pearson Correlation .325 .089
**
 .175 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .379 .081 
N 100 100 100 
 employees having formal training 






Sig. (2-tailed) .007 .165 .002 
N 100 100 100 
 high levels of access to IT 






Sig. (2-tailed) .046 .020 .029 
N 100 100 100 
 not promptly canceling access of 
ex-employees. 
Pearson Correlation .242 .260 .221 












given the same 
logical and/or 
physical access as 
the organization’s 
regular employees. 












 allowing authorized mobile device 
to access organizational 
information from outside the 
organization physical boundary. 





Sig. (2-tailed) .537 .000 .000 
N 100 100 100 
 insiders' knowledge of the 







Sig. (2-tailed) .210 .004 .000 
N 100 100 100 
 insiders'  knowledge of methods 







Sig. (2-tailed) .014 .001 .000 
N 100 100 100 
insiders' knowledge of the 
potential value of the 









Sig. (2-tailed) .003 .000 .000 
N 100 100 100 
technically skilled insiders who 
violates the security for personal 
gain. 
Pearson Correlation .305 .311 .389 
Sig. (2-tailed) .002 .002 .000 
N 100 100 100 
 employees' level of technical 
sophistication. 
Pearson Correlation .200 .262
**
 .320 
Sig. (2-tailed) .047 .009 .001 
N 100 100 100 
 employees having formal training 






Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .281 .007 
N 100 100 100 
 high levels of access to IT 






Sig. (2-tailed) .094 .000 .000 
N 100 100 100 
 not promptly canceling access of 
ex-employees. 
Pearson Correlation .178 .131 .294 
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Correlations 










policy training and 
awareness. 
 allowing authorized mobile device 
to access organizational 
information from outside the 
organization physical boundary. 





Sig. (2-tailed) .177 .054 .005 
N 100 100 100 
 insiders' knowledge of the 







Sig. (2-tailed) .027 .008 .004 
N 100 100 100 
 insiders'  knowledge of methods 







Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 
N 100 100 100 
insiders' knowledge of the 
potential value of the 









Sig. (2-tailed) .002 .004 .003 
N 100 100 100 
technically skilled insiders who 
violates the security for personal 
gain. 
Pearson Correlation .468 .536 .314 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .001 
N 100 100 100 
 employees' level of technical 
sophistication. 
Pearson Correlation .224 .387
**
 .386 
Sig. (2-tailed) .025 .000 .000 
N 100 100 100 
 employees having formal training 






Sig. (2-tailed) .011 .216 .016 
N 100 100 100 
 high levels of access to IT 






Sig. (2-tailed) .017 .003 .073 
N 100 100 100 
 not promptly canceling access of 
ex-employees. 
Pearson Correlation .296 .456 .242 









~ 333 ~ 
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employees and the 
organization. 
 allowing authorized mobile device 
to access organizational 
information from outside the 
organization physical boundary. 





Sig. (2-tailed) .069 .122 .010 
N 100 100 100 
 insiders' knowledge of the 







Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .001 .000 
N 100 100 100 
 insiders'  knowledge of methods 







Sig. (2-tailed) .006 .221 .000 
N 100 100 100 
insiders' knowledge of the 
potential value of the 









Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .035 .000 
N 100 100 100 
technically skilled insiders who 
violates the security for personal 
gain. 
Pearson Correlation .494 .101 .416 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .317 .000 
N 100 100 100 
 employees' level of technical 
sophistication. 
Pearson Correlation .207 .270
**
 .398 
Sig. (2-tailed) .039 .007 .000 
N 100 100 100 
 employees having formal training 






Sig. (2-tailed) .305 .078 .095 
N 100 100 100 
 high levels of access to IT 






Sig. (2-tailed) .018 .185 .000 
N 100 100 100 
 not promptly canceling access of 
ex-employees. 
Pearson Correlation .366 -.016 .289 
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Correlations 
  insiders being  
motivated to harm 
their organization. 






by financial gain. 
 allowing authorized mobile device 
to access organizational 
information from outside the 
organization physical boundary. 





Sig. (2-tailed) .747 .054 .087 
N 100 100 100 
 insiders' knowledge of the 







Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .001 .024 
N 100 100 100 
 insiders'  knowledge of methods 







Sig. (2-tailed) .003 .000 .000 
N 100 100 100 
insiders' knowledge of the 
potential value of the 









Sig. (2-tailed) .133 .000 .000 
N 100 100 100 
technically skilled insiders who 
violates the security for personal 
gain. 
Pearson Correlation .471 .393 .482 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 
N 100 100 100 
 employees' level of technical 
sophistication. 
Pearson Correlation .355 .276
**
 .288 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .005 .004 
N 100 100 100 
 employees having formal training 






Sig. (2-tailed) .426 .276 .193 
N 100 100 100 
 high levels of access to IT 






Sig. (2-tailed) .141 .036 .013 
N 100 100 100 
 not promptly canceling access of 
ex-employees. 
Pearson Correlation .257 .371 .361 
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Correlations 















 allowing authorized mobile device 
to access organizational 
information from outside the 
organization physical boundary. 





Sig. (2-tailed) .023 .000 
 
N 100 100 100 
 insiders' knowledge of the 







Sig. (2-tailed) .222 .103 .071 
N 100 100 100 
 insiders'  knowledge of methods 







Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 
N 100 100 100 
insiders' knowledge of the 
potential value of the 









Sig. (2-tailed) .333 .020 .000 
N 100 100 100 
technically skilled insiders who 
violates the security for personal 
gain. 
Pearson Correlation .241 .169 .207 
Sig. (2-tailed) .016 .094 .039 
N 100 100 100 
 employees' level of technical 
sophistication. 
Pearson Correlation .225 .420
**
 .180 
Sig. (2-tailed) .024 .000 .074 
N 100 100 100 
 employees having formal training 






Sig. (2-tailed) .003 .000 .175 
N 100 100 100 
 high levels of access to IT 






Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .005 .000 
N 100 100 100 
 not promptly canceling access of 
ex-employees. 
Pearson Correlation .176 .164 .027 
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Correlations 
  insiders' 
knowledge of the 
methods used to 
detect insider 
threat behavior. 
 insiders'  
knowledge of 
methods to grant 




of the potential 




 allowing authorized mobile device 
to access organizational 
information from outside the 
organization physical boundary. 





Sig. (2-tailed) .071 .000 .000 
N 100 100 100 
 insiders' knowledge of the 










N 100 100 100 
 insiders'  knowledge of methods 







Sig. (2-tailed) .003 
 
.000 
N 100 100 100 
insiders' knowledge of the 
potential value of the 









Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .000 
 
N 100 100 100 
technically skilled insiders who 
violates the security for personal 
gain. 
Pearson Correlation .395 .425 .449 
Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 
N 100 100 100 
 employees' level of technical 
sophistication. 
Pearson Correlation .332 .485
**
 .330 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .000 .001 
N 100 100 100 
 employees having formal training 






Sig. (2-tailed) .091 .000 .627 
N 100 100 100 
 high levels of access to IT 






Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .002 
N 100 100 100 
 not promptly canceling access of 
ex-employees. 
Pearson Correlation .268 .388 .289 
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Correlations 





 employees' level of 
technical 
sophistication. 
 employees having 
formal training in 
computer science, 
IT or similar. 
 allowing authorized mobile device 
to access organizational 
information from outside the 
organization physical boundary. 





Sig. (2-tailed) .039 .074 .175 
N 100 100 100 
 insiders' knowledge of the 







Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .001 .091 
N 100 100 100 
 insiders'  knowledge of methods 







Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 
N 100 100 100 
insiders' knowledge of the 
potential value of the 









Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .001 .627 
N 100 100 100 
technically skilled insiders who 
violates the security for personal 
gain. 




N 100 100 100 
 employees' level of technical 
sophistication. 
Pearson Correlation .320 1
**
 .347 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 
 
.000 
N 100 100 100 
 employees having formal training 






Sig. (2-tailed) .231 .000 
 
N 100 100 100 
 high levels of access to IT 






Sig. (2-tailed) .010 .001 .002 
N 100 100 100 
 not promptly canceling access of 
ex-employees. 
Pearson Correlation .547 .221 .104 
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Correlations 
  high levels of 
access to IT 
systems given to 
employees. 
 not promptly 
canceling access of 
ex-employees. 
 high levels of trust 
given to 
employees. 
 allowing authorized mobile device 
to access organizational 
information from outside the 
organization physical boundary. 





Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .793 .000 
N 100 100 100 
 insiders' knowledge of the 







Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .007 .188 
N 100 100 100 
 insiders'  knowledge of methods 







Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .000 
N 100 100 100 
insiders' knowledge of the 
potential value of the 









Sig. (2-tailed) .002 .004 .006 
N 100 100 100 
technically skilled insiders who 
violates the security for personal 
gain. 
Pearson Correlation .257 .547 .235 
Sig. (2-tailed) .010 .000 .018 
N 100 100 100 
 employees' level of technical 
sophistication. 
Pearson Correlation .321 .221
**
 .278 
Sig. (2-tailed) .001 .027 .005 
N 100 100 100 
 employees having formal training 






Sig. (2-tailed) .002 .301 .000 
N 100 100 100 
 high levels of access to IT 









N 100 100 100 
 not promptly canceling access of 
ex-employees. 
Pearson Correlation .163 1 .232 















limited by shares. 





 a poor level of 
health and fitness 
among employees. 
 allowing authorized mobile device 
to access organizational 
information from outside the 
organization physical boundary. 





Sig. (2-tailed) .893 .117 .770 
N 100 100 100 
 insiders' knowledge of the 







Sig. (2-tailed) .222 .318 .356 
N 100 100 100 
 insiders'  knowledge of methods 







Sig. (2-tailed) .462 .736 .900 
N 100 100 100 
insiders' knowledge of the 
potential value of the 









Sig. (2-tailed) .450 .159 .742 
N 100 100 100 
technically skilled insiders who 
violates the security for personal 
gain. 
Pearson Correlation -.209 -.021 -.075 
Sig. (2-tailed) .037 .833 .460 
N 100 100 100 
 employees' level of technical 
sophistication. 
Pearson Correlation -.145 -.090
**
 .076 
Sig. (2-tailed) .149 .373 .451 
N 100 100 100 
 employees having formal training 






Sig. (2-tailed) .532 .049 .204 
N 100 100 100 
 high levels of access to IT 






Sig. (2-tailed) .060 .483 .358 
N 100 100 100 
 not promptly canceling access of 
ex-employees. 
Pearson Correlation .016 -.072 -.177 
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  psychological 




 personal factors 
such as alcohol 
and drug addiction 
or violent behavior. 
 inappropriate or 
concerning 
behavior  prior to 












 high levels of trust given to 
employees. 
Pearson Correlation .317 .207 .210 






organization ownership being 
limited by shares. 
Pearson Correlation .118 -.016 .094 






 lack of customer and/or client 
participation in product 
development. 
Pearson Correlation -.054 -.007 -.038 








 a poor level of health and fitness 
among employees. 
Pearson Correlation .056 .019 .160 
Sig. (2-tailed) .579 .854 .111 




given the same 
logical and/or 
physical access as 
the organization’s 
regular employees. 



















 high levels of trust given to 
employees. 
Pearson Correlation .383 .283 .255 
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 lack of customer and/or client 
participation in product 
development. 
Pearson Correlation -.125 -.172 .028 








 a poor level of health and fitness 
among employees. 
Pearson Correlation .064 .099 .018 
Sig. (2-tailed) .527 .327 .857 
N 100 100 100 
 
Correlations 










policy training and 
awareness. 







 high levels of trust given to 
employees. 
Pearson Correlation .295 .266 .190 






organization ownership being 
limited by shares. 
Pearson Correlation -.271 -.195 -.142 






 lack of customer and/or client 
participation in product 
development. 
Pearson Correlation -.116 -.080 .031 








 a poor level of health and fitness 
among employees. 
Pearson Correlation -.077 -.107 .004 
Sig. (2-tailed) .449 .290 .967 
N 100 100 100 
 
Correlations 










employees and the 
organization. 
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organization ownership being 
limited by shares. 
Pearson Correlation -.041 .126 .054 






 lack of customer and/or client 
participation in product 
development. 
Pearson Correlation -.153 -.031 .005 








 a poor level of health and fitness 
among employees. 
Pearson Correlation -.126 .067 .105 
Sig. (2-tailed) .212 .510 .296 
N 100 100 100 
 
Correlations 
  insiders being  
motivated to harm 
their organization. 






by financial gain. 







 high levels of trust given to 
employees. 
Pearson Correlation .164 .279 .315 






organization ownership being 
limited by shares. 
Pearson Correlation -.139 -.072 -.179 






 lack of customer and/or client 
participation in product 
development. 
Pearson Correlation -.198 -.130 -.351 








 a poor level of health and fitness 
among employees. 
Pearson Correlation -.131 -.015 -.105 
Sig. (2-tailed) .193 .884 .296 
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 high levels of trust given to 
employees. 
Pearson Correlation .419 .327 .354 






organization ownership being 
limited by shares. 
Pearson Correlation .067 .003 .014 






 lack of customer and/or client 
participation in product 
development. 
Pearson Correlation .104 .085 .158 








 a poor level of health and fitness 
among employees. 
Pearson Correlation .247 .125 .030 
Sig. (2-tailed) .013 .215 .770 
N 100 100 100 
 
Correlations 
  insiders' 
knowledge of the 
methods used to 
detect insider 
threat behavior. 
 insiders'  
knowledge of 
methods to grant 




of the potential 











 high levels of trust given to 
employees. 
Pearson Correlation .133 .555 .274 






organization ownership being 
limited by shares. 
Pearson Correlation -.123 -.074 -.076 













 lack of customer and/or client 
participation in product 
development. 
Pearson Correlation -.101 -.034 -.142 








 a poor level of health and fitness 
among employees. 
Pearson Correlation -.093 .013 -.033 
Sig. (2-tailed) .356 .900 .742 
N 100 100 100 
 
Correlations 





 employees' level of 
technical 
sophistication. 
 employees having 
formal training in 
computer science, 
IT or similar. 







 high levels of trust given to 
employees. 
Pearson Correlation .235 .278 .589 






organization ownership being 
limited by shares. 
Pearson Correlation -.209 -.145 .063 






 lack of customer and/or client 
participation in product 
development. 
Pearson Correlation -.021 -.090 .197 








 a poor level of health and fitness 
among employees. 
Pearson Correlation -.075 .076 .128 
Sig. (2-tailed) .460 .451 .204 
N 100 100 100 
 
Correlations 
  high levels of 
access to IT 
systems given to 
employees. 
 not promptly 
canceling access of 
ex-employees. 
 high levels of trust 
given to 
employees. 
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organization ownership being 
limited by shares. 
Pearson Correlation -.189 .016 .006 






 lack of customer and/or client 
participation in product 
development. 
Pearson Correlation .071 -.072 .131 








 a poor level of health and fitness 
among employees. 
Pearson Correlation .093 -.177 .186 
Sig. (2-tailed) .358 .079 .065 





limited by shares. 





 a poor level of 
health and fitness 
among employees. 







 high levels of trust given to 
employees. 
Pearson Correlation .006 .131 .186 






organization ownership being 
limited by shares. 









 lack of customer and/or client 
participation in product 
development. 
Pearson Correlation .400 1 .449 










 a poor level of health and fitness 
among employees. 
Pearson Correlation .241 .449 1 
Sig. (2-tailed) .016 .000 
 
N 100 100 100 
 
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
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Appendix 3: Invitation Letter 
 
Curtin University  
School of Information Systems 
 
 
A study of insider threat behaviour: Developing a holistic framework 
 
 
My name is Asmaa Munshi. I am a doctoral candidate in the school of information 
systems at Curtin University in Western Australia. I am conducting research into 
insider threat behaviour. My research aims to identify factors that are correlated with 
the insider threat behaviour. 
 
This email is seeking your permission to participate in an email interview to evaluate 
my draft insider threat model. This process will take more than one email between 
me and you to discuss this issue. If you decide to participate, you will be asked to 
complete a couple of questions about insider threat contributing factors from your 
perspective and experience. The interview will start with general questions regarding 
the insider threat cases that you have experienced and then asking you to evaluate my 
model about insider threat factors. Your participation is anonymous and your identity 
will not be published or disclosed. 
 
This research aims to minimize the problems of the insider threat by providing a 
management framework how to manage insider behaviour and increase the users’ 
awareness. The contributions of this research are applicable to businesses and users’ 
needs, especially in security and IT departments. 
 
I will keep you updated on my results of this study and at the end of my degree I will 
share with you my management framework. 
 
 
If you would like to participate, please contact me at the email or number listed 
below to discuss your participation and email you the "participant information sheet" 
to understand more about my study, and later we can start off the interview. 
 
Your help and cooperation is highly appreciated 
 
With kind regards, 
Asmaa Munshi 
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Phone number: +61423507092 
E-mail: a.munshi@postgrad.curtin.edu.au
Appendix 4: Participant Information Sheet 
 
Curtin University  
School of Information System 
 
 




My name is Asmaa Munshi; I am a PhD student at Curtin University, and 
I am conducting research into insider threat behaviour, in particular my 
research aim to identify factors that are correlated with this issue.  
 
Introduction  
Any security system relies upon its operators, even if it is designed and implemented 
in a perfect manner. Organisations face ongoing threats and attacks from external and 
internal sources. Insider attacks are associated with legitimate users who abuse their 
privileges and can easily cause significant damage or loss to an organisation. The 
overall aim of this research is to develop a conceptual insider threat model that can 
frame a holistic view of insider threat behaviour and inform the deviloping of a 
framework to manage the insider threat. Previous research in this area focused on 
quite narrow and specific areas and most of the models and frameworks developed so 
far specialise in either people to people relationships, segmentation of tasks, access 
to information or network architectures. Little research published so far gives a 
bigger picture in regard to insider threat behaviour. Therefore, this research amis to 
gain a holistic view of the insider threat through understanding the factors that 
influence insider threat behaviour, both by individuals and organisations, and then 
develop a framework which centres on security measures to manage insider threat 
behaviour.  
Purpose of Research 
This research will minimize the problem of the insider threat by providing a 
management framework to manage insider behaviour and increase the awareness of 
users. The contributions of this research are applicable to business and user needs 
especially in security and IT departments. 
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 To gather information about factors that influences the insider to behave 
inappropriately with to manage these factors. 
 The primary point of these interviews is to evaluate my insider threat model. 
 
 
 The results and recommendations obtain from the interviews will helps me to 
enhance and improve my model. 
Please note: 
• The interview process will take approximately 45 minutes. 
• The interview will be recorded to help with deciphering and analysing. 
• Your privacy is greatly respected and any information that could identify you 
will not be published at any time. 
• All information will be stored in a secure location at Curtin University for 
five years. 
• Taking part is voluntary and you can withdrawal at any time.  
• Your withdrawal would not affect you in any way.  
Thank you very much for you time.  Please keep this letter for your 
information. 
 
This study has been approved under Curtin University's process for lower-risk Studies (Approval Number 
IS_12_31). This process complies with the National Statement on Ethical Conduct in Human Research (Chapter 
5.1.7 and Chapters 5.1.18-5.1.21).For further information on this study contact the researchers named above on 
0423507092 or the Curtin University Human Research Ethics Committee. c/- Office of Research and 
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School of Information Systems 
 
 





• I understand the purpose and procedures of the study.  
 
• I have been provided with the participant information sheet.  
 
• I understand that the procedure itself may not benefit me.  
 
• I understand that my involvement is voluntary and I can withdraw at any time without 
problem.  
 
• I understand that no personal identifying information like my name and address will be 
used and that all information will be securely stored for 5 years before being destroyed.  
 
• I have been given the opportunity to ask questions.  
 
















Investigator: Asmaa Munshi                   
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Appendix 6: Semi-structured Interview Questions 
 
 
1- I would like to start with your experience how long you have been work and what is your job 
title? 
 
2- As security specialists, what does "insider threat" mean to you?  
 
3- Have you experienced any cases of insider threat in your organisation?  
a. Share with us this experience. 
 
4- Are there any risk factors that we should look out for? Are there any evidences that someone 
might be an insider? 
 
5- "Conflict between the organisation and an individual who is willing and able to seek personal 
gain at the organisation's expense". 
a. Share with us your perspective behind the risk of insider threat and effect on the 
organisation?   
b. From your perspective how to minimize this problem?  
c. Do you have any suggestion strategies to address this issue?  
 
6- Out of your experience, do you agree that giving high trust to underachieving employee may 
affect the insider threat behaviour? 
a. If yes Why, if no Why not?   
b. What are your thoughts to minimize this problem?  
c. Do you have any suggestion strategies to address this issue?  
 
7- Outside influence: employees' background, employees coercion by outsider or the use of 
outsourced employees.  
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b. What is your opinion to minimize this problem?  
 
8- Do you agree that "knowledge of the insiders especially their awareness about the methods used 
to detect insider threat behaviour" can influence the insider to behave inappropriately? 
a. If yes Why, if no Why not?   
b. How this problem could be minimized in your estimation?  
 
9-  From your experience, do you think "Insufficient security policy" increase the insider threat 
behaviour? 
a. If yes Why, if no Why not?   
b. What are your thoughts to minimize this problem?  
c. Do you have any suggestion strategies to address this issue?  
 
10- Out of your knowledge, can you please give any example how social isolated workers increase 
the risk of insider threat behaviour?  
a. What are your ideas to minimize this problem?  
b. Do you have any suggestion strategies to address this issue?  
 
11- "Liberal access for the employees" 
a. From your experience, can you please define liberal access? 
b. How liberal access can influence the insider to behave wrongly?   
c. What are your thoughts to minimize this problem?  
d. Do you have any suggestion strategies to address this issue?  
 
12-  "Loyalty of workers" 
a. How loyalty may affect the insider threat behaviour?   
b. From your experience, how this problem can be minimized? 
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Factors Contributing to Insider Threat Behaviour 
 
14- If you could add any factors to the model or delete any factors from the model, what would it 
be? Why these specific factors are essential? 
 
15- Based on your experience, what are the factors you consider more common than others? Why 
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Appendix 7: Interview Sample Script 
 
1- I would like to start with your experience how long you have been work and 
what is your job title? 
 
My job title is the Chief Information Security Officer. I've been involved in the 
security industry for over thirty years, and have attained certifications in both the 
traditional/physical and IT security environments (CPP and CISSP designations). 
 
2-  As security specialists, what does "insider threat" mean to you?  
What does insider threat mean to me? 
 
My definition of an insider threat is the possible avenues an 
employee/contractor/volunteer could use to compromise an organization's People, 
Property or Information. An insider threat is one of the most difficult to defend 
against because an employee/contractor/volunteer inherently has a pre-defined level 
of access to an organization's resources. It is this access, or the escalation of access, 
that leads to most insider threats being realized. 
 
3- Have you experienced any cases of insider threat in your organisation?  
Share with us this experience? 
 
 In the earlier phases of my career, I was exposed to insider threats and the 
consequences of these threats being realized. In one case, a previous organization I 
worked at was targeted by corporate espionage teams, seeking to gain greater market 
share. An employee was hired into one of my previous employer's workspace, this 
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marketing plans for an increasing market and then left the company after stealing 
company marketing plans. My organization suffered a direct loss from this event, but 
we could not criminally prove the charge. 
The case I identified was attributed to corporate espionage. The actor was motivated 
by greed to steal the marketing plan and provide it to a competitor. We were unable 
to determine if the other corporation had compromised our employee (i.e. blackmail, 
veiled threat, etc.). 
 
4- Are there any risk factors that we should look out for? Are there any 
evidences that someone might be an insider? 
 
Again, my perspective of insider threats is from the corporate world. We categorized 
them into unplanned/opportunistic and planned threat vectors. As for clues, there- are 
a number of indicators that have consistently been uncovered during post-incident 
reviews. These include: 
- an employee is identified to have poor credit or is in significant financial hardship 
- an employee is displaying negative or neutral behaviour at work: either 
withdrawing from some social groups, or expressing anger/disappointment to the 
organization 
- an employee is displaying a sudden interest in areas outside of their scope of 
control. The interest begins quietly enough, but becomes more persistent over time. 
- an employee may be suffering marital problems, or problems with loved ones at 
home 
- an employee begins to display aggressive behaviour in meetings, or with co-
workers 
- an employee begins to display odd or out of character work habits: showing up 
early or on weekends, staying late, working through lunch hours. 
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From a technical perspective, there are indicators as well: 
- increased attempts to access confidential files/folders from outside the department 
- increased use of remote access software, during off business hours 
- increased file transfer activity during off business hours, either on premise or via 
remote connection. 
- Attempts to increase privilege levels for "typical" business system users. 
- Fumbled or aggressive calls to a help desk team to try and change someone's user 
ID/password that has higher privileges than other accounts. 
- Increased traffic to social media sites, or to POP email accounts. 
- increased file transfer traffic to upload sites, or to personal POP email accounts 
 
 
5- "Conflict between the organisation and an individual who is willing and able 
to seek personal gain at the organisation's expense". 
 
a- Can you please give any example from your experience how previous 
sentence increase the risk of insider threat and affect and organisation? 
  
My personal experience, from previous positions, is that an insider with a real or 
perceived conflict with an organization is a greater threat than from an outside 
party. A motivated actor with inside access to assets, etc. has greater opportunity 
to impact an organization. 
 
In previous organizations, I dealt with an inside threat stemming from an 
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employee had justified the offense by stating they were upset at the organization 
not providing full benefits while on leave, and then took advantage of the 
corporation by working for a competitor. While we were unable to fully estimate 
the damage, we did identify that some information was missing and eventually 
attributed the loss to the employee. 
 
b- From your perspective how to minimize this problem?  
 
Keep the employees happy. Build with them an air of trust & rapport; keep listening 
from them through weekly casual social meetings if they are having any rough times 
or complaints against the organization. Moreover, an organization must have well-
established control frameworks in place to manage, review and audit access to assets 
by employees. The assets could be the organization's people, property or information 
but each type of asset can have a series of controls in place to limit access and/or 
reduce threats by malicious forces. 
 
c- Do you have any suggestion strategies to address this issue?  
- Review the Recruitment policy in a way that personality screening is 
done through an expert who can foresee problems from a potential 
employee. 
- Review HR policy in organization for bonuses, appreciations and 
rewards. No stone must be unturned to keep employees loyal 
&happy.  
- Weekly social gathering (e.g. breakfast) to add some social spice to 
the team. 
- Define and execute severe punitive actions for employees found 
doing breaching so that others would refrain from trying similar 
actions in future. 
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- Team-building & Leadership skills (Leading is the best way to 
Manage)  
- Internal threat analysis screening skills 
 
6- Out of your experience, do you agree that giving high trust to underachieving 
employee may affect the insider threat behaviour? 
 
a- If yes Why, if no Why not?   
 
 Yes it does. The probability of risks from employees with low performance and lack 
of core capabilities is very high. The problem becomes even greater if they had a 
high degree of trust and access.  
 
b- What are your thoughts to minimize this problem?  
 
- Review and provide adequate training to low performers lacking 
skills. 
- Personality and Suitability check of other low performers (seeming to 
lack core capabilities) and assign them better suited responsibilities as 
per their capabilities. 
- Downsize employees not needed. 
 
c- Do you have any suggestion strategies to address this issue?  
 
Apart from above mentioned: 
- Periodic evaluation of employees for performance and root cause 
analysis to perform the above mentioned. 
- Organization internal roles and responsibilities must be reviewed in 
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down the stream i.e. the most critical data stays with the top order and 




7- Outside influence: employees' background, employees’ coercion by outsider 
or the use of outsourced employees. 
 
a- How outside influence increase the risk of insider threat behaviour?   
 
Increased risks in all such cases 
- Weak values and less moral personalities. 
- People doing multiple and similar jobs 
- Outsourcers may deploy staff to steal info. Also outsourced resources 
are less careful (why should they care?) 
- What is your opinion to minimize this problem?  
- Reduce outsourcing: Capitalize on own resources.  
- Signatures on stringent NDA (Non-Disclosure Agreements) signed 
with all employees specially the outsourcer company.  
- NDAs (Non-Disclosure Agreements) are important entities that 
secure organizations against vulnerabilities. In most simplified words, 
these are agreements that the invited parties will not steal, sell, 
misuse the information while working in or for that organization. If 
violations done, the organization can sue the violators in court. 
- All organizations (wherever applicable) must get NDAs signed with:  
o its employees (as part of recruitment)  
o any outsourcing companies who'll send staff to this 
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Roles and responsibilities review as I stated above. 
- Special provisions in all employee contracts barring them to do 
multiple similar jobs. 
- Provisions in HR for severe punitive actions as stated above. 
8-  Do you agree that "knowledge of the insiders especially their awareness 
about the methods used to detect insider threat behaviour" can influence the 
insider to behave inappropriately? 
 
a- If yes Why, if no Why not?   
 
Obviously, if the insiders know how their posed threats or actions are detected, 
they’ll find out ways to compromise the measures taken. As a matter of fact, any 
risks can be mitigated or minimized; they can never be eliminated to zero level. Our 
concern must always be to have least possible residual risk.  
 
I believe an insider’s knowledge about existing controls (or lack thereof) can 
influence behaviour.  If an insider has the requisite motivation and opportunity, and 
if they learn that there is a limited chance of being detected, all three components of 
an event/theft/etc. triangle are present. 
 
Reducing the likelihood of an insider threat being realized requires a detailed 
knowledge of internal processes and controls.  In many cases, the lack of controls in 
place to monitor or enforce behaviour places an organization at risk.  If an 
organization spends the time to identify where they are at risk from insider threats, 
appropriate controls can be put into place to:  restrict access to sensitive information, 
enforce the “separation of duties” required for financial transactions, and create a 
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a- How this problem could be minimized in your estimation?  
 
Here are some suggestions that hopefully illustrate my point: 
- Limit access to sensitive files to only those employees with a business need to 
know, and ensure adequate automated logging/monitoring mechanisms are in 
place to audit access to information (what was seen, what was done, who did 
it, etc.). 
- Ensure employees are restricted to what they can do in financial systems.  
You may even want to physically separate the Accounts Payable from the 
Accounts Receivable teams, to reduce the likelihood of collusion. 
- Create a “two man” rule for major research projects or product launches.  
Don’t simply rely on just one individual – ensure there are others involved in 
key projects, particularly sensitive projects with a direct impact to the 
organizations’ well-being (i.e. new product launch). 
- Layer auditing and control mechanisms into every automated system (i.e. file 
sharing systems, financial applications).  If auditing and logging capabilities 
are present, enable them and regularly review them for suspicious behaviour. 
- Inform your staff that monitoring and compliance programs are in place.  In 
many cases, simply educating your staff that controls are in place, and 
consequences exist, will deter some of the more “opportunistic” behaviour. 
 
 
9- From your experience, do you think “insufficient security policy” increases 
the insider threat behaviour? 
 
a- If yes Why, if no Why not?   
 
Absolutely!  This has been one of the most telling indicators of potential insider 
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management. The most effective ways to avoid leakages are sufficient policies and 
security procedures. These are pillars to avoid insider threats. Without them, no 
measures could be practical & effective. 
 
b- What are your thoughts to minimize this problem?  
 
There’s really only one way to address this – ensure the senior management team 
endorses the requirement for policy, compliance and enforcement.  Without senior 
management consent, any security program will be meaningless. 
 
One suggestion that has worked for me in the past is to regularly engage senior 
management not only on the need for such a program, but the benefits to the 
organization if a program/policy/process/enforcement mechanism are in place.  
Employees that know what is expected of them, and understand there is a 
consequence for their actions, typically perform better than those who do not have a 
clear understanding of their role regarding security, etc. 
 
- Development of efficient and sufficient policies & procedures   
- Concentration of propriety information on the upper nodes of organization 
staff (as described in the previous question). 
- Periodic management audit of procedures and policies for effectiveness and 
practice. 
- Update of policies after regular intervals. Many things happen in passing 
years. 
- Do you have any suggestion strategies to address this issue?  
- Policy & Procedure development by people very much experienced in this 
area (technical and human sciences) 












10- Out of your knowledge, do you think that "social isolated workers" can 
increase the risk of insider threat behaviour? 
 
a- If yes Why, if no Why not?  
 
Yes. Socially isolated workers are greater threats. The reason behind in my view is 
the personal factors which is the major cause of leakages. Breathing in a friendly & 
social environment (psychologically) adds lots to get people stay human & ethical. 
This applies equally to night shift workers and other people who have to work in 
isolated work areas (like Finance, Programming or monitoring service departments). 
 
b- Can you please give any example? 
 
One of my client companies in my old organization was a top-notch Technology 
Retailer focusing on the big-shots. An employee there was working as the database 
administrator & programmer and was working in a somehow socially isolated 
environment (language and culture barriers). Someone noticed that at some point of 
time later, he was found offering elite class SMS advertising service to people (he 
offered on a social network). What he did in fact was to steal mobile numbers from 
the customers list in his company database and then use them as target audiences for 
his advertising. Based on my assessment, the factors to make him so were majorly 
social. 
 
c- What are your ideas to minimize this problem? And do you have any 







~ 363 ~ 
 
- Weekly social gathering (e.g. breakfast) to add some social spice to the team. 
- Engaging the workforce on multiple levels is one method of reducing the 
potential for this type of threat to be realized.  Not every employee will 
engage in every activity, but if employees are valued and they perceive their 
value to the organization, the risk of an insider threat being realized will 
diminish. 
- Improve Managers: Train managers (bi-yearly for example) for Team-
building, Socialism & Leadership skills (Leading is the best way to Manage). 
 
 
11- "Liberal access for the employees" 
 
a- From your experience, can you please define liberal access? 
 
Unnecessary open-minded access to facilities allowed to employees.  Sometimes 
given for convenience, and sometimes just for nothing. 
 
b- How liberal access can influence the insider to behave wrongly?   
 
With pure information security point of view, liberal access is sometimes simply 
wrong and sometimes it’s very wrong. But the most immediate disadvantage of 
stopping it is killing the convenience. So we must control it, not stop it in full. For 
example I’m checking my mail 24/7 on my iPhone. If they stop my access, I’ll have 
to stay in my office to check my mail. This is impractical for people like me who 
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Liberal Access for insiders in nothing more than a convenience to cheat. They can 
show their mails, other confidential info to anyone they like. Liberal access to 
systems will allow them program or tame policies applied on systems as they like. 
 
Liberal Access poses external threats too. For example, what if an authorized 
smartphone is stolen. Or what if an employee with liberal access corrupts the IPS and 
IDS (Intrusion detection & prevention systems). Many external sources will be able 
to break into and steal whatever they like.  
 
c- What are your thoughts to minimize this problem? And do you have any 
suggestion strategies to address this issue?  
 
There are a number of controls an organization can put into place to minimize this 
type of risk. A solid control framework, focused on the "least access" privilege 
principle, is an excellent first step to securing access to resources. These resources 
may be your people, property or information. 
 
User education and training is another key component for reducing the potential for 
employees to unintentionally misuse their level of access. Employees should be 
aware of their roles in keeping information secure, and know how to report 
potentially suspicious activity like someone gaining inappropriate access to 
resources. 
 
Selecting the "right" employee during the hiring process is also a part of the overall 
control framework. If an organization can take the right steps to hire the "right" 
employee (i.e. using reference checks, financial/criminal checks, background 
investigation and behavior interviews/tests), the organization can minimize the risk 
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Separation of duties and responsibilities must also be in place to reduce this type of 
risk. Accurately defining a job role and responsibility and then ensuring any 
corresponding positions have different access will immediately reduce this level of 
risk. 
 
12- "Loyalty of workers" 
 
a- How loyalty may affect the insider threat behaviour?   
 
Hugely! much more than any other factors. I know there are studies that have 
assessed employee loyalty, and tried to gauge their response to scenarios. I can't 
remember which study I read, but if an employee does feel some fealty to the 
organization, they are less likely to do something inappropriate. There must be a 
level of trust, reward and reciprocation between the employee and the organization 
beyond the simple employment contract. 
 
b- From your experience, how this problem can be minimized? And do you have 
any suggestion strategies to address this issue?  
 
Loyalty is not something we can impose onto someone. It has to come from inside 
the personality of the recruited and appointed person. And then it must be respected 
in three ways. 
- Encourage motives to ascertain loyalty (bonuses, appreciations, social 
ingredients, job satisfaction with other colleagues) 
- Discourage motives to disloyal anyone (injustice, ignorance, doubting 
someone in the wrong way) 
- Prevention of external factors like distributed loyalty (working at 2 different 
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13-  Do you have any documentation or guideline in your organisation about risk 
factors? 
 
a- If yes, does it include some of the factors that we have discussed in this 
interview?   
 
We do try to assess the risks to our organization from insiders, and have deployed 
most if not all of the controls I've talked about over these past few questions. In 
general, we have discussed almost everything (if not everything) in this interview. In 
previous organizations, I was successful in deploying all of these controls and a few 
more, to reduce the risks we were facing from individuals trying to leverage their 
access to resources for personal gain. 
 
Unfortunately, it sometimes takes being victimized by insider threats to make these 
changes occur. Earlier in my career, I was with an organization that not only lost 
market share, but proprietary information to a competitor. It turned out an employee, 
with unrestricted access, was able to download and sell information on sales plans, 
etc. That was really an eye opener for me - and made me much more aware of what 
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INSIDER THREAT BEHAVIOURAL MODEL 
 
 
Factors Contributing to Insider Threat Behaviour 
 
 
14- If you could add any factors to the model or delete any factors from the 
model, what would it be? Why these specific factors are essential? 
 
As for your model - I really like it. I don't think I'd add or subtract from the model or 
its definitions. I think it encompasses the components of insider threats, and 
identifies the most common aspects of how an organization is impacted by the 
insider. 
 
15- Based on your experience, what are the factors you consider more common 
than others? Why these specific factors? 
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 Conflict between the organization and an individual who is willing and able to 
seek personal gain at the organisation's expense.  
 Outside influence on workers.  
 To support a cause 
 Loyalty of workers.  
 Personality Issues 
 The perfect crime.  
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